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Abstract. 
Instability in financial markets has occupied much time in the fmancial and popular press over the past 
three years. Questions have been raised as to the structure and fmancial robustness of emerging market 
exchanges in the face of higher volatility and extreme capital flows. This study aims to see how the South 
African spot and futures markets have fared under these conditions. In order to establish whether the above-
mentioned South African markets have absorbed the instability successfully a benchmark was needed. In 
this regard this study has chosen the pricing mechanism as a benchmark to establish the South African 
markets' resilience. The aim of the study is to determine how the pricing efficiency of the futures market 
(in relation to the spot market) has behaved during the emerging market crises and how it has reacted to 
changing volatility. In the event the pricing efficiency breaks down this would lead one to conclude that the 
markets were adversely affected by the crisis and in the event the pricing efficiency remained efficient and 
stable one would be able to conclude that the markets successfully negotiated the emerging market shocks. 
The development of the futures market, underlying spot, volumes and price movements are analysed in the 
study over a lO-year period. This allows one to contrast structural differences in the market over the period 
and draw some conclusions as to how the market handled them. This also includes an examination of the 
regulatory framework. 
The pricing efficiency is examined primarily by looking at the arbitrage gap between the fair value of the 
futures, as determined using the cash and carry pricing mechanism, and the actual traded values of the 
futures contracts. This has resulted in the need for certain assumptions to be drawn as to the actual fair cost 
of carrying a position (this would include interest rates and transaction costs). In response to this an 
application was developed, called the futures fair value calculator, which allows one to change the 
parameters and view the impact on the arbitrage gap. The variables chosen for the purpose of this study are 
believed to be market norms. 
After building the fair value calculator and assessing the arbitrage gap the findings were that there are 
arbitrage opportunities, which in turn implies the market does display inefficiencies (the pricing mechanism 
breaks down). The incidence of these inefficiencies is shown to decrease as the futures market matures over 
the past 10 years. The inefficiencies are magnified with the emerging market shocks taking place, but are 
not necessarily found to be due to volatility. It is suggested that the inefficiencies come from other market 
influences with the primary possibility being isolated as the securities lending market. 
The market volatility is determined by looking at two models, a traditional model and a GARCH 
(Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model. Each show there to be an increase in 
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the general volatility levels between the period prior to the emerging markets crises occurring and post the 
emerging markets crises occurring. The GARCH model shows an approximate doubling of volatility levels 
over the two periods. 
Both the volatility models are compared to the arbitrage gap and the study finds little or no relationship 
between volatility and the size of the arbitrage gap. This suggests that volatility either has little or no effect 
on the breaking down of the pricing efficiency. The GARCH-modeled volatility does exhibit a closer 
relationship between the volatility of the market and the size of the arbitrage gap, but the relationship is not 
close enough to be significant. This suggests that there is a weak relationship between volatility and market 
pricing efficiency. This relationship does not seem to be causal but rather that the increased volatility could 
highlight other market weaknesses that lead to the inefficiency. 
The study concludes by highlighting a number of opportunities for further studies as well as a possible for 
financial innovation and product development in the area ofETF'g (Exchange traded funds), basket trading 
and securities lending. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
With the creation of the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) in 1988 (Lambrechts, 1990 : 1) futures 
trading has become an increasing feature of the South African Financial Markets. Turnover within SAFEX 
has grown since its inception. Coupled to this are the new influences that the South African Financial 
Markets have experienced. Since the democratisation of South Africa, there has been an increasing 
involvement of foreign participants in our financial markets. This foreign involvement has brought an 
increased demand for derivative products. This can best be seen when South African companies issued 
convertible debentures in Europe (Counihan & Malherbe, 1999 : 13), this led to foreign fmancial 
institutions wanting to borrow the shares of these South African companies to be able to lock in arbitrage 
profits, where the convertible bonds differed from their theoretical values. In this case the demand was not 
for derivative products, but it does illustrate the injection of more sophisticated trading strategies into the 
South African Markets. 
The arbitrage opportunities created by the issue of the convertible bonds could also exist with the issuance 
of SAFE X futures. Like the bonds, the futures have a theoretical value (which will be discussed below-
see chapter three) and when the actual value differs from this theoretical value. arbitrage opportunities are 
created. 
This increased involvement of foreign institutions in South African fmancial markets leads to some 
interesting questions. Exactly how efficiently priced are SAFEX futures? How effective are SAFEX listed 
futures in facilitating effective arbitrage operations? What arbitrage opportunities exist between SAFEX 
futures and their underlying spots? To this end research has been performed on the efficiency of SAFEX 
futures, discussed in detail in chapter 6 but only between the years of 1989 and 1991. Since then South 
African Financial Markets have undergone significant changes relating not only to the increasing 
involvement of foreign participants, but also to the spot market. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
has increased its liquidity by enacting numerous changes, which are collectively known as the JSE's "Big 
Bang" (JSE, 1999 : history.htm). The first change was to allow of brokers to transact in a dual capacity. 
Prior to this the brokers were only able to transact in an agency capacity. The relaxing of the regulations to 
let them hold stock has increased the liquidity in the JSE - the brokers could now supply the orders of their 
clients from their own pools of stocks. Secondly banks and foreigners were allowed to obtain membership 
or ownership of JSE brokers. The above changes occurred on 8 November 1995 (JSE, 1999 : history.htm). 
Thirdly liquidity within the JSB increased further with the introduction of the JET (Johannesburg Equity 
Trading) System. This electronic trading system was implemented over a three-month period from 8 March 
1996 to 7 June 1996, by which stage all of the JSE's listed securities were converted from the floor trading 
system (JSE, 1999: history.htm). 
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Collectively, all these changes led to a change in the number of deals on the JSE from 762091 in 1995 to 3 
655 200 in 1998 - a percentage change of380%. These deals had a value of R 63 247 million in 1995 and 
R 319 334 million in 1998 a percentage change of 405% (JSE 1998 : Market Profile 1). The above figures 
exclude arbitrage transactions. Since 1995 the increase in the number of arbitrage transactions has 
increased by 63% while the value of these deals has increased by 311 % (JSE 1998 : Market Profile 1). See 
table 1.1 for more detail. 
Table 1.1 - Turnover on the JSE Equities Market - 1995 to 1998. 
Descri I:2tion 1998 1997 1996 1995 
Excluding Arbitrage 
Value (R million) 319334 206542 117099 63247 
Percentage change 55% 76% 85% NA 
Number of Deals 3655200 2343957 1440240 762091 
Percentage change 56% 63% 89% NA 
Volume (Million) 34412 17850 8993 5148 
Percentage change 93% 98% 75% NA 
Arbitrage 
Value (R million) 89118 67612 41474 21700 
Percentage change 32% 63% 91% NA 
Number of Deals 96622 115387 100089 59128 
Percentage change -16% 15% 69% NA 
Volume (Million) 4256 3164 1798 1029 
Percentage change 35% 76% 75% NA 
(JSE 1998 : Market Profile 1) 
The above changes in the spot market, combined with the influx of the foreign financial institutions, leads 
one to conclude that the efficiency studies conducted in the early 1990's need to be updated. 
Another factor that has affected the use of futures in South Africa has been the proliferation oflocal 
Investment Banks and financial services companies. In October 1999 there were a number of these 
institutions that did not exist in 1995 (See Appendix 1.1 for Investment Banks and Financial Services 
companies that did not exist on 1 January 1995). Investment Banks such as PSG Investment Bank and 
institutions such as Cadiz have contributed to the increased usage of derivative instruments. In its 
prospectus, Cadiz states, as part its business "the provision of .... Strategies to ... clients in the bond, bond 
derivative and equity derivative markets" (Cadiz, 1999 : 17). This illustrates how local institutions are 
becoming more involved in sophisticated derivative transactions. In order for these derivatives to be used, 
some understanding needs to exist of how efficiently priced they are, if they are to be used for hedging 
purposes. 
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In addition to the above changes, the South African Markets have experienced turbulence in the past two 
years (beginning in October 1997) with the emergence ofa series of market "crises". Together with an 
update on the efficiency of the South African Futures Market, this study will focus on the past two years 
and determine what impact this turbulence has had on SAFEX pricing efficiency. 
1.1 Background. 
Research has been undertaken on the pricing efficiency of South African Futures (Levett, 1991; Mitchell. 
1989; Snell, 1990; Lambrechts, 1990). Lambrechts concluded that it was not possible to determine if the 
South African Futures Market is inefficient or not, in this case six tests were applied to determine the 
efficiency of the pricing of selected futures. Four for the six tests concluded the futures were efficiently 
priced and the other two concluded to the contrary. Mitchell (1989) found that selected futures he tested 
were efficient whereas others were not. Specifically, Mitchell tested whether E 168 (Eskom 168) futures 
were more efficient than BA (Bankers Acceptance) futures. Mitchell found that both markets exhibited 
inefficiencies. Mitchell also tested whether volumes affect pricing efficiency. He found that there is no link 
between volumes and pricing efficiency. Levett's (1991) findings were that the SAFEX futures were 
efficiently priced, although regression analysis did identify some inefficiencies (most of the time the futures 
were efficiently priced). Levett applied hedging strategies to determine how effectively hedging operations 
could be performed using SAFEX futures. He concluded that using numerous hedging methods, one could 
engage in some form of hedging using SAFEX futures, however, some hedging models had more success 
than others. Snell (1990) concluded that the futures he analysed were not efficiently priced. He did this by 
examining the futures market over the period 1987 to 1989 to see whether market performance had 
improved over the period. 
This study aims to add to this body of research by examining the effects of market volatility on the 
efficiency of SAFEX futures as well as updating the efficiency studies undertaken in the late 1980's and 
early.1990's. 
South Africa is now part of the global economy and the efficiency of our markets is of importance 
for us to remain an active part of that economy. If our derivatives markets are not adequately efficient. the 
capital flows into our markets could be hampered as hedging operations would lose their effectiveness and 
foreign investment could be lured away to more efficient markets. This highlights the importance of 
periodically updating our knowledge of the efficiency of our derivative markets. 
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Coupled to this is the volatility our market has experienced during the past two years. The 
"emerging market crises" which have been attributed to this, have been the subject of attention in the 
financial press and this study will quantify how the SAFEX futures have reacted to this. This is important 
to examine as it will give some insight into the resilience of the SAFEX futures to market shocks and the 
overall state of the South African markets during this period of market difficulty. 
1.2 Definitions. 
For a detailed list of definitions see Appendix 1.2. 
1.3 The Research Problem. 
One of the primary functions ofa market is to promote price discovery (Collings, 1993 :30). This is 
because of the need of market participants to price risk correctly. The hedger needs to be able to hedge 
against future movements in the spot price and the speculator needs to accept the risk of this movement. 
The interaction of the buyer and the seller of this price risk should produce an agreed upon futures price. 
Once a price has been agreed upon it allows other buyers and sellers to see what a fair rate is for the risk 
that has been traded. This price that has been discovered will produce the basis for future trades. It is thus 
important that the price agreed upon can be regarded as rational and correct by the market participants. 
Collings (1993) investigated the price discovery mechanism of the South African Futures Exchange in an 
attempt to explain the economic impact of an efficient financial futures market on the South African 
Economy. It is not the aim of this thesis to investigate the price discovery mechanism of the South African 
Futures Exchange, but rather to test the efficiency of the SAFEX listed futures, which will allow 
conclusions to be drawn to the state of SAFEX's price discovery mechanism. 
The relationship between the spot and futures price is determined by the cost of carry model where the 
future is priced at the opportunity cost of holding the underlying spot instrument over the life of the futures 
contract. The robustness of this pricing mechanism will be examined by ascertaining how efficient it is 
within SAFEX. 
Once the efficiency of the SAFEX listed futures has been established, the volatility experienced in world 
markets over the past few years will be examined with an aim to conclude how the pricing efficiency 
within SAFEX has reacted to this volatility. This should allow one to draw some conclusions on the state of 
SAFEX's pricing mechanism as well as the robustness of this mechanism during periods of changing 
volatility. In the event the pricing efficiency does not hold one should be able to determine the arbitrage 
opportunities within SAFEX. 
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The research problem is thus: How does the pricing efficiency of SAFEX listed futures react to market 
volatility? 
1.4 Justification for the Research. 
During the "three crises" (the three crises being the Malaysian Crisis, the Russian Crisis and the Brazilian 
Crisis) experienced from October 1997 the emerging markets have been subject to large flows of foreign 
capital. These flows have been accused of destabilising the emerging markets with one of the most 
vociferous critics being the Malaysian Premier Mohammad Mahathir (Cavill, 1997 : 3). During this time 
the South African currency market experienced large movements in capital. This can be best observed in 
figure 1.1 which shows the Rand - United States Dollar exchange rate. There is an initial accelerated 
depreciation in the Rand against the dollar at the end of October 1997 (A). This is followed by another 
period of accelerated depreciation that occurs from June 1998 to early July 1998 (B). This is reversed from 
late August to early November 1998 (C). 
Figure 1.1 - Rand vs US DoUar 
30 September 1997 to 17 May 1999 
70000~~----------------------~----~----~------4-----------------------' 
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Given these currency flows and market movements this research is an attempt to quantify how this affected 
the South African Futures Market. The efficiency of the Futures Market during times of crisis will allow 
market participants to determine the effectiveness ofrisk management strategies during these periods. 
Due to the informational content of futures and spot markets (Lambrechts, 1990: 4) market participants 
should react to the prices that are arrived at in the market. It is for this reason that these prices should be 
true and accurate. The trueness and fairness of futures market prices, under periods of market duress, also 
needs to hold in order for society to enjoy a social benefit from the existence of a futures market. 
1.5 Purpose of the Study. 
The actual futures prices wi1l be tested against their theoretical counterparts to establish an "efficiency 
gap". This "efficiency gap" will then be compared to market volatility. The purpose of the study will thus 
be to determine the relationship between this "efficiency gap" and market volatility. The study will not be 
theoretical and actual data will be tested over a twelve-year period from 1987 to 1999. The testing involved 
in establishing the "efficiency gap" will be to take the cost of carry model which is based on arbitrage 
opportunities between the theoretical; and actual futures price and apply it to the data set to determine the 
theoretical futures price. The testing of the relationship between the "efficiency gap" and the market 
volatility will be done by comparing the output from different volatility models to the day-ta-day size of the 
"efficiency gap". This should allow conclusions to be drawn as to the movement in the size of this 
"efficiency gap" relative to changes in volatility and whether any relationship exists between the two. 
The above testing will allow for conclusions in the following areas: 
a) Whether SAFEX listed futures have any relationship with their theoretically determined prices. 
b) In the event of there being a difference between the theoretical and actual futures prices, the nature 
of this difference and its extent. This will allow for insight into the market's efficiency. 
c) In the event of the "efficiency gap" existing, if there is any relationship between it and different 
volatility measures. 
d) If there is a relationship, the aim will be to ascertain the nature and extent of this relationship. 
1.6 Objectives of the Study. 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to establish the effect of volatility on the pricing efficiency of 
SAFEX listed futures. 
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A secondary objective will be to quantify the impact of the recent market volatility on the efficiency of 
pricing of SAFEX listed Futures. This recent volatility was manifested in the form of the "Asian Crisis", 
the "Brazilian Crisis" and the "Russian Crisis"; it would be useful to determine exactly how these "crises" 
have affected the pricing efficiency within SAFEX, and consequently the stability within our markets. 
1. 7 Research Method. 
The first step in the research of both the pricing efficiency and volatility was to conduct a literature review 
of works in these areas. In South Africa, numerous dissertations have been completed in the field of futures 
pricing efficiency. Each of these has been reviewed with a primary aim of investigating the pricing models 
used and the formulation of these models. The volatility research has been divided in two. The first area 
dealing with more traditional measures of volatility such as standard deviation and variance. The second 
area deals with the application of the general auto-regressional conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) 
statistical model. The forecast volatility produced by the GARCH model will be tested against the 
"efficiency gap" in the same way as the traditional volatility measures will be tested. 
Upon completion of this the next step will be to develop the efficiency pricing models that would be used 
in the testing of the actual futures prices. As stated above, the model was developed along the lines of the 
cost of carry model, making adjustments for taxes, interest on margin, dividends and other transaction 
costs. The research conducted by Hugo Lambrechts (1990) was heavily relied on in the formation of the 
efficiency models. The models were applied to the spot data to produce the theoretical futures prices. These 
were then compared with the actual prices and tested statistically for pricing efficiency. 
Once efficiency had been determined the "efficiency gap" was determined between the theoretical and 
actual futures prices. This was done by simply subtracting the one from the other. 
The following step was to calculate the volatility measures. This was done on a two-step basis. The 
traditional volatility measures were calculated ftrst and then regressed against the efficiency gap to 
determine if there was a relationship between the two. This was then repeated for the GARCH measure, the 
actual measure was applied over the period and the results were regressed against the efficiency gap. 
1.8 Overview and Structure of the dissertation. 
The overview of the dissertation excludes the introductory chapter (chapter one). 
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1.8.1 A review of the South African Futures Market 
Chapter 2 begins with the history of SAFE X and it's forebear being the market created by Rand Merchant 
Bank. This section describes what steps have been taken to encourage the growth of SAFEX and what 
growth subsequently has been enjoyed. 
This leads into the segmenting of the periods under scrutiny into two periods, namely: April 1987 to end 
September 1997 and October 1997 to end October 1999. These periods are analysed and major events are 
put into perspective. It is important to note that this analysis is of the events that occurred during the two 
periods and not a data analysis. This is conducted later when the efficiency tests are undertaken. The focus 
of this analysis is the three crises that took place between October 1997 and October 1999. The reason for 
this is that this is the main justification for the research, that is, how the SAFEX reacted to these market 
shocks. 
A discussion and description of these market shocks leads on to a brief discussion of volatility and what 
effect it has on markets. This is done for the reader to understand the context of the thesis, why volatility is 
being examined and why it is being researched together with market volatility. 
As it is the market participants who drive the market, a brief description follows, of each of the types of 
market participants, their roles in the market and how they interact. 
1.8.2 Futures - The Mechanics. 
Chapter 3 describes the functioning of a futures contract and how profits and losses are made. The chapter 
begins with an analysis of the futures contract and a description of its main features. This leads on to the 
difference between a future and a forward and what needs to be in place in order for a forward to be called 
a future. Technical terms such as the basis and spreads are defmed as well as how the mark to market 
process works. The chapter finishes with some application of futures trading (speculating or hedging) and 
some specific issues surrounding futures such a program trading. 
1.8.3 Volatility - a Discussion. 
Chapter 4 introduces the issues involved with market volatility. Possible causes are explored as well as how 
the market has reacted to this and chosen to protect itself against this phenomenon. One reply to volatility 
was the introduction of portfolio insurance. This has been credited with being one contributing factor to the 
1987 "crash" and will be examined briefly. Other reasons cited for market volatility are futures close-outs 
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and securities lending. These are also examined in detail in this chapter to determine if this is indeed the 
case, and why. 
The chapter fmishes off discussing measurement of this market phenomenon. The traditional methods of 
measuring volatility are examined and explained as well as the more innovative methods. This is done for 
the reader to understand their application in this thesis. 
1.8.4 Literature Review of Efficiency Studies. 
Chapter 5 produces exactly what its title suggests. The efficiency studies done around the world are 
examined separately to those produced in South Africa. The main reason for this is the (efficiency) model 
differences between South African studies and foreign works. 
1.8.5 GARCH - an Explanation and Literature Review. 
Chapter 6 explains what GARCH is. A literature review is also conducted of the development and use of 
this measurement from when it was first introduced in 1986. The aim of the literature review is to aid 
understanding of what this measure is trying to achieve and how it does this. This will lead to greater 
understanding of the findings of the thesis by the reader. 
1.8.6 Empirical Testing of Market Efficiency - Closing rate data. 
Chapter 7 is where the first actual modelling and testing begins. The efficiency of the market is tested in 
this chapter. In other studies (lambrecht's 1990, Snell 1990) on South African futures market efficiency, 
closing rate prices have been used. This chapter uses similar methodologies. The value added by this 
chapter is the updating of this efficiency-based research. In South Africa, the last thesis dealing with this 
was produced in 1991 by Levett. The state ofSAFEX's efficiency has not been measured since and this 
chapter rectifies this. 
The approach taken is to divide the data into two parts and comment on each one separately. The first part 
deals with pre October 1997 and the second part deals with the market from October 1997 to October 1999. 
Comparisons will be drawn as to the differences in the efficiency of the pricing of the SAFEX-listed 
futures. The data is separately reviewed from a statistical perspective before actual testing begins. As part 
of the results the output from the application of the model is reconciled with the events occurring in the 
market. 
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1.8.9 Empirical Testing o/Volatility Traditional. 
Chapter 8 provides the reader with two outcomes. The first is the actual state of the volatility of the South 
African equity and futures market over the past 10 years. Again, this data is divided in two and the two are 
compared. The second outcome is the actual comparison of this volatility with the market efficiency 
determined above. It is at this point that the efficiency gap is regressed against the traditional measures of 
volatility to determine if volatility has, indeed, an effect on the efficiency of the pricing on SAFEX listed 
futures. 
As mentioned above, the traditional volatility measures include standard deviation and variance and 
exclude ARCH and any of its derivatives. What the reader should gain from the initial volatility 
investigation will be an assessment of the volatility of the South African markets during the crises. At this 
point conclusions will be able to be drawn as to the impact of volatility on the efficiency of the pricing of 
South African Futures. 
1.8.10 Empirical Testing o/Volatility - GARCH 
Chapter 9 sets out to achieve what is stated above, namely an alternative way of measuring volatility and 
forecast volatility and what relationships exist between this and the pricing efficiency of SAFEX-listed 
futures. As in the previous chapter the volatility measured will be compared with the "efficiency gap" 
between the actual and theoretical prices of SAFEX-listed futures. The aim of this will be to determine if a 
relationship exists and if one can conclude on how volatility affects the South African markets. 
1.8.11 Implications 0/ the findings and Conclusions. 
Chapters 10 and 11 put into perspective the findings of the previous chapters. Further areas for research are 
identified and conclusions are drawn on the state of the South African Markets. These chapters will act as a 
"report card" on how South Africa reacted to the three crises over the past two years. 
1.9 Limitations. 
The main limitation is that the efficiency of the futures market is tested under conditions that do not truly 
reflect the actual market behavior (such as using closing rate data only and not intra day data) (Lambrecht!>, 
1990: 6). The danger of this is that the wrong conclusions could be drawn from the research. The main 
components that are not observed, through an ex post examination of the market, are the "estimation and 
adjustment of both transaction costs and risk" (Lambrechts, 1990 : 6). The transaction costs that are not 
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observed are essentially embodied in the spread between the buy and sell prices of both the spot and the 
futures prices. 
One of the assumptions made in assessing market efficiency is that any difference between the actual and 
theoretical futures price should be subject to arbitrage trading by market participants and thus should be 
reduced soon after it appears. A problem with this reasoning is the assumption that the arbitrageur is indeed 
able to take advantage of the opportunity that has presented itself In practice the arbitrageur may be unable 
to take advantage of the opportunity due to liquidity constraints, the risk involved in taking the position, or 
other market constraints that may present themselves. This may lead to any results concerning the 
efficiency of the market to be flawed and incorrect conclusions being drawn. An attempt is made to reduce 
the risk of producing flawed research by testing intra-day data. 
Lambrechts (1990:8) quotes Followill's (1986: 169) assertions that if this is the case, and there are 
"unassumed market positions", this may be an indication of the market's sophistication rather than 
evidence of its inefficiency. 










Chapter 2: A Review of the South African Futures Market. Page 12 
Chapter 2: A Review of the South African Futures Market. 
2.1 A Brief HistOlY of SAFEX. 
Rand Merchant Bank pioneered futures trading in South Africa with trading beginning in April 1987. The 
fITst contracts to be traded were on various equity indices and long bonds. There were five contracts 
launched in the first batch. Rand Merchant Bank undertook all the duties of the exchange that included 
being the market maker and the clearinghouse. 
This initial market led to the establishment, in September 1988, of the South African Futures Exchange 
(SAFEX) and the SAFEX Clearing Company (Pty) Ltd (SAFCOM). Twenty-one banks and financial 
institutions (SAFEX, 1999:safexdep.htm) completed this formation of SAFEX. Included in the 21 
institutions were the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the South African Reserve Bank. Upon formation 
80 "seats" were subscribed for at an initial price ofR 25000 each. An executive committee was elected to 
oversee the employment of the R 2 million start-up capital that had been raised by the sale of the "seats". In 
1989, when the systems and infrastructure had been put in place, another 39 seats were issued at a price of 
R 35 000 each, thereby allowing other market participants to join. SAFCOM took over the operation of 
Rand Merchant Bank's futures 'market' in Apri11990. Upon taking over the operations, futures were made 
available, by SAFEX, on equity indices, long bonds and money market products. 
Up to this point SAFEX was not an officially licensed exchange. In August 1990 the Financial Markets 
Control Act was enacted (SAFEX, 1999:safexdep.htm) and SAFEX was officially licensed as a derivatives 
exchange. The official opening of the exchange took place on the 10 August 1990 by the Minister of 
Finance. At this point monthly volumes were approximately 60,000 contracts, with 10,000 open interest 
(SAFEX, 1999:safexdep.htm). The next development came in October 1991. The South African Reserve 
Bank gave permission for non-residents to participate in SAFEX. 
The first time monthly volumes started to consistently exceed 100,000 open contracts was in June 1992. 
From this point volumes began to grow exponentially: monthly volumes exceed 200,000 by January 1993 
and passed the one million mark in December 1993. Open interest grew at a similar pace: by December 
1993 it was at 500,000 contracts and exceeded the I million mark in January 1997 (SAFEX, 
1999:safexdep.htm). 
There were a number of SAFEX implemented developments that aided this market growth. The first came 
in October 1992 with the latmch of options-on-futures that were launched together with a portfolio-
scanning- type margining system (SAFEX, 1999:safexdep.htm). The second was the introduction of a fully 
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automated trading system that was launched in May 1996. The next development came in September 1997 
in the form of individual equity options, which were introduced on the six largest JSE-listed equities. In 
February 1999 the next development materialised when the Individual Equity Options were replaced. In 
their place SAFEX introduced twelve Individual Equity Futures (IEF) and options on the futures. Six lEF's 
were listed (SAFEX, 1999:safexdep.htrn) upon their general introduction. 
Another development to take note of was the development of the Agricultural futures market. SAFEX 
launched this market in January 1995. The agricultural futures market developed in the same way as the 
financial futures market. In March 1998 options were introduced on agricultural products. The agricultural 
products suite was extended in February 1999 to include Sunflower Seeds and Cape Wheat futures. This 
thesis will not deal with the agricultural futures markets in South Africa; this has only been added for one 
to gain a complete understanding of the history of SAFEX. 
2.2 Review of the Markets to October 1997 - Spot and Future. 
A few months after the launch of the informal SAFEX market, the world markets were thrown into turmoil 
with the October 1987 crash. This affected the South African Equity and Futures Markets. This was 
followed by numerous other crises of different proportions, most notably was the Mexican Peso crisis and 
the U.S. Bond Market bear market, both of 1994. During each of these periods the markets experienced 
varying degrees of volatility. Each of these periods is examined in more detail below. The futures and spot 
markets are not analysed sepamtely. The two markets are linked through a set relationship (see chapter 3) 
and thus react similarly to market events. In the event of this not being the case this will be noted. 
The period reviewed is 1 April 1987 to 28 August 1997. The fust period of note began on the 19 October 
1987 when the world markets experienced a market "crash". The All Share Index experienced a high of 
2804 on the 19th October, the following day the index closed down 11.7% or 328 points. This drop 
continued until 12th February 1988 when the index closed at 1517,1287 points lower (45.9% down). This 
period is marked period A on figure 2.1 below. The period 1 April 1987 to 28 August 1997 has been 
chosen as the South African Futures Market was established in April 1987 and the emerging market crises 
"began" in late August 1997. The volatility over this period is analysed separately in chapter 10 below. 
After the 1987 "crash" the markets recovered until the next dip, which occurred from August 1990 to 
February 1991. During this period the overall index dropped from a high of3210 achieved on 14 August 
1990 to a low of 2527 on 31 January 1991. The drop was 21.28% or 683 points. The reason for the drop 
was primarily due to the political turmoil within South Africa at the time. This period is marked B in figure 
2.1 below. 
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As political events were moving towards a liberalisation of the South African political environment, so the 
market rallied until June 1992 when the market again peaked at 3744 on the 4 June 1992. The overall index 
then dropped from this point to 2926 on the 15 October 1992 - a drop of 818 points or 21.85%. Again, this 
was primarily due to political shocks within South Africa. This period is marked C on the below figure 2.1. 
A significant rally was then realised until November I December 1994. During this period the overall index 
rose from 2926 to a high of 6054 on the 7 September 1994 - an increase of3128 points or 107%. This was 
due to the first democratic elections being held in South Africa and the re-entry of South Africa into the 
global fmancial markets. It is important to note that during this period two significant financial global 
events took place. namely: the Mexican "Peso" crisis and the United States bond bear market. Both of these 
events occurred in 1994 and are market by the period D on figure 2.1. 
Even though South Africa had been accepted back into the global fmancial markets, one can see the effects 
of these two crises were minimal with the JSE Overall Index maintaining a bull trend over this period. In 
1994 Alan Greenspan, chairman of the United States Federal Reserve implemented a number of interest 
rate increases as part of his economic policies. The first of these occurred on the 4 February 1994 with 
others following at varying intervals throughout the year. The effect of this was the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index dropped from a high of 4820 on the 3 February 1994 to a low of 4389 on the 5 April 1994, a drop of 
431 points or 8.94%. During the same period the JSE dropped 1 %. These interest rate increases culminated 
in U.S. bond market participants suffering significant losses. The most notable casualty was Orange County 
California, which has to apply for bankruptcy protection on 6 December 1994. The trend of South Africa 
not being effected by external markets is important to note as this changes during the August 1997 to 
August 1999 period. 
The Mexican Peso crisis began with the assassination of Mexican presidential candidate Luis Donaldo 
Colosio on March 23, 1994 (Arner, 1999). This led to a loss of foreign exchange reserves as foreign 
investors pulled out of Mexico during the course of 1994. This culminated in the Mexican Stock Exchange 
dropping over the period end 1994 to 27 February 1995. The Mexican Bolsa index fell 39% in nominal 
terms this period (Arner, 1999). The JSE was initially not effected. Looking at period D in figure 2.1 below 
the JSE rallied during a period of turbulence in Mexico. The drop from late 1994 to 27 February 1995, 
however, had a direct impact on the JSE. This is represented by period E. During this time the JSE dropped 
from a high of 5942 on 17 November 1994 to a low of 5054 on 31 January 1995 - a drop of 888 points or 
14.9%. This drop is due to what is due to what became known as the Tequila Effect (Arner, 1999). The 
Tequila Effect was the withdrawal of foreign investors from all emerging markets and corresponding drops 
in their stock exchanges. This illustrates that South Africa was still governed by the movements 
international markets. The Tequila Effect illustrates how South Africa could be affected by difficulty 
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experienced in other emerging markets. For the remainder of the period until 28 August 1997 South Africa 
was in a bull market and there were no significant market events to report. 
Figure 2.1- JSE Overall Index: 1 April 1987 to 28 August 1997. 
2.3 The Crises - The Markets from August 1997 to August 1999. 
After the above period the JSE entered a period of turmoil. A number of market shocks were experienced, 
starting with the Eastern Crisis and following on with the Russian and Brazilian Crisis. These events and 
how they affected the South African market are the focus of this thesis. The volatility during this period is 
analysed separately in Chapter 10 below. This analysis has been perfonned to put dates to the shocks and 
market movements into conrext. 
2.3.1 The Eastern Crisis 
The Eastern Crisis was set off by the devaluation of the Thai Bhat in July of 1997 according to John Cavill 
(1997). After significant government intervention in the Eastern economies of Malaysia, Thailand, 
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Indonesia and Hong Kong, the markets became less stable. This led to significant losses. On the 9 July 
1997 the Singapore Straits Times index was at 2007,23, by 12 January 1998 it had dropped to 1073,47. A 
drop of933,76 points or 46.5% of the market had occurred over a six-month period. Initially, until the 22 
October 1997. the South African market did not react to this. From 28 August 1997 to 22 October 1997 the 
JSE rose from 7368 to 7413 - a rise ofless than one percent. During the same period the Straits Times 
index fell from 1915,96 to 1731,68 - a drop of 10%. 
This led to the drop as shown in figure 2.2 below (see area marked "a"). The JSE dropped from a high on 
22 October of7413 to a low of5874 on the 28 October 2000 - a drop of 20.7%. The JSE continued to drop 
until the 12 January 1998 when it hit a temporary bottom of 5568. This was caused as the extent of the 
financial crisis in the East became known. Significant foreign borrowings led to the IMF baving to put 
together "rescue" packages for the Eastern economies, an example of this is the US$ 57 Billion package the 
IMF put together for South Korea. (Baker, 1998). 
South Africa was not as badly affected by the market shocks as the Eastern economies were. It was 
suggested by Forecaster Ecosa economist Helmo Preuss (1998), that one reason for this was that South 
Africa had already undergone a default type scenario in 1985, when the South African Banking system had 
to restructure the payment of its international debts. 
The South African market rallied from the low of 12 January 1998 to a high of 8374 achieved on the 21 
April 1998 (area marked b on figure 2.2 below). The increase was 2806 points or 50.4%. This rebound was 
explained by a general article in the Financial Mail (1998) to be due to South Africa's standards of 
transparency and accounting relative to other emerging markets. Another factor was the fact that 
shareholding structures were becoming concentrated and market liquidity was rising in South Africa. Mark 
Richardson (1998) offers another reason: Trevor Manual the South African Finance Minister was thought 
of highly in international financial circles. 
During this period the South African Market became increasingly affected by the international markets as 
one can see by the October 1997 drop. This also introduced increased variability into the JSE. From 28 
August 1997 to 21 April 1998 (a period of approximately 8 months) the JSE had dropped by 20010 and then 
risen by 50%. This leads to the question of whether the efficiency of the South African market is 
maintained during these periods of stress and significant variability. 
2.3.2 The Russian Crisis 
The one feature of the Eastern Crisis is the devaluation of the currencies of the Tiger economies (Malaysia, 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia). This put pressure on their trading partners. One of the concerns was that either 
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China or Japan would significantly devalue their currencies, thereby setting off another round of market 
collapses. Plender (1998) observes that Japan was subject to economic difficulty, but could not afford to 
devalue the Yen, because, in the event of this happening, China might see little incentive in maintaining a 
stable currency, thereby forcing the Asian Tigers into another round of devaluations. 
One such victim of these eastern devaluations was Russia. Russia's economy was already in a state of 
instability prior to the Asian Crises. After the market turbulence had passed through Asia, Russia 
succumbed and faced a fmancial crisis in August 1998 (Peel, 1998). The initial crisis had occurred over 
May / June 1998 with the IMP putting together another "rescue" package ofUS$ 23 Billion in July 1998. 
South Africa was affected by this default The JSE reached a high of 8371 on 21 April 1998, only to be 
effected by the Russian Crisis and drop to a low of 4676 on 11 September 1998. This drop is represented by 
period C in figure 2.2 below. This drop of3695 points, or 44.14% shows the increasing variability or 
volatility in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Over the period of a year the market had dropped 20%, 
risen 50% and then dropped another 44%. At this point one can observe that South Africa was now being 
directly affected by the movements in the international markets. South African institutions were also 
directly involved. Standard Bank was exposed to the Russian market and faced the prospect of writing off a 
significant investment It was thus a combination of this direct impact on the South African economy and 
the general withdrawal from emerging markets by the international investment community that caused this 
drop in the JSB. 
2.3.3 The Brazilian Crisis 
After the Russian Crisis had been overcome the JSE recovered, rising from 4676 on 11 September 1998 to 
6024 on the 6 November 1998 an increase of28.8% (marked as period D in figure 2.2 below). After this 
the Brazilian market was becoming increasingly unstable. Reasons for the instability ranged from the 
increasing nervousness amongst the worlds investors regarding emerging market economies as well as 
structural economic deficiencies that the Brazilian Economy was dealing with. 
The Brazilian Crisis was, according to Bell (1999), precipitated by a management problem. ltamar Franco, 
the governor of the wealthy state of Minas Gerais, placed a moratorium on his state's debt repayments to 
the federal government. Coupled with this was the fact that the Brazilian Real was pegged, within a trading 
range, to the U.S. Dollar. With the global instability this peg was put under pressure by the currency market 
participants and the Brazilian short-term interest rates were forced up to 70%. This pressure led to the 
resignation of Gustavo Franco, the head of the Brazilian Central Bank. The currency was left to float and 
devalued by 20% against the U.S. Dollar. During January the Bovespa Index (the Brazilian Stock Exchange 
Index) dropped 30% and rebounded by 33% on the news of the devaluation and floatation of the currency. 
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The IMF came to Brazil's aid by providing a $41 .5 Billion facility but this was not deemed to be enough to 
stem the crisis (Wood, 1999~ . Brazil responded by introducing an austerity package against a backdrop ofa 
possible broadening of the debt moratorium (Bell, 1999). 
In response to this the South African Reserve Bank raised short-term interest rates to avoid an extreme 
deterioration of the Rand against the South African trading partners. The prime interest rate rose from 18% 
to 25% over this period. The effect on the stock market can be seen on figure 2.2 below in the area marked 
E. During this period the JSE dropped from 6024 on the 6 November 1998 to 5085 on the 17 December 
1998. The drop of939 points (15.6%) was the last significant drop for the two-year period. 
After the Brazilian Crisis the JSE experienced a recovery, rising over the next two years to 7023 on the 27 
August 1999. This increase of 1938 points equated to a percentage increase of 38.11 %. The JSE had 
experienced movements in this two-year period that were more extreme than what it had experienced in the 
preceding 10 years. During this two year period the JSE had initially dropped 20%, risen 50%, dropped 
another 44%, rebounded 29% , dropped a further 16% and then finally risen 38% - 6 significant reversals in 
the space of two years. 
Figure 2.2 - JSE Overall Index: 28 August 1997 to 28 August 1999. 
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2.4 South African Futures Market Participants 
As per Fourie, Falkena and Kok, participants in the futures markets can be divided into four main groups, 
namely: Hedgers, Arbitrageurs, Speculators and Investors. (Fourie, Falkena & Kok, 1992 : 216). Kolb 
(1997 : 21) and Lambrechts (1990 : 40 51) offer different a categorisation. In this case the participants are 
broadly seen to fit into a 2 dimensional matrix (See figure 2.1): those acting in an agency capacity and 
those acting in a principal capacity mapped on to those acting as speculators and those acting as hedgers. 
Examining these categories, new participants arise: Brokers (both floor brokers and introducing brokers), 
Futures Commission Merchants (FCM), Associated Persons (AP), Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA), 
Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and Floor Traders. One could add to this list the role of strategy brokers, 
as they actually create and design positions using OTC (Over-the-counter) instruments and I or 
combination of listed instruments for a client to achieve a certain exposure or specific hedge. 
Figure 2.3 - Broad Categories of Futures Market Participants. 
/1 Principals / Agents / 
Speculators 
/ / / 
Hedgers 
1/ / / 
2.4.1 Hedgers 
A Hedger is an individual or entity that has an exposure to an instrument and wishes to diminish this 
exposure by entering into transactions which have an opposite effect to the initial exposure the instrument 
gives. This reduction of exposure can be done by the use of various derivatives, in this study, hedging using 
futures to reduce exposure to a risk is what will be focused on. Hedgers can take the form of fmancial 
institutions such as banks and asset management companies. Hedgers reduce their exposure to risk by 
passing it on to speculators who will accept this risk in the hope of making the commensurate profit 
Hedging is given as the primary reason for the economic benefit embodied in the existence of futures 
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markets. This allows commercial activities such as farming to continue with certainty. This benefit creates 
stability in these markets, by removing price related uncertainty and passing it on to those who are willing 
to accept it. During 1999 there has been a move to remove other risks such as weather related risks with the 
introduction of futures and options on the weather by the Chicago Mercantile exchange (Luce, 1999). 
Commodity or weather related futures will not be dealt with in this thesis, however. 
The hedger's optimal decision is to decide on a combination of hedging and speculation (Lambrechts, 1990 
: 48). This suggests that hedgers do not only perform hedging activities but can be involved in a 
combination of strategies. This is because the hedger is motivated by an effort to stabilize income by taking 
away price risk and simultaneously optimise expected profits. 
2.4.2 Arbitrageurs 
Arbitrageurs are market participants who engage in the market for risk free profit. In the case of the futures 
markets, arbitrageurs are participants who seek to exploit the differential between the theoretical price of a 
futnre and the actual price ofa future. Arbitrageurs are responsible for maintaining the efficiency in the 
pricing of a futures market by taking advantage of the mispricing between the actual and theoretical futures 
prices. Arbitrageurs also facilitate the convergence of the futures price with the spot price as the future 
nears maturity. 
2.4.3 Speculators 
A speculator can be defined as "anyone who uses the futures market for capital gain only" (Fourie, Falkena 
& Kok, 1992 : 216). Speculators serve an important purpose in futures markets by supplying liquidity and, 
through being actively involved in the futures market, lead to more efficiently priced futures. The liquidity 
allows hedgers to have their trades absorbed into the market without undue disturbance in the current price 
of the future (Botha, 1988 : 4). Speculators are in turn divided into a number of categories depending on the 
length of time they hold a position and whether they are directly involved in the trading floor or not. The 
role of the speculator is a controversial one. Speculators have often been accused of destabilising markets, 
causing exaggerated movements in prices. Speculators, however, perform an important function of 
establishing and maintaining efficient markets (Lambrechts, 1990 : 49). Speculators are a significant part of 
the futures market; they risk their own capital to profit from price movements. They are also credited for 
lessening extreme price movements by their participation in the markets, that might otherwise occur 
(Lambrechts, 1990 : 50). During the market crises of the past two years, speculators have been blamed for 
some of the market shocks that have occurred, however, not all the blame can be placed on speculators. If a 
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market is generally inefficiently priced, whether speculators get involved or not, it will have to regress 
towards its true value at some time. 
2.4.3.1 Floor Traders. 
Floor traders are speculators who, as the name suggest, operate from within the futures exchange. In the 
United States of America floor traders must be members of the futures exchange. The main difference 
between floor traders and other traders is the requirement to be a member of the exchange. This will enable 
the floor traders to avoid commission costs that traders who are not a member of an exchange would have 
to pay. This avoidance of commission costs will enable these traders to exploit smaller arbitrage 
opportunities. 
2.43.2 Scalpers. 
Scalpers are speculators on the floor of an exchange who sells contracts for their own account. 
(Lambrechts, 1990 : 42). Scalpers profit from small movements in the futures they trade in. They tend not 
to hold positions overnight, but can do so from time to time. Scalpers can operate as market makers and 
thus will offer to buy at the bid price and sell at the offer price. Scalpers attempt to profit from buying at 
slightly lower than the last price and selling slightly higher than the last bid price. This requires continuous 
bidding and offering. This supplies liquidity into the market. This focus on small movements in price 
makes the scalper indifferent to longer-term trends and confmes the scalper to hold positions for short 
periods. Like floor traders scalpers will be members of the exchange and not pay commissions. This 
enables the scalpers to profit from the small movements in price. These small movements in price are 
known as ticks or minimum fluctuations. 
2.4.33 Position Traders. 
Position traders take a longer-term view of the market. They are thus concerned with trends that are 
exhibited by a future. Where a scalper will liquidate a trade before the day is out, a position trader will hold 
for numerous trading days. The decision to trade is usually based on some fundamental or technical view of 
the market. These traders also provide liquidity to the market for hedgers to perform their operations. 
Position traders can also be a member of an exchange, but do not have to be. The position traders, by 
avoiding the need to close out their positions before the day is over, avoid the close out costs (such as 
brokerage or commissions), but expose themselves to the risks involved in carrying a position overnight. 
Position traders can hold a future for periods of more than a day to a number of months. 
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2.4.3.4 Day Traders. 
A13 the name suggests, day traders will enter and exit a trade during the same trading day. Similar to 
scalpers, they wi11look to unwind a position before the trading day closes, thereby avoid the risks involved 
with carrying a position overnight. Day traders aim at narrower spreads between bid and offer prices than 
the position traders, but not as narrow as the scalpers. The main aim here is for the trader to identify a 
mispricing of a futures contract at the beginning of the day, exploit this and close out the position by the 
end of the day at which time the mispricing has ceased to exist. Day traders can be both locals (members of 
the exchange), or off floor proprietary traders. A day trader differs from a scalper in that a day trader may 
profit or lose more from larger price changes than a scalper (Lambrechts, 1990 : 45). 
2.4.3.5 Spreaders or Spread traders. 
These traders would take positions across different contracts. Spread traders can either trade across 
different maturities of the same contract, or across the same maturity of similar contracts. They will do this 
be buying the one contract and selling the other, thereby covering themselves and limiting their exposure. 
These trades are a form of arbitrage. The spreader will thus be reducing the risks involved in speculating. 
Similar to the arbitrage traders, spread traders seek to profit where the price of a future has drifted from its 
theoretical value. The purpose of the trade is to anticipate the potential change in relative values between 
two contracts (Lambrechts, 1990 : 30). The fact that the contracts are similar or the same contract but with 
different maturities does not remove the risk involved in the spread trade and thus does not make it a 
perfect arbitrage trade, however, the similarity serves to reduce the risk substantially when compared with 
an outright open position. This leads to futures exchanges accepting lower margin requirements for spread 
type trades. The mechanics ofa spread trade are explained in chapter 3.3. 
2.4.4 Investors 
Investors will take the longest positions of all the participants. The aim of the investor could best be 
described as follows: "Instead of purchasing assets in the cash market as an investment, investors may also 
establish synthetic cash positions in the futures market as an alternative investment form." (Fourie, Falkena 
& Kok, 1992: 217). 
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An example of an investment type trade will be where the investor purchases an index future and shorts 
certain of the underlying shares in the index to establish a specific exposure to a selection of shares in the 
index. 
2.4.5 Brokers 
Brokers will execute trades or orders for customers and receive a fee for doing this. Brokers, when filling 
orders, may trade for their own accooots or act as agents. Brokers may also ask as traders and enter into 
proprietary trades that are not necessarily with their clients. Brokers have to be members of the exchange 
they are dealing on. In order to be able to trade they will also have to be a clearing member or have an 
agreement with a clearing member, for the clearing member to clear the broker's trades. Brokers will also 
engage in supplying their clients with advice. This advice will vary from broker to broker. A discount 
broker would limit the advice given to the client where a full service broker will not only advise the client 
on market conditions, but may also supply recommendations to the client. Brokers can be divided into 
numerous subsections, namely: Floor brokers, introducing brokers, associated persons and commodity 
trading advisors. 
2.4.5.1 Floor brokers. 
Floor brokers will execute orders for individuals who are not on the floor of the exchange. In the United 
States of America there are broker associations or broker groups of which floor brokers are members. 
These floor brokers will band together to fill orders for their customers (Kolb, 1997 : 39). These broker 
associations are not a feature of the South African Markets. 
2.4.5.2 Introducing brokers. 
These participants are again, a feature of the U.S. market. Introducing brokers accept orders but not the 
funds to support those orders. An introducing broker will find a carrying broker who will execute the 
trades. The introducing broker will find the client and engage the carrying broker to complete the trade. The 
commissions for such trades are then split between the introducing brokers and the carrying brokers. 
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2.4.5.3 Associated Persons. 
This is a broad category that describes individuals who are involved in the solicitation of orders, customers, 
customer funds, or supervises the above activities (Kolb. 1997 : 40). This will thus include brokers as well 
as other participants who make up the futures industry. 
2.4.5.4 Commodity Trading Advisors. 
This is an American term for an individual who advises clients on how to trade. This will be done either 
directly or through publications. The advice will vary from individual trades, where opinions will be given 
on when to close out and whether a specific trade is advisable or not. to market opportunities. Thus the 
writer of a newsletter who advises that interest rates will be moving sharply in the near future and that 
interest rate futures should be entered into, would qualify as a commodity trading advisor. 
2.4.5.5 Strategy Brokers 
A strategy broker would essentially be a commodity trading advisor. However the strategy broker would be 
more actively involved in the advice given. A strategy broker offers synthetic strategies for commission. 
An example would be where a strategy broker approaches a fund manager and offers to hedge away a 
specific risk. The strategy broker will then proceed to construct a position through the use of both over the 
counter (OTC) and listed futures to hedge away the risk. This will then be sold to the fund manager. The 
strategy broker will then find a counter party to enter into the opposite side of the position, again taking a 
commission. This type of trade is called "back to back" where the broker creates the trade but is not a party 
to it. There is, however, nothing stopping the broker in becoming a principal in the transaction. These types 
of brokers serve an important purpose as they bring more participants into the market. In the case of the 
South African market these brokers are important as they bring into the market unsophisticated parties such 
as certain fund managers who would not, as a feature of their investment strategies, engage in the use of 
futures to hedge away risks. These strategy brokers supply the expertise that these parties may not have, by 
advising and building the strategies for them. SAFEX is still a young exchange, having being formed only 
in 1988. Strategy brokers perform an important role in its development by introducing more participants 
and thus liquidity to the exchange, ensuring its growth. This, in turn, will enable more contracts to be 
traded and prices to become more efficient. A strategy broker can be seen as an advanced form of Futures 
Commission Merchant (FCM). 
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2.4.6 Futures Commission Merchants 
A futures commission merchant (FCM) is an individual or firm that accepts orders to trade futures for a 
commission. FCM's will use floor brokers to execute the trades they have been commissioned to undertake. 
Essentially the FCM intermediates between the clients and the traders. Lambrechts (1990: 46) cites 
Kaufman in derming FCM's as "Individuals, associations, partnerships and corporations engaging in 
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery (on and 
subject to the rules of any contract market) and registered with the CFTC". The CFTC is the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, which is an American federal regulatory body. FCM's must be a member of 
an exchange if they are to trade for their clients. If they are not a member of an exchange they will have to 
be affiliated with one to fill the orders they solicit. 
FCM's clients are primarily principals who trade for their own account. FCM's thus take on the function of 
administering margin accounts and requirements, profit and loss monitoring, risk supervision, placing and 
executing orders, record keeping. accounting, generating trading research and strategy proposals and 
hedging strategies (Lambrechts, 1990 : 47). 
2.4.7 Commodity Pool Operator 
A commodity pool operator is an American term that describes an individual or entity that solicits funds to 
form a pool which will engage in futures trading activities (Kolb, 1997 : 40). This pool of funds is called a 
commodity pool. The individuals who contribute the funds gain a share in the pool and participate in the 
profits and losses made upon trading of the futures. 
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Chapter 3: Futures· The Mechanics 
A futures contract, according to Blake (1990 : 158) is "an agreement between two counter parties that fixes 
the terms of an exchange that will take place between them at some future date". While this statement is 
correct there are numerous subtleties that one needs to be aware of. The most significant is the difference 
between the futures and the forward contract. The specifics of the futures contract are described below. 
3.1 The Futures Contract. 
Each futures contract has a number of characteristics, the first being that the future trades on an organised 
exchange. In the case of South Africa a future would have to be associated with SAFEX. A contract for 
future delivery of a good, which is not traded through SAFEX, could not be considered a future. The 
futures exchange cannot be the same as the foreign exchange market, which is a loosely organised market 
and has no physical location. A futures exchange should have membership in the form of membership 
seats. It should also have a fixed location and trading times. There does not necessarily need to be a trading 
pit. Since the advent of automated trading the need for this. to defme an exchange, has been negated. 
The second characteristic of a futures contract is that its terms must be standardised. Generally, the futures 
contract specifies the quantity and quality of the good that can be delivered to fulfill the futures contract. 
The contract also specifies the delivery date and the method of closing the contract, and the permissible 
minimum and maximum price fluctuations permitted in trading (Kolb, 1997 : 5). Finally the contract 
outlines the minimum price fluctuations or price tick size. This can be seen in the example of the All Share 
Index (ALSI) contract traded on SAFEX. The underlying instrument is the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Actuaries Top 40 Companies - All Share Index (ALSI40). The contract size is 10 Rands multiplied by the 
index level. The contract size refers to the price of the contract. An example would be where the future 
agreed upon value of the ALSI40 is 6000. The value of one contract would be 6000 multiplied by RIO 
being sixty thousand Rands. The expiry dates and times for the ALSI40 futures contract are 16hOO on the 
3rd Thursday of March, June, September and December or the previous business day in the event the day 
falls on a non-trading day such as a public holiday. The contract is quoted as the index level. SAFEX does 
not quote decimal points, only complete units. The initial margin (explained below) is revised periodically 
by the risk committee. Margins are reduced by SAFEX for spread positions. The minimum price movement 
is one index point (which would be ten Rands as each point is multiplied by 10 to ascertain the value 
involved). The expiry valuation method is the arithmetic average of the index taken every two minutes over 
the fmal two hours of trading on the expiry date as calculated by the JSE. The settlement method for the 
ALSI40 contract is cash settlement and the clearinghouse fees are R 1.00 per futures contract (SAFEX, 
1999: ifindspecs.htm). The rest of the contracts are detailed in appendix 3.1. 











Chapter 3: Futures - The Mechanics Page 27 
A third feature of a futures contract is that a clearinghouse guarantees the obligations associated with it. In 
the cast of SAFEX listed futures the clearinghouse is SAFCOM. This guarantee ensures the market 
functions correctly and thus creates confidence in the market by the market participants. The clearinghouse 
manages to achieve this guarantee by being the counter party to every trade. In the case of a buyer of a 
futures contract the clearinghouse will be the seller. In the case of the seller of the futures contract the 
clearinghouse will be the buyer. The clearinghouse then protects itself by ensuring that the number of 
futures contacts sold equals the number of futures contracts purchased. In the case of adverse market 
movements, this matching will protect the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse does expose itself in the case 
of credit risk. As the clearinghouse guarantees each trade entered into, in the event ofa party defaulting on 
a payment the clearinghouse will have to expose itself by still settling with the counter party. The 
clearinghouse mitigates this in two ways. The first is the mark-to-market process (described below) and the 
second is through the penalties it imposes on a member in the event of the member defaulting. The 
clearinghouse thus protects all market participants from credit risk and thus allows for the smooth 
functioning of the market. In the event the clearinghouse did not exist, each market participant would have 
to obtain credit approval from each other market participant in order for trade to be able to take place. This 
would significantly impede the growth and functioning of the market as certain participants would not be 
able to trade with others due to their unfavorable credit ratings. Thus in the South African case all trades on 
SAFEX must go through SAFCOM, where SAFCOM is the counter party to each trade. 
A further feature ofa futures contract is that trading of the contract requires margin payments and daily 
settlement. This is discussed below. Briefly, this entails the trader putting down a percentage of the value of 
the futures contract, at the commencement of the trade, as a deposit. This is to guard against the 
clearinghouse losing in the event of default of the trader. This margin as it is called is added to each day or 
subtracted from depending on the extent of the fluctuation of the profit or loss associated with the futures 
contract. 
Futures contracts can also be closed easily. This feature is as a result of the standard form of the futures 
contract. Closing of a futures contract refers to the case where the trader decided to reverse the position 
entered into. An example would be where a trader has agreed to deliver R 1 million worth of Eskom Bonds 
to a counter party at a set price and at a set date in the future. If the trader wants to rid him or herself of this 
obligation it would be done by closing the futures contract. There are essentially three ways to close a 
futures contract. The first is where the futures contract is closed through delivery of the underlying 
instrument or cash settlement of the profits or losses accruing to the contract. Some futures contracts are 
written in such a way that actual delivery of the underlying instrument must take place on the expiry of the 
futures contract. This would normally be the case for the commodity based futures contract. Here, the 
exiting of the futures contract at expiry of the contract would be achieved by actually delivering the 
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underlying good. With the development of the financial futures contract actual delivery became difficult or 
impractical (especially in the example of the index futures, where, if the contracts were not cash settled, the 
seller would have to deliver the index to the buyer on expiry). An alternative was developed - cash 
settlement. This can be best illustrated by means of an example: Suppose party A enters into a contract to 
purchase 100 De Beers shares at R180 one month from now. Suppose at the end of the period the actual 
price of De Beers is R 175. In this case the buyer in the futures contract has realized a loss. The share is R 5 
cheaper in the market that what has been agreed to as per the futures contract. In the case where the 
contract was to be settled through actual delivery the buyer would have to purchase the R 180 share from 
the futures contract counter party and sell it into the market, thereby realising a R 5 loss. Where the contact 
is cash settled the buyer merely pays the seller R 5 and the contract's obligations are fulfilled - no actual 
delivery of the underlying instrument takes place. This type of contract is common for futures based on 
indices, as it is often impractical to deliver the underlying instruments in this case. 
The second method of settling a futures contract involves the offsetting the original trade by the entering 
into of a reversing trade. Taking the above example and extending it: the buyer of the De Beers future 
could contract to sell one De Beers share for the same expiry date and for the same amount. This would 
have the effect of "immunising" the buyer from any movement in the De Beers share. It is important to 
note that the buyer must ensure that the terms of the two contracts are the same. If this is not the case the 
buyer has not managed to fully reverse the position entered into. 
The third method of closing a futures contract is known as an exchange for physicals or ex-pit transaction. 
In this transaction two traders agree to simultaneous exchange of a cash commodity and futures contracts 
based on that cash commodity (Kolb, 1997 : 13). Adapting the above example, assume the buyer in the 
futures contract wants to actually acquire the De Beers share and the seller in the futures contract actually 
wants to sell a De Beers share that is in his or her possession. In this case the buyer agrees to actually buy 
the De Beers share and cancel the futures contract and pays the seller. The seller agrees to actually sell the 
De Beers share and cancel the futures contract and delivers the De Beers share to the buyer. The exchange 
is notified and adjusts its books to acknowledge that the buyer and the seller are out of the futures market. 
The last feature of futures contracts is that they are regulated by identifiable agencies. 
3.2 The Forward versus the Future. 
Another type of instrument that resembles the future is the forward or forward agreement. The forward 
agreement is a future that does not comply with the above characteristics. An agreement between two 
parties to exchange a motor vehicle at a set price at a set date in the future would be an example of a 
forward. This contract would typically not be traded on an organised exchange. It would not be a 
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standardised contract - it would commonly be tailored to meet the counter parties' needs. There would be 
no clearinghouse to guarantee the performance of the parties to the contract. It would be unlikely that there 
would be any margin payments and the contract would be difficult to exit without entering into new 
negotiations with the counter party. There would also be no identiftable agency or authority that would 
regulate the contract. 
The best known forward market is the market for foreign exchange. All trades are done over a network of 
telephones and only through approved counter parties. The market participants have to assess the credit risk 
of each counter party before being able to trade with them, as there is no organisation to guarantee the 
performance of the counter party. 
3.3 Futures Trading. 
When buying a future there are a number of orders one can give to one's broker. These orders will depend 
on the reason for the trade and the urgency of the trade. Briefly, there are three basic types of orders, 
namely the market order, the limit order and the stop order. Once the order has been entered and the 
transaction executed the issue of how the trade is actually settled becomes an issue. Each of these issues 
and concepts are described below. 
3.3.1 Market order. 
An instruction is sent to the broker instructing him or her to execute the order at the current market price. 
This type of order is usually given where there is some urgency to conclude the trade. The broker is not 
allowed to use his or her discretion when executing this type of trade. (Lambrechts 1990: 13). 
3.3.2 Limit Order. 
In this case the client sends an instruction to the broker to buy or sell the futures within set parameters. The 
broker then has the discretion to execute the transaction under better terms than this. The parameters are 
usually related to either the time within which the transaction must be completed or a set price. In the case 
of a set price the buyer will determine a price above which the trade must not occur, and it is then up to the 
broker to conclude the trade at a level below the price set. The converse applies to the seller. Limit orders 
are also known as "limit-only" orders or "or better" orders (Lambrechts, 1990 : 13). 
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3.3.3 Stop Order. 
Stop orders are designed to limit the possible loss faced by a market participant by setting predetermined 
prices that, if the future trades at that price, the broker must execute either a sale or a purchase depending 
on the type of stop order. Stop orders are also known as stop-loss orders. The stop loss traditionally refers 
to the case where the market participant holds a long position in a future and leaves an order with a broker 
that instructs the broker to sell in the event of the price of the future dropping to a set level. Practically the 
trade will only take place at the closest level to that of the stop loss. 
3.3.4 Settlement 
Traditionally, futures have been settled at the expiry of the futures contracts through physical delivery of 
the underlying instrument. This is because traditionally futures were used by farmers to hedge away price 
risk while their crops were still in the field. In SAFEX futures on specific shares and bonds are physically 
settled. The index, short-term interest rate and Rand Dollar futures are settled in cash and no physical 
delivery of the underlying takes place. According to Lambrechts (1990 : 35) physical settlement is 
important to ensure the convergence of cash and futures prices as the futures contract moves towards 
expiry. This is because if this convergence does not occur arbitrage opportunities present themselves 
between the spot and the future. This convergence is important because is provides the basis of pricing for 
futures contracts. 
The main reason for cash ~ettlement is to avoid the transaction costs involved in settlement and regulatory 
constraints (as is the case with the Rand Dollar future). In the event index based futures were to be 
physically settled. this would lead to the creation of share "baskets". These baskets would be made up of 
the shares that constitute the index. To construct this basket the market participant would be faced with 
costs such as brokerage and the spread on each share as well as the added cost associated with creating odd-
lot orders. 
One prerequisite for a cash settlement system to work correctly is the existence of an efficient underlying 
spot market. This is needed because the spot market will be used as a reference point for calculating the 
futures settlement price. The spot price should be "widely available and easily accessible, uniform and 
representative as an industry standard. immune to manipulation by any interested party and an accurate 
barometer of the value of the commodity or security" (Lambrechts 1990 : 35). 
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3.4 The Basis and Spreads. 
The basis is a key concept in the understanding of futures prices. The basis is the difference between the 
current cash or spot price and the futures price. Thus the basis is the relationship between the current and 
future prices. A spread defines the relationship between futures of different maturities and different 
underlying instruments. 
3.4.1 The Basis 
The futures price normally used in the determination of the basis is the near future (the future next in line to 
reach expiration). This basis is prone to diminish over the life of the futures contract. The reason for this 
can be seen in the pricing of the futures contract, however. the basic logic behind it is that by the end of the 
life of the futures contract the price of the future and the spot price should be equal. The basis will thus be 
zero at this point. This is known as convergence. The basis is typically more stable than the actual future or 
spot prices. This is because the basis defines the relationship between the two. which is subject to arbitrage 
opportunities if it does not hold. For an example of how this arbitrage works see below. The stability of this 
relationship is also due to the fact that the spot and futures prices should both react to information affecting 
the market. 
With the basis comes basis risk. If a market participant decided to hedge a position it is done on the 
understanding that the relationship between the spot and the future will follow a predicted route. One way 
to ensure this is to hold the hedged position to the maturity of the futures contract. It is known that the spot 
and future prices will be equal at this point. A problem arises where the hedger wishes to unwind the hedge 
before the futures contract has matured. In this case the hedger is being exposed to a possible unanticipated 
change in the basis. As stated above. any unanticipated changes in the basis should be removed through 
arbitrage. however there could be delays in the arbitrage taking place. In this case the hedger will not exit 
the hedge in the same position as when the hedge was entered into, and the hedger will have either have 
profited from the hedge or experienced a loss. The risk of this happening is known as basis risk. The main 
source of this change in the basis is the movement in interest rates. This is because they affect the pricing of 
the future. How this occurs is described below. 
This basis risk has led to the creation of arbitrage traders who enter into positions that are free of price risk 
(as each trading position is hedged) and speculate over the movement in the basis. 
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3.4.2 Spreads 
Like the basis, spreads are relationships that should hold between futures of different maturities and 
underlying instruments. In the flrst case an example would be the relationship between the futures contract 
for the delivery ofa basket of Didata shares in March and a futures contract for the delivery ofa basket of 
Didata shares in June. In the second case an example would be the relationship between the futures contract 
for the delivery of a basket of Didata shares on March and the futures contract for the delivery of a basket 
of Comparex shares in March (Didata and Comparex are both large Information Technology companies 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.). It would be reasonable to expect the two shares to have a 
relationship due to the relative similarities between the companies. 
The trader will profit by exploiting these relationships. This will be done by buying the one contract and 
simultaneously selling the other. Similar to basis trading, the aim will be to proflt from changes in the 
relationships where the one contract changes relative to the other. Ail with the basis trading where the spot 
and the future will tend to move in the same direction, futures related by either the virtue of their 
underlying spot instrument or their maturities will also tend to move in the same direction. The profit is 
made in the extent of each move. Another benefit of engaging in spread trading is the margin requirements 
tend to be less. This is explained in more detail below (under section 3.6 Margin and Marking to Market). 
An example of a spread trade would be as follows: 
Table 3.1 - Example of a Spread Trade. 
Position on 9 June 1998 
Contract Price of Contract (A) Number of Contracts (B) Contract size (C) Contract Value (A*B*C) 
December 1998 ALSI 1 6,3401 11 R 101 R 63,400 
September 1998 ALSI! 6,1971 -11 R 101 R -61,970 
Note: +1 Contract = buy, -1 Contract = sell. 
Position on 4 Semember 1998 
Contract Price of Contract (A) Number of Contracts (B) Contract size (C) Contract Value (A*B*Cl 
December 1998 ALSI 1 43231 -11 R 10 I R 43,230 
September 1998 ALSII 41531 11 R 10 I R 41,530 
Net loss on December Contract: R -20,170 
Net gain on September Contract: R 20,440 
Net gain 1 loss overall: R 270 
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A spread trader enters into a partially hedged position on the 9 June 1998 by buying 1 December 1998 
ALSI contract and selling 1 September 1998 ALSI contract. At this point the trader should be partially 
hedged - one would expect both the contracts to react to movements in the underlying All Share Top 40 
Index. On the 4 September 1998 the arbitrage trader decided to exit the position. This is done by reversing 
the trades, so 1 September 1998 ALSI contract is purchased and 1 December 1998 contract is sold. Table 
3.1 shows the figures for each trade. 
When the position is unwound the December contract has yielded a loss of R 20 170 while the September 
contract has yielded a profit ofR 20 440 leaving the trader with a net, spread-generated profit ofR 270. 
Note also, that the prices used in the examples are the closing rates for each day. The above example does 
not include margin requirements and does not take taxation into account. 
Where a spread is between two contracts that have similar underlying instruments such as the Comparex 
Didata example above, this is known as an intermarket spread. Where the spread is based on different 
maturities, such as in the ALSI example above, this is known as an intramarket spread. As the spread trader 
is also a speculator, losses can also be made. In the case ofa loss the spread would be negative. 
The partially hedged nature of the spread trade lowers the risks involved with this type of trade. The profit 
or loss that will result from a spread position will be less than the profit or loss that may result from an 
outright long or short position in a future. This is because the price risk is substantially reduced in the 
spread position. 
3.5 The Pricina of a Futures Contract. 
The pricing of a futures contract is based on the ability to arbitrage between the spot price of an instrument 
and its future price. Essentially, this arbitrage is based around the alternative of holding the spot position, in 
which case the market participant will incur costs such as the opportunity cost of holding cash and other 
transaction costs, and the holding of the futures position. 
The futures pricing model is known as the cost-of-carry model or carrying charge theory of futures prices. 
This cost of carrying a good until a future date is broken down into four compartments according to Kolb 
(1997: 69), namely: storage costs, insurance costs, transportation costs and financing costs. In the case of a 
commodity based futures contract the storage cost will be the cost of actually holding the good. For 
example, if one were to purchase gold one would have to incur costs to keep it in secure environment. 
Likewise, this purchasing of gold would have to be insured against theft. If the trader purchased wheat the 
insurance would have to extend to cover risks such as fire. The costs that need some explanation are the 
fmancing costs. The most significant finance cost is the opportunity cost of the cash that is invested in 
purchasing the spot instrument - interest. According to Kolb (1997: 70), the interest rate that market 
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participants have to bear is the repo or repurchase rate (see definitions for definition ofrepo rate). 
Larnbrechts (1990, 139) uses the NeD rate, but this thesis was completed before the introduction of an 
active repo market into South Africa. 
Ignoring all charges, except for the financing charges, the cost-of-carry arbitrage model can be illustrated 
through the following example: 
Suppose a trader was faced with the choice between purchasing a September 1998 South African Breweries 
future (SABQ) or 100 South African Breweries shares (SAB) on the 3 July 1998. The analysis is as 
follows: 
Table 3.2 " Cost of Carry Arbitrage Example 
Prices for the AnalYSis 
Spot price of SAB on the 3 July 1998: 
Futures price of SABQ on the 3 July 1998: 
Transactions: 
03·Jul·98 
Borrow R 6350 for 1 year at 10% 
Buy 100 SAB shares in the spot market for 6350c 
Sell 1 SABQ September 1998 futures contract for 662.5c 
Total Cash Flow 
30·Sep·98 
Deliver the shares against the futures contract 
Repay the loan capital 
Repay the interest (R 6,350 * 10% * 89 days) 
Total Cash flow 












When the arbitrage position is entered into on the 3 July 1998 the arbitrageur enters the position by 
borrowing to buy the underlying South African Breweries shares. In this example the interest rate is 
assumed to be 10%. The prices taken for the example are also the closing prices of the respective share and 
future. In order to hedge the position entered into, a futures contract is sold. The futures purchased are thus 
sold forward for delivery on the 30 September 1998. If the position is held to maturity the trader will not 
suffer any basis risk and all price risk should have been hedged away. 










Chapter 3: Futures - The Mechanics Page 35 
At maturity of the futures contract the shares are delivered against the futures contract. The arbitrageur 
receives the agreed price for the shares and repays the loan and the interest from these proceeds. In this 
case the arbitrageur is left with a surplus. This should not be the case, as the trader has been in a riskless 








Fo,t = So (1 + C) 
The price of the future in time 0 for delivery time = t. 
The price of the spot instrument at time O. 
The cost of carry expressed as a percentage. 
(1) 
In the same way as the relationship between the spot and futures price is governed by the cost-of-carry 
model. the relationship with futures contracts of different maturities is governed in a similar fashion. The 





FO,d = Fo,n (l + C) ................ d>n 
The price of the future in time 0 for delivery time = t. 
The price of the future in time 0 for delivery time = n. 
The cost of carry expressed as a percentage. 
(2) 
The above cost-of-carry model needs to be adjusted for market imperfections. These imperfections 
primarily take the form of transaction costs. These transaction costs can be both direct and indirect. Direct 
transaction costs would typically be brokerage. Indirect transaction costs would include unequal borrowing 
and lending rates, limitations to storage (of the underlying spot indeed needed to be stored) and margins 
and restrictions on short selling. The direct transaction costs do not only include brokerage. but can also 
take the form of the spread. In the market the buyer will attempt to buy at a price lower then the seller is 
willing to sell at. The gap between the closest buy and sell prices - the spread - is cost the trader will have 
to pay to either acquire or sell the instruments. 
Direct transaction costs affect the cost-of-carry pricing model as follows: 
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So(1 - T)(1 + C) ~ Fo,t ~ So (1 + T)(1 + C) (3) 
Where: 
FO,t = The price of the future in time 0 for delivery time = t. 
So = The price of the spot instrument at time O. 
C = The cost of carry expressed as a percentage. 
T = The cost of executing the transaction. 
This equation defines the no-arbitrage bounds of the future. These are the bounds within which the future 
may fluctuate without allowing market participants the opportunity to enter into the market and eam 
arbitrage profits by pushing the price back to its equilibrium. These bounds are illustrated below in figure 
3.1: 




Upper Arbitrage Bound 
Equilibrium: So (1 + C) 
Lower Arbitrage Bound So (1- T)(1 +C) 
Time 
(Source Kolb, 1997 : 81) 
Arbitrage Opportunity 
In typical markets the trader will only be able to borrow at one rate and lend at a different rate. The cost-of-
carry model described above (1) does not allow for this, it assumes the trader can borrow and lend at the 
risk free rate. The impact of different rates is that the no-arbitrage bounds are widened. Unequal borrowing 
and lending rates impact on the cost-of-carry pricing model as follows: 
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Where: 
= 
80(1 - T)(1 + Cd ~ Fo,t ~ 80 (1 + T)(1 + eB) 
The lending rate, 
The borrowing rate. 
Page 37 
(3) 
Most markets have some form of restrictions on short selling. These restrictions can be either regulatory or 
operational. In the case of regulatory the market authorities would dictate that short selling would, either 
not be allowed, or allowed under certain restrictive conditions. Operational restrictions would take the form 
of a shortage of loanable underlying instruments (or no market existing at all). To facilitate a short sale a 
trader needs to, in effect, borrow the underlying securities, sell them into the market and repurchase them at 
a future date for a lower price. (This is described in more detail below see 3.10). The cost-of-carry model 
described above (1) assumes that there are no restrictions on short selling. Short selling is needed to enable 
reverse cash-and-carry arbitrage and, in turn, keep the futures prices in equilibrium. The most common 
restriction regarding regulated short selling is the broker retains the proceeds of the short sale. The trader is 
thus only has use of the remaining funds. This restricts the trader's ability to execute reverse cost-of-carry 
arbitrage. The impact of the trader only being able to use a fraction of the proceeds of a short sale are 
demonstrated in the formula below: 
So(l - T)(1 + fCL) ~ Fo.t ~ 80(1 + T)(1 + eB) (4) 
Where: 
f = the fraction of usable funds derived from the short sale. 1 >f> 0 
The fmal restriction is embodied in any limitations to storage of the underlying instrument. This will 
primarily affect futures where the underlying instrument is a commodity. In the cost-of-carry arbitrage 
strategy, one needs to hold the underlying instrument until the strategy is closed out. It is for this reason 
that it is this leg of the futures pricing formula that is affected by storage costs. Storage limitations will be 
treated on a case-by-case basis when determining the ability to execute the cost-of-carry arbitrage strategy. 
Another aspect of the cost of carry model is that it will allow the user to determine an implied repo rate. 
This is done by rearranging formula (1): 
C 801 Fo.t - 1 (5) 
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This will arise when one has the actual price of the future and the actual price of the spot. By feeding these 
variables into the cost-of-carry model one will be able to determine the interest rate that is implied through 
the differential in prices. This implied repo rate is compared to the actual repo rate. Where the actual repo 
rate is significantly higher or lower than the repo rate implied by the cost of carry model there is an 
opportunity for arbitrage to take place in the form of the cost-of-carry arbitrage or the reverse cost-of-carry 
arbitrage. 
The model to price the futures cDntract has been outlined. It will be further adjusted in chapters below to 
take into account specific issues that occur in both the data and the South African environment. The day to 
day operations of the futures contract are governed by the margin requirements stated in the contract and 
the mechanism of marking to market. 
3.6 Margin and Marking to Market. 
To enter into a futures position a market participant needs to furnish the exchange with margin. This is a 
cash deposit that acts to guarantee the trader's ability to fulfill future commitments. The margin thus 
ensures the integrity of the futures market. The margin is essentially security or collateral against the 
futures position the market participant has entered into. 
The margin deposits earn interest. The interest rate on the margin deposits is quoted daily and accrues to 
the trader over the period that the collateral is deposited. The margin requirements are decided by 
SAFCOM who the margins are deposited with and who pay the interest on the margin. This is the official 
margin, the brokers may require further margin from a client of they so wish. SAFCOM will change the 
margin requirements depending on the underlying condition in the markets. Margin requirements are an 
additional cost to market participants. This can be explained by the opportunity cost involved in allocating 
available cash to margin accounts. Market participants may have a use for cash that would yield a higher 
rate of return. By placing their cash resources in margin accounts they will not be able to earn more than 
the short-term risk free rate as this is what SAFCOM would invest the funds in. It is for this reason that the 
margin requirements are set as low as possible by SAFCOM - to reduce the cost of trading for the market 
participants. 
Margin comes in three forms, namely: initial margin, maintenance margin and variation margin. Initial 
margin is the margin the trader initially advances to the broker (who will, in tum, forward it to SAFCOM) 
in order to be able to enter into the trade. Once the trade is entered into the trader will have to ensure the 
margin is maintained above a minimum level as the price of the future fluctuates. Tbis level is known as the 
maintenance margin. In the event the margin falls below the maintenance margin level the trader will be 
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called upon to make deposits into the margin account to raise the margin back to the maintenance level. 
These additional margin deposits are called variation margin. The effect of there always being margin in an 
account has the effect of having all the cash flows concerned with a trade having taken place before the 
trade is concluded. If the trader does not adhere to the margin call - the call to deposit more variation 
margin - the broker will be obligated to liquidate the trader's position at current market levels and recover 
any loss from the margin account and the personal assets of the trader. 
In the setting of the margin levels, the exchange (in the case of South Africa, SAFCOM) take into 
consideration the trader's inter and intra market spreads (see above 3.4.2) as well as market conditions. 
Before looking at the setting of margin requirements one must understand the attitude of SAFEX to risk. 
This can best be summed up as "You stand good for your client" (SAFEX, 2000 iRiskMan.htrn). This 
means that the broker must stand good for the losses of its clients and the clearing members must stand 
good for the losses of the other members who use them. It is for this reason one finds the brokers will be 
inclined to ask for additional margin over and above what SAFEX requires. SAFEX bears the ultimate risk, 
if a client, broker and clearing member were to default, SAFEX would have to stand good for the losses. 
In setting margin requirements SAFEX uses the SPAN (Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) methodology 
introduced by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1987. The premise SPAN is based upon is that one 
needs to consider an entire portfolio when setting margin requirements and not just the individual trades. 
This is because of the possibility of an inter or intra market spread existing within a portfolio. Tills reduces 
the risk profile of the portfolio due to the fact that certain trades may offset one another (hence the spread). 
Inter market cross-margining is a system that establishes the margin requirements by considering the spread 
positions that exist within a trader's portfolio across different exchanges. As there is only one futures 
market in South Africa this will not be applicable to the margin determination. Intra market cross-
margining takes into account all the time series spreads, or spreads based on similar underlying 
instruments, into account. As part of a spread position one will sell the one contract and purchase the other, 
similar, contract. This reduces the flnal risk exposure and the margin is set lower accordingly. Intra market 
cross-margining can best be described by means of an example: 
Suppose one has two contracts on the same underlying instrument that have been entered into - there is an 
agreement to purchase the September ALSI contract and a counter agreement to sell the December 
contract. One has a time series spread and the risk has been reduced as one is buying and selling the same 
instrument. While the two contracts are held the margin will be reduced by the effects of offsetting and the 
effects of spreading. A new parameter will be calculated - the Class Spread Margin Requirement (CSMR) -
which will be the new margin arising on the spread position. In the case where a position contains options 
or a less straightforward mix of contracts, the calculation becomes more complicated. The principles 
remain the same, however, the capital needed to enter the positions is optimised by using the minimal 
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amount of margin (SAFEX, 2000 iRiskMan.htm). A numerical depiction of the above example can be seen 
below: 
Table 3.3 - Example of Margin Setting. 
Contract I Number of Initial Margin Per Class Spread Margin Total Margin 
Contracts Contract Requirement per contract 
September +1 R3,500 R 1,000 
. December -1 R4,000 R 1,000 
R 500 R2,OOO R2,500 
.. 
Based upon a SAFEX example (SAFEX, 2000 IRISkMan.htm). 
In the above example, because the September contract is purchased and the December contract sold the 
initial margins for each contract cancel each other out. This leaves a total initial margin requirement ofR 
500. It is for this reason that another level of margin is determined based on the total risk to the net 
position. This results in a total margin ofR2,500 that is paid upon entering the position. 
SP AN offers cross-margining between futures and options on futures by considering the entire portfolio in 
setting margin requirements (Kolb, 1997 : 35). The SPAN system considers 16 possible "what if" scenarios 
to determine the appropriate margin. The SPAN system computes how the value of a portfolio would 
change under each of the 16 different scenarios. (Kolb, 1997 : 35). The trader's portfolio is scanned at a 
number of points over a wide range of market moves. In a similar fashion to Value At Risk, the largest 
possible loss is computed over this range. The range is the anticipated market moves for the next trading 
day, which are calculated statistically. The exchange, once having identified the expected largest possible 
loss, sets the initial margin requirements equal to this. (See Appendix 3.2 for the 16 SPAN scenarios). 
The body responsible for setting margins within the SAFEX I SAFCOM structure is the Risk Management 
Committee (RMCO). Each clearing member has a seat in RMCO as it is the clearing members that 
underwrite the exchange (SAFEX, 2000 iRiskMan.htm). Briefly, RMCO determines the "Risk Parameter". 
This is the number of standard deviations that is used to determine the possible worst-case loss and thus the 
margin requirements. Since it has been introduced., the standard deviations have been set at 3.5 (SAFEX, 
2000 iRiskMan.htm). At a given volatility the prices between 3.5 standard deviations can be calculated. 
Once a scanning range is determined using the standard deviations the table in appendix 3.2 is used to 
determine maximum loss. 3.5 Standard deviations equates to a 99.95% confidence level. This means that 
the possible loss that will be determined will be the greatest statistically calculated loss to occur over 2000 
trading days. This is biased towards normal trading conditions. In a period of uncertainty or market 
instability the margins may be set temporarily higher. This can be done using an "intra-day margin call". 
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This is where all positions are marked to market during the day and margin requirements are recalculated 
using different rates (SAFEX, 2000 iRiskMan.htm). These margin rates should thus change daily given the 
fact that market conditions are constantly changing. It is for this reason that the initial margin requirements 
are set using a "trigger" process. 
The trigger process is where initial bandwidths are set around the calculated margin requirements. (See 
figure 3.2) In the below figure, the center line depicts the daily-calculated margin requirements. Margin 
requirements are actually set beyond a bandwidth around these lines that is shown using the lower and 
upper trigger lines. This results in the actual initial margin requirements only changing periodically and not 
on a daily basis. Once the trigger is breached this results in new margins being set. 
Figure 3.2 - The triggering Process. 
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Source: SAFEX, 2000 iRiskMan.htrn 
From figure 3.2 one can see that the theoretical margin line (center) moves. This is primarily due to 
changes in volatility. It is for this reason that volatility needs to be calculated on a daily basis. SAFEX uses 
the greater of a long-term volatility and the overnight volatility to set margins. The long term period used is 
750 days or three year volatility periods of daily historical closing prices. The overnight market volatility is 
derived, according to SAFEX, as follows " ... from the implied volatilities of at-the-money options quoted 
on the futures, where these exist. Where options exist on more than one expiry month, a weighted linear 
regression is performed to allow for the term-structure of volatility in finding the overnight volatility. If 
options do not exist on a contract, the contract's own 30-day exponential historical volatility of the contract 
is used as a surrogate for the overnight market volatility .... " (SAFEX, 2000 iRiskMan.htm). This will result 
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in the authorities setting higher margin requirements during periods of higher volatility (assuming a trigger 
level is breached). Volatility is concentrated on when a portfolio contains options. 
Current SAFEX margin requirements are listed below. They became effective on Friday, 19th May 2000, 
for settlement on Monday, 22nd May 2000. 
Table 3.4 - SAFEX Margin Requirements. 
ALSI FINI INDI RESI RNDD 
IMRs: 
Jun-oo 6000 4000 8000 8500 25000 
Sep-OO 6000 8000 
Dec-OO 6000 
Mar-Q1 6000 9000 
Mar-02 7000 
VSRs: 2.50 2.50 3.00 2.50 1.25 
CSMRs: 
Jun-OO 12Q 500 1000 12Q 2500 
Sep-OO 700 1000 
Dec-OO 800 
Mar-Ol 800 .!.W!!! 
Mar-02 800 




Aug-OO 25000 35000 35000 17500 2500 
Sep-OO 2500 
Nov-GO 25000 35000 
Dec-OO 2500 
Mar-OI 2500 




Aug-oo 2000 2250 2500 1750 600 
Sep-OO 600 
Nov-OO 2000 2250 
Dec-OO 600 
Mar-Ol 600 
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AGLQ DDTQ 
IMRs: 
Jun-OO 4500 1200 
VSRs: 4.00 ~ 
CSMRs: 
Jun-OO 500 150 
(Source SAFEX, 2000) 
IMR = Initial Margin Requirements. 





CSMR = Class Spread Margin Requirement 
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RCHQ BOEQ CPXQ SABQ 
1500 100 500 800 
3.50 4.00 5.00 3.50 
175 25 75 100 
Marking to market is the process whereby each day a trader's positions are recalculated using the current 
spot rates. This may result in variation margin being called for by the broker. As margin requirements are 
relatively small when compared to the underlying exposure inherent in the futures contract, small 
movements in the prices of the futures contracts or the underlying spot instruments can lead to margin 
requirements being breached. This would be when the margin held on account for the trader falls below the 
maintenance margin limits. The trader would transfer funds into the margin account to complete the mark 
to market process. The mark to market procedure occurs at the close of trade each day for the duration the 
trader holds the position. 
As per Lambrechts (1990: 24) there are three steps involved in the marking to market process. The ftrst step 
involves the calculation of the closing price of the futures contract. This is followed by the marking to 
, market of open positions since the previous day. The final step comprises the mark to market of the 
transactions of the current day (Lambrechts 1990: 26). 
In the calculation of the day's closing prices SAFCOM takes the closest bid and offer prices at the close of 
trading at 5:30 pm. The average is then calculated by adding the two together and dividing by two. The 




B = change in closing price and 
C = value factor. (Lambrechts 1990: 26) 
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In this calculation the profit or loss is determined by mUltiplying the total change in market exposure by the 
value factor. The value factor is outlined in the contracts of each future. The value factor can also be known 
as the contract size. (See appendix 3.l for SAFEX contract sizes). 
Once this calculation has been completed the profit or loss on the trade for the current day is calculated: 
DxExC (7) 
Where: 
D ::: position, 
E ::: change in prices (Lambrechts 1990 : 26). 
The total mark to market amount is equal to the summation of the second and third steps. 
3.7 Limits. 
There are essentially two types of limits that a futures exchange can set, namely position limits or price 
limits. The reason for limits being set is to stop the market from destabilising past an unacceptable point. 
Each exchange will determine what this "unacceptable point" is. The effect of implementing the limits is to 
increase the time span over which new information is introduced into the market. The theory is that this 
will reduce excessive or wild speculation and keep the market orderly. An example would be when a 
market crash occurs. During this period there may be an excess of uncertainty within the market. This could 
cause the market to fluctuate wildly. When the limits are breached trading is suspended. This is supposed to 
allow the traders to digest the information surrounding the event (in this case a crash) and when the market 
next opens, reduce the heightened volatility. 
A prolonged imposition of price limits, according to Lambrechts (1990:15), may result in the markets 
closing for long periods of time. This may result in significant losses for market participants as they are 
unable to close their positions and thereby stop their losses. It is for this reason that price limits may, if 
applied rigidly, become destructive and interfere with fundamental market forces. It is for this reason that 
an exchange is able to change price limits as trading conditions change. This variable price limit enables 
the market to follow the fundamentals affecting it, more closely. 
Another factor to be aware of with regards to price limits is the competition between the different 
exchanges. One exchange may have stringent price limits that act to significantly reduce trading volatility 
during periods of instability. The breach of the price limits and the consequential suspension of trading may 
turn traders away from the exchange to conclude their deals and close their positions in other exchanges 
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with less onerous price limits. In South Africa this is not really an issue as there is no direct competition for 
SAFEX. One must, however, be aware of this as the Chicago Board of Trade recently had a future listed on 
South African Rands, which illustrates how exchanges can take business away from one another. 
In any futures research one must be aware of price limits being imposed and subsequent suspension of 
trade. This can lead to apparent arbitrage opportunities if the spot market remains open when the futures 
market closes. In reality there are no opportunities as one cannot take advantage of them because of the 
closure of the futures market. In the history of SAFEX there is DO evidence of price limits being imposed. 
Position limits center around the ability of an individual or group of market participants to control a 
fmancial instrument. Position limits are thus designed to guard against market participants attempting to 
corner the market. The position limit limits the trader'S total allowable position. In the history of the 
markets there have been numerous attempts to corner the market. In 1979 - 1980 there was an attempt to 
corner the silver market. It was known as the Hunt Silver Manipulation (Kolb, 1997: 41). This was done by 
the traders attempting to purchase all the available silver as well as the silver futures contracts. This allows 
the traders to control the price and extract significant profits. The exchange will react to this by ordering the 
traders to sell a portion of their holdings. To prevent this, position limits are imposed. Position limits can be 
complex in their application as exchanges need to take into consideration how the positions are constructed. 
One could fmd a broker serving two different clients who are both taking large positions in a specific 
future, however, the positions may be taken for completely different reasons. Like price limits, there has 
been no evidence of an implementation of position limits within SAFEX. 
3.8 Interest Rate Futures versus Eguity Futures. 
The above description of the futures contract is a generic one. This has to be adjusted for the specifics of 
the contracts. In the case of fmancial futures there are two distinct types - the interest rate and the equity 
future. In the case of each one the generic formula «1) in section 3.5) needs to be adjusted for the change 
in the underlying instrument. 
In the case of the equity futures there are two distinct types - the individual stock future and the stock index 
future. Each one results in similar adjustments to the generic cost of carry futures pricing formula. In the 
case of the equity future the complication that arises is the fact that dividends are received by the 
stockholder. In the case of the stock index futures the market participant will receive dividends on the 
underlying shares making up the index if the preference is to hold the index rather than the future. The 
holder of the stock index futures will not receive, or benefit from, dividends as the futures are linked to the 
price of the index that excludes dividends. When pricing equity futures one needs to take into account the 










Chapter 3: Futures - The Mechanics Page 46 
dividends that will be received between the time the futures contract was purchased and when it either 
closes out or matures. 
The receipt of the dividends lowers the cost of holding the stocks. In the cost of carry model the holder of 
the underlying shares incurs a cost for holding them. The largest cost (established in 3.5 above) is interest 
on the cash employed in the purchase of the shares. The receipt of dividends constitutes a return of this 
cash and should thus reduce the cost of carrying the shares. From this one can conclude that the cost of 
carrying an equity future needs to be adjusted by the value of the dividends received while holding the 







Fo,t = So (1 + C) -:E Di (l + fi) 
;=1 
The price of the equity future in time 0 for delivery time = t. 
The price of the underlying stock or index at time O. 
The cost of carry expressed as a percentage. 
The ith dividend. 
(8) 
ri The interest earned on carrying the ith dividend from its time of receipt until the futures 
expiration at time t. (Kolb, 1997: 231). 
Again, as in the generic futures price determined in formula (1) above. this new formula must be subject to 
adjustments for market imperfections. The imperfections are applied to the above formula in the same 
manner as they have been in 3.5 above. 
The interest rate future includes money market futures and bond. gilt and other interest paying instruments 
that have futures written on them. The principles are the same as in the case of the equity futures: the 
futures price needs to be adjusted by the interest that the holder of the underlying instrument receives over 
the time the positions are held for. When looking at interest rate futures it is important to note that in the 
South African case, at expiry of the future the underlying instrument has to be physically delivered. This 
differs from the foreign futures markets such as the Chicago Board of Trade where settlement is achieved 
using the cheapest to deliver bond and not one specific underlying bond. For this reason South African 
bond futures are easier to understand but are less flexible. 
When pricing the interest rate future one has to be aware of the differences between the short term 
underlying instruments and the long-term instruments. On SAFEX there are two short-term futures 
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contracts, namely the futures contract on Banker's Acceptances (BA's) and the futures contract on the 
Johannesburg inter-bank agreed rate (JIBAR) rate. There are currently four long term futures contracts all 
written on underlying South African Government Bonds, namely: R153, R150, R157 and R162. The reason 
for the pricing difference is that in the case of the long-term bonds one actually receives interest coupons 
whereas in the case of the short-term instruments they are purchased on a discount basis. This means that 
there are no interest cash flows, one simply pays less than the par value for the instrument when 
purchasing. Upon maturity of these instruments one receives the par value of the instrument. Even with this 
difference one still has to adjust the cost of carry model by the interest one receives when holding the 










Fo,t = So(1 + C) - AI 
The price of the interest rate future in time 0 for deli very time = t. 
The price of the underlying bond at time O. 
The cost of carry expressed as a percentage. 
The accrued interest from the underlying bond. 
(9) 
This equation is very similar to equation number (I). One has the same cost of carry relationship, but is 
adjusting it for the interest that is earned on the underlying bond. This equation will also be adjusted for the 
market imperfections as described in 3.5 above. 
3.9 Portfolio Insurance, Program Trading and Securities Lending. 
In this part of the chapter some of the concepts surrounding futures and the trading thereof are explained. 
Risk is managed through the use of portfolio insurance and program trading. Securities lending is used to 
facilitate the arbitrage which is necessary to ensure an efficiently priced futures market. Market volatility is 
often seen to be caused by these advanced strategies - this is not always the case. 
3.9.1 Portfolio Insurance. 
Portfolio insurance refers to a collection of techniques for managing the risk of an underlying portfolio 
(Kolb, 1997,263). This will be achieved practically by attempting to set a floor on the value ofa portfolio 
while managing to ensure that there is no ceiling in place. The basics of portfolio insurance involve the 
application of what is known as dynamic hedging. This is where one enters into futures positions in the 










Chapter 3: Futures· The Mechanics Page 48 
opposite direction to one's current underlying exposure (i.e. implement a hedge) to reduce one's exposure 
to a loss. This is best understood by means of an example. Suppose one has a portfolio of equities with an 
initial value ofR 1 million. One would decide what floor one would be comfortable with. In the example a 
floor ofR 900 000 is assumed. As one is long of the underlying shares one would sell the shares forward to 
hedge the exposure. In this case we assume R 500 000 of the portfolio is sold forward. The portfolio is now 
50% hedged. This has had the effect of reducing the exposure, while reducing the possible maximum 
payoff of the portfolio. Say the value of the underlying portfolio drops to R 990 000. To ensure the floor is 
kept, the portfolio would have to be further hedged. In this example another R 50 000 of the portfolio 
would be sold forward. This would have the effect of increasing the proportion of the portfolio that is 
hedged to 56%. If the portfolio dropped to R 980 000 it would have to be hedged further. Another R 45000 
of the underlying stock would be sold forward. This would have the effect of increasing the hedged portion 
of the portfolio to 61 %. 
As one can see the percentage of the portfolio is increased as its value nears the set floor. Upon reaching 
the floor the portfolio would be 100% hedged. This would restrict the portfolio to earning the risk free rate. 
As the value of the portfolio increases the hedges would be unwound. Hence the dynamic nature of the 
hedges. Portfolio insurance is thus the use of futures to reduce the underlying exposure of a portfolio to 
loss, while still al10wing some exposure to gains. 
3.9.2 Program Trading. 
Program trading is also known as portfolio insurance. It also involves a dynamic trading strategy designed 
to reduce the losses a portfolio may be exposed to. Where, as the value of a portfolio drops, portfolio 
insurance described above advocates forward selling, program trading advocates selling off part of the 
portfolio itself. 
Program trading was partly blamed for the 1987 stock market "crash" according to Bernstein (1996 : 319). 
This was because as the values of the portfolios fell and positions were liquidated, so the general price level 
fell as well. This caused a spiral effect and result in prices dropping quickly as selling increased through the 
use of program trading. After the week of Monday 19, 1987, the portfolios "protected" by portfolio 
insurance were subject to losses similar to those who had not opted for portfolio insurance (Bernstein, 1996 
: 320). 
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3.9.3 Securities Lending. 
Securities Lending has also been accused of destabilising markets. Securities lending is a term that refers to 
the practice of a portfolio manager lending out underlying equities and bonds to facilitate arbitrage 
strategies. This can best be explained by means of an example: 
Asset manager A has a long term holding in stock X. Arbitrageur B needs to borrow share X to complete a 
short strategy. Arbitrageur B enters into a transaction with asset manager A whereby Arbitrageur B 
borrows share X from the asset manager and sells it The aim of the transaction for the arbitrageur will be 
to wait for the price of the share to drop, buy it back at as lower price and deliver it back to the asset 
manager in settlement of the loan. Asset manager A enters into the transaction to eam a lending fee - the 
asset manager will charge the arbitrageur a fee, which in South Africa, typically varies from 0.5% (50 basis 
points) to 2.5% (250 basis points) per year, of the initial value of the shares loaned out It is important to 
note that there are no set guidelines as to what the fees should be - they are determined by market forces of 
supply and demand. See figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3 - Securities Lending Example. 
At Initiation of Transaction 
Share X 
Asset Manager A Arbitrageur B 
Collateral 
.... .... 
Unwinding of Transaction 
Collateral 
.. 
Asset Manager A 
,.. 
Arbitrageur B 
Share X + Fee 
As described before. part of the cash and carry arbitrage dictates that one must be able to short the 
underlying instrument. Practically this will be done by using a securities loan mechanism. If one was to 
enter a transaction involving the Sasol future listed on SAFEX and a reverse cash and carry arbitrage 
strategy was entered into, the Sasol share would have to be sold short at the inception of the transaction. 
This short sale would be hedged forward by means ofa long futures contract on SasoL In August 1999, the 
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Genesis report (Counihan, C & Malherbe, S, 1999) was issued which sought to investigate whether 
securities lending had a role to play in destabilising the South African markets. It was empirically proved 
that securities lending actually stabilised the South African market during periods of turbulence. As the 
main reason for securities loans being entered into is to facilitate arbitrage, this suggests that futures 
arbitrage is a stabilising influence on volatile markets. 
3.10 Regulation in the Futures Market 
The South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) is governed by two sets of "rules". The first is the Financial 
Markets Control Act (Act No. 55 of 1989) as amended. The second is the rules of the South African 
Futures Exchange (SAFEX Rules) that came into operation on 1 July 1994 in terms of Government Gazette 
No. 15841 of! July 1994. The SAFEX rules will be dealt with under appendix 9.3.1 in the appendices 
below, while the Financial Markets Control Act will be dealt with under appendix 9.3.2 in the appendices 
below. 
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Chapter 4: Volatility - a Discussion. 
The purpose of this thesis is not only to determine the pricing efficiency of SAFEX listed futures, but also 
to determine how this pricing efficiency reacts to market shocks. A proxy for market shocks is assumed to 
be an increase in volatility. The approach is to calculate the volatility and compare it against the significant 
market events during the period to determine if the shocks are identifiable through increases in volatility. 
Once the volatility has been determined it is compared to the change in the pricing efficiency in an attempt 
to identify any discemable patterns. According to Kolb (1997,375) most of the debate surrounding 
volatility and futures has been around the possible volatility caused in underlying equity markets by the 
existence of fmancial futures. Some critics of index futures trading have sought to have the practice banned 
on the grounds that it increases volatility in the underlying markets. Consequently a number of studies were 
completed in this area. Their fmdings are discussed below. Whether financial futures increase market 
volatility or not would only affect a study covering a period before and after the introduction of futures 
trading. As this thesis covers a period starting with the introduction of futures trading, the issue of whether 
fmancial futures trading increases volatility is ignored as the focus is on the marginal or excess volatility. 
4.1 What is Volatility? 
The volatility of an instrument is the degree of variance in its price over a period of time. Increased 
volatiHty in a market increases the risk inherent in the market. This has implications for the pricing of the 
instruments listed on the markets. The cost of capital increases as one introduces more risk as investors 
need to be compensated for this risk. Increased volatility thus results in increased cost of capital and raises 
fmance hurdle rates. This, in tum, can reduce the amount of finance available for businesses. 
When measuring volatility one needs to be aware of the notion of excess volatility. In any market there will 
be a level of volatility experienced as prices fluctuate on a day-to-day basis. From time to time there may 
be periods where volatility increases due an event or string of events. This increased volatility is what is 
known as excess volatility. This chapter examines this excess volatility. The thesis compares these periods 
of excess volatility with the pricing efficiency of the futures contracts. Volatility can also be considered as 
being the annualised standard deviation of the natural logarithms of asset returns. This will be expressed 
mathematically in chapter 8. 
For the purpose of measuring volatility in the context of this thesis one needs to be aware that there are two 
types of volatility - the volatility of the spot and futures market. The volatilites of these two markets are not 
necessarily the same. Theoretically they should by similar due to the arbitrage opportunities that would 
arise in the event they are not. If the spot market was, for example, more volatile than the futures market 
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this would imply the prices in the spot market move more than the prices in the futures market. This would 
create situations where a spot price has moved and the related futures price has not. This would create the 
arbitrage opportunity as described in chapter three. 
With regards spot market volatility, the term volatility describes the fluctuations in the price of a stock or 
other type of security. If the price of a stock is capable of large swings, the stock has a high volatility. The 
pricing of options contracts depends in part on volatility. A stock with high volatility, for example, 
commands higher prices in the options market than one with low volatility. Volatility is measured by an 
alpha factor; for example, a stock with a 1.4 alpha is regarded as one whose price will vary by 40% in a 
year. Also: a measure of the volatility of a security relative to an entire market, such as the Standard & 
Poor's 500 Index, is known as the security's beta or beta coefficient. (Hull, 1999 : 51). 
Volatility is not necessarily a bad phenomenon. It does increase risk to market participants, but may 
increase trading opportunities. The risks that increase with the introduction of volatility are: 
• Delayed trading information. 
• Multiple prices. 
• Inaccurate price quotes. 
• Varied Price Executions. 
4.1.1 Delayed trading information. 
Increased volatility means that prices move faster than they normally would. For this to occur there would 
have to be an increased number of trades. During periods of increased volatility this increase in the number 
oftr'ddes can result in the delayed reporting of these trades. This delayed trading information would have an 
effect on any market participants' trading. Given participants will react to market information when making 
decisions, the delayed transmission of the market information will impair the ability to make decisions and 
thus increase the risk involved in trading. This risk related directly to the reporting of each trade put 
through by the market participant to the market participant. If the market participant puts a buy order 
through, hoping to make a profit from a small price increase, in a volatile market, the participant needs to 
know if and when the original buy order is executed. The longer it takes to notify the participant that the 
order has been filled the increased risk that the participant will not be able to exit the trade as planned. 
Thus, any delay in the reporting of any trade to a market participant will result in increased risk in a volatile 
market. 
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4.1.2 Multiple Prices. 
This risk is related to the above one. This can best be described by means of an example. A market's 
volatility increased and a trader put through an order to sell 1000 ABCs at 100 cents in response to market 
report of a buy order of 2000 ABCs at 100 cents. On the order reaching the market the price had moved and 
the trader had only managed to fulfill part of the order at 100 cents, or alternatively, 50 ABCs were sold at 
100 and 50 were sold at 90. This example shows the delay in the order reaching the market resulting in 
multiple prices being matched. In a volatile market, the increased number of orders could make any delay 
in transmitting a price to the market costly. This would increase the operational risk involved in trading. 
4.1.3 Inaccurate Price Quotes. 
This is similar to the first risk. In this case the risk is not that the trader is informed late of any orders the 
trader put through. This is simply the risk inherent in the delay of the transmission of market information 
during periods of volatility. This is because it impairs the decision making ability of the market participants 
and exposes them to the possibility of making incorrect trading decisions. 
4.1.4 Varied Price Executions 
This risk is similar in nature to 4.1.2 above. In 4.1.2, due to time delays in a volatile market orders risk 
being filled at mUltiple prices. In this case, again due to the volatility, the orders can be filled at a totally 
different price to what was expected. The trader will put in a market or "at best" order based on information 
that indicates prices at a certain level. Due to the delay in getting the order to market. by the time the order 
is executed the prices might change. As the order is a market order, the floor broker will be authorised to 
execute the trade at the market price that, due to the delay, might have changed. This risk of varied price 
execution impacts on the trader's expectations by introducing uncertainty into the decision making process. 
This, in turn, increases the risk involved in trading. 
4.2 Possible Causes - The introduction of Futures Trading. 
In answer to the question "Has stock market volatility increased with the introduction of financial futures?" 
Kolb (1997,107) outlines the fmdings of twenty studies in this area. Working (1960) tested this hypothesis 
against the onion market. The findings were that the introduction of futures trading actually reduced the 
volatility of the underlying spot market. This was retested in 1963 by Gray. The results of this test were the 
same as in the Working's study - the introduction of futures trading actually reduced the volatility in the 
underlying spot onion market. 
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The focus of these studies remained on the commodity markets: Powers (1970) studied the effects of the 
introduction of futures trading on the cattle and pork market. Like the previous studies the conclusion was 
that the introduction of futures stabilised the underlying spot market. Taylor and Leuthold (1974) applied 
the above study to live cattle prices. The results were the same - the introduction of futures trading resulted 
in more stable prices after futures trading began. 
Froewiss (1978) was the first to examine the effect of the introduction offmancial futures trading on the 
underlying spot market. The study was conducted on the mortgage bond market after the introduction of 
mortgage interest rate futures. The results of this study was that the introduction of futures trading did not 
increase the price volatility in the mortgage bond market. This study was repeated in 1981 by Figlewski. 
The results in this case differed: the introduction of futures trading resulted in an increase in the volatility 
of the underlying mortgage bond market. A further study was completed on the impact of the introduction 
of futures trading on the mortgage bond market. The study was completed by Moriarty and Tossini (1985). 
This time the fmdings were that futures trading did not increase the volatility in the mortgage bond market. 
It must be noted that all these studies were completed on the United States mortgage bond market. 
The last of the non-index futures studies reviewed by Kolb (1997 : 109) was completed by Antoniou and 
Foster (1992) who looked at the impact of futures trading on the Brent crude oil market. The fmdings were 
that the persistence of volatility in the underlying Brent crude oil market declined after futures trading 
commenced. 
Index futures were first examined for their impact on volatility in 1987 by Santoni. The results of this study 
revealed that there was no significant increase in daily or weekly volatility of the Standard and Poors (S&P) 
index after futures trading on the S&P index was introduced. This study was backed up by Edwards in 1988 
who reproduced the Santoni study and came to the same conclusion. The Edwards study was extended to 
include intraday data. Harris (1989) formed two groups, an S&P 500 group and a group ofnon-S&P 500 
stocks to simulate S&P 500 stocks. The groups had the same volatility before S&P 500 futures commenced 
trading. After the futures have begun trading the S&P 500 stocks were slightly more volatile. This thesis 
thus supported the hypothesis that the introduction of index futures trading increases the volatility of the 
underlying spot market. 
Lockwood and Linn (1990) found evidence to support the above view that volatility increases with the 
introduction of index futures trading. Their study was extended to include hourly returns on the Dow Jones 
indices and found that volatility increased after index futures commenced trading. Maberly, Allen and 
Gilbert's study (1989) found that volatility increases with the introduction of index futures trading 
particularly in bull markets. This view was refuted by the study conducted by Becketti and Roberts (1990) 










Chapter 4: Volatility - a Discussion. Page 55 
who found that there is little relationship between volatility in the stock market and the existence or volume 
of index futures trading. 
Brorsen (1991) increased the scope of the study to include examining the effects of the deregulation of the 
charging of broker's commission. The study did look at the introduction of index futures trading and 
concluded that volatility did increase largely due to "reduced market frictions" (Kolb, 1997: 382). Again, 
in 1991, Gerety and Mulherin found to the contrary. The Gerety and Mulherin study found that there was 
no systematic increase in volatility after the introduction of stock index futures. Bessembinder and Seguin 
(1992) recorder similar results in their study that examined whether volatility patterns in the stock market 
are related to volume in the futures market. They found there to be no relation between volumes in the 
stock futures market and the volatility of the underlying spot market. 
The fmal two studies suggested an increase in volatility. Kamara, Miller and Siegel (1992) found that stock 
market volatility increased after stock futures trading commenced, but were unable to conclude as to what 
caused this. Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993) examined the bid-ask spread on the New York Stock 
exchange both before and after the introduction of stock futures trading. They found that, after the 
introduction of stock futures trading, the bid-ask spread increased which the authors suggest was due to 
trading volumes being attracted to the futures market. 
The above studies show different results. The evidence suggests that the introduction of futures trading 
does not increase market volatility in all the markets with the exception of the stock market, the fmdings 
are not irrefutable. However, the weight of the evidence suggests that the introduction of futures trading to 
these markets does not effect a market adversely. In some cases these markets became more stable than 
they were prior to the introduction of futures trading. In the case of equity futures the studies are less 
conclusive. Some of the studies concluded that the introduction of stock or index futures trading resulted in 
an increase in volatility while others refuted this. Kolb (1997 : 389) concludes that the introduction of 
futures trading do not appear to result in increased volatility. His reasons for this are that there could be 
other reasons for any increases in volatility such as inflation or deficits. He does concede, however, that it 
is possible that the introduction of stock futures trading did result in an increase in volatility. 
The studies were performed by calculating the volatility of the spot market before the futures were 
introduced and comparing it to the volatility of the spot market after futures trading had begun. This 
excludes studies such as Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993) who used a different methodology when 
looking at bid-ask spreads. 
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4.3 Possible Causes - Index Arbitrage. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the effects of volatility on index arbitrage opportunities. Kolb (1997 : 
380). However, studies have been performed to examine if index arbitrage causes volatility. If index 
arbitrage causes volatility, this will impact on the study as a circular argument would ensue: index arbitrage 
causes volatility which in tum causes index arbitrage, which in tum causes volatility etceteras. 
As described in chapter three, index arbitrage involves traders identifying opportunities where the price of 
an index future is different from its theoretical one calculated using the cost of carry model. In the event 
this is the case, traders will enter into the market and take advantage of the opportnnity, thereby increasing 
trading volume. According to Kolb (1997 : 378) the positions are typically held to maturity (expiration of 
the futures contract) where they will be unwound as the futures price converges on the spot price. To avoid 
settlement procedures some traders will unwind their position once the discrepancy has been removed by 
entering into reverse trades, thereby removing the need to hold the position to maturity. 
Critics of index arbitrage fear that as futures approach maturity, the desire to avoid settlement procedures 
will result in traders unwinding positions with increasing regularity as maturity approaches Kolb (1997 : 
379). This would result in significant increases in trading volumes and volatility of the underlying prices. 
This, according to the same critics, will disrupt trading and push away investors who are averse to 
volatility. Kolb (1997 : 379) points out that this would only be the case if there was an order imbalance. If 
there were similar numbers of cost of carry position holders and reverse cost of carry position holders 
looking to unwind their positions, (and thus a balance in the orders) the trades would be filled without 
much effect on the market. One would thus not see an increase in volatility. 
Index arbitrage only effects market volatility if two prerequisites are in place. Firstly, as the futures 
approach expiry the volatility could increase. Secondly, this would only be possible if there was some form 
of order imbalance between cost of carry and reverse cost of carry positions held by the market 
participants. The first part is examined below in 4.5. The effect of order imbalances were examined by the 
Brady Report (United States) which was a report commissioned in response to the October 1987 "Crash". 
The results of this report suggested that there was an order imbalance that resulted in increased volatility. 
However, the recommendations of the Brady report implied that the order imbalance was caused by 
increased volatility in the market. This was corroborated by a study completed by Bume, Mackinlay and 
Terker (1989: 830) who found that S&P stocks fell 7% further than non S&P stocks. However, by the 
middle of the following day this has been rectifies and the difference had been mostly eliminated. The 
Bume, Mackinlay and Terker (1989: 830) study also found a positive correlation between order 
imbalances and the fall in the stock prices, suggesting that index arbitrage destabilised the market 
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Both the recommendations of the Brady report and the Bume. Mackinlay and Terker (l989) study pointed 
to the fact that index arbitrage only adds to the volatility in a market once the market has already become 
unstable through increased volatility. The further finding is that this does not remain the case as the index 
arbitrage also returns the stocks to the general market level. 
One should expect the above to occur. In the case ofa market that becomes more volatile. index arbitrage 
will have to take place to keep futures prices in line with the stock prices. This will introduce more trades 
into the market. This introduction of more trades could impact on the level of the stock prices. However, in 
this case where index arbitrage forces the prices out of equilibrium would induce index arbitrage in the 
opposite direction to return to the equilibrium where no arbitrage could take place. This would precipitate 
the conclusion that index arbitrage may increase volatility in times of increased volatility, but only 
temporarily. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the effects of excess volatility on the pricing efficiency of the futures 
prices. This will be done by examining the possible arbitrage opportunities that are created by the 
introduction of excess volatility. The above suggests that one should anticipate seeing two distinct stages in 
the arbitrage opportunities. The first stage should show one direction being predominant (for example cost 
of carry) and a second stage should show the opposite form of arbitrage being predominant (reverse cost of 
carry). 
4.4 Portfolio Insurance. 
The reason for the Brady report being commissioned was that critics of index arbitrage trading felt that, 
index arbitrage combined with portfolio insurance led to a destabilising spiral. The theory of this 
destabilising spiral is known as Cascade Theory (Kolb, 1997 : 385). Cascade Theory can best be explained 
by means of an example: 
Portfolio insurers would look to reduce equity exposure as the markets begin to drop (for the dynamics of 
portfolio insurance see 3.9.1). This would be done by selling futures. This increased selling could result in 
the futures prices dropping below their theoretical values. When a future drops below its theoretical value 
the arbitrage strategy to apply is the reverse cost of carry strategy. This results in the index arbitrageurs 
buying futures and selling the underlying stocks in accordance with the arbitrage strategy. This results in 
the underlying stock prices being depressed further which, in turn causes portfolio insurers to sen more of 
their portfolio forward depressing futures prices further, encouraging index arbitrageurs to enter the market. 
In combination, the arbitrageurs and the portfolio insurers drive down both future and spot prices. This is 
Cascade Theory. 
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The above example shows how portfolio insurance can combine with index arbitrage to force markets 
downward. The regulatory authorities have taken steps to ensure this does not occur. The lead in this has 
come from the United States in the form of the Brady report recommendations. The main recommendation 
is the implementation of circuit breakers (Kolb, 1997 :387). Circuit breakers are halts in trading during 
periods of volatility. The effect of this is to "decouple" the stock market and the stock futures, allowing 
time to stop the circular pattern of the Cascade Theory. An example of circuit breakers are price limits. 
SAFEX has never implemented price limits but has the power to do so. This is because circuit breakers are 
controversial and their value unknown (Kolb, 1997: 387). 
Portfolio insurance when looked at in isolation can also be seen as a possible contributor to volatility in 
markets. This is through order imbalances. These order imbalances could affect stock prices as described 
above in 4.3. The order imbalances would arise through the portfolio insurance trades being executed in the 
same direction of the market. In the case where the market is falling, in terms of portfolio insurance, a 
forward sale has to take place that is in the same direction of the market. When the market is rising 
portfolio insurance dictates that purchases have to be made which are in the same direction of the market. 
When the trades are in the same direction of the market there is the possibility for order imbalances to 
result. As portfolio insurance is on the same direction of the market there is a tendency for portfolio 
insurance to contribute to the existing "momentum" of the market (Kolb. 1997 :379) and the result and 
volatility. 
4.5 Futures Close Out. 
There are two arguments that support the view that as the expiration date of a futures contract approaches, 
so the volatility of the futures price should increase. The first argument looks at the period up to maturity, 
while the second focuses on the volatility on the expiry day and, more specifically, the final trading session. 
4.5.1 Period up to Maturity. 
The original proponent of this theory was Samuelson (1965 : 41 - 49) who argued that the volatility of 
futures prices should increase as the contract approaches maturity. The Samuelson Hypothesis (as it has 
become to been known) assumes that competitive prices within a market keep the prices of the futures 
equal to the expected spot price at the contract's termination. This results in what is known as a 
"Martingale" which is a price process in which the expected value of the next price equals the current price. 
so the expected price change is zero (Kolb, 1997 : 108). Applying this to the term of a futures contract one 
can conclude that the futures price equals the expected spot price. 
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This links into volatility as follows: Little information is known about the future price of the spot 
instrument at the commencement of the life of the future. As the futures contract approaches maturity, more 
becomes known about the possible value of the future spot price. The closer to the expiry date the contract 
is, there is more introduction of information regarding the possible future value of the spot price. This 
increased introduction of information results in more movements in the expected price of the spot as the 
information is absorbed. As the futures prices follow a Martingale, they move as the expected value of the 
future spot price changes, which results in increased volatility in the futures market. Using commodities to 
illustrate the point, Kolb (1997 : 109) gives the following example: 
Table 4.1 - Example of the Samuelson Hypothesis. 
"Little is known about a corn harvest a full year before harvest time. As 
harvest approaches, the market gets a much better idea of the ultimate price 
I that corn will command. For a futures contract expiring near the harvest, 
Samuelson'S model implies that the futures price should be more volatile as 
the harvest approaches" 
Source: Kolb (1997: 109) 
Below are six studies that examine the evidence of the Samuelson Hypothesis in the commodities markets. 
Rutledge (1976) looked at the hypothesis in relation to wheat, soybean oil, silver and cocoa futures. The 
results were that the hypothesis was rejected in the flrst two cases but accepted in the case of silver and 
cocoa futures. Rutledge, thus did not prove for or against the Samuelson Hypothesis. Grauer (1977) looked 
for evidence of the hypothesis working on 10 different commodities. No support was found for the 
hypothesis. 
In 1979, Dusak-Miller performed the same tests and found support for the Samuelson Hypothesis in live 
beef futures. This was further confirmed by the study performed by Castelino and Francis (1982) who 
found support for the hypothesis in wheat, corn and soybean complex futures. Anderson's study (1985) also 
supported the Samuelson Hypothesis but found evidence of other factors effecting volatility (Kolb. 1997 : 
109). The above studies, combined with the results of the Milonas study (1986), which found support for 
the hypothesis in 10 out of 11 commodities tested, suggest that the Samuelson Hypothesis is correct. The 
bulk of the evidence supports its existence. Each of the above studies found there to be a type of seasonal 
volatility. The Samuelson Hypothesis supports this seasonal volatility; the seasons are linked to the 
maturity of the futures contracts. 
Kolb (1997 : 110) comments that there could be other kinds of seasonal volatility. One of these mentioned 
(in the case of commodities) is the harvesting season influence. A study completed by Anderson and 
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Danthine (1983) concluded that a possible effect on the seasonal nature of volatility in futures prices could 
be the supply and demand for information concerning the underlying spot commodity or instrument 
Another issue is the possibility of autocorrelation in the volatilities measured - if volatility is high in one 
month there is a possibility that it will be high in the following month. A final suggestion for other sources 
of seasonal volatility is given by Kolb (1997 : 110): the day of the week effect. This is where volatility 
appears to be higher on Mondays than on other days of the week. 
4.5.2 Volatility on Expiry Day. 
In 4.3 above, mention was made of market volatility increasing as futures approached their maturity or 
close out. This would illustrate futures contributing to periodic increases in volatility. Santoni (1987) 
observed what was termed a "jump" volatility. This jump volatility is the occasional extreme jump in 
prices. The existence of jump volatility does not necessarily mean that market prices have moved to a 
higher level of volatility, just that there are periods of heightened volatility. Santoni (1987) examined the 
effects of the introduction of index futures trading and only noticed jump volatility. He concluded that there 
was no evidence of increased normal market volatiJity. 
When a market experiences order imbalances one should anticipate some degree of jump volatility. This 
would be intensified by an unwinding of an index arbitrage program that could possibly add to the order 
imbalance. This possible emergence of jump volatility as a futures contract approaches expiry has lead to a 
number of studies examined below. Part of these studies looked at what is known as the triple witching 
hour. This is when index futures, options on stock indices and options on the stock indices' futures expire. 
This simultaneous expiry has led to the term "the triple witching hour" as there is a heightened fear of 
excess or jump volatility. In the South African derivatives market the focus is more on the futures close out 
as this is where the market liquidity is the greatest. Most of the studies below find that there is increased 
volatility on these close out days, compared with other days. The jump volatility is concentrated in the last 
hour of trading. This is due to the method in which the fmal settlement price is determined. On SAFEX, the 
equity index futures' settlement prices are determined as follows: an arithmetic average of the index is 
taken every 2 minutes, over the fmal two hours of trading on expiry date, as calculated by the JSE (see 
appendix 3.1). On the Chicago Board of Trade the settlement price is determined in a similar manner. As 
the settlement price is determined over the last trading session, as the session draws to a close, so traders, 
not wanting to settle, will reverse their positions. This will result in increased trading volumes and possible 
order imbalance. 
Stoll and Whaley (1986) produced the first study in this area of expiration day volatility. The study was 
done using minute-by-minute price data. The mean and standard deviation of returns were computed over 
the day. The study found that the standard deviation was higher when futures expired than when they did 
not. This was particularly prevalent in the last hour of trading. This was not the case when the S&P 100 
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option expired while the future did not. In this case the study found that the volatility was not significantly 
higher than on days on which nothing expired (Kolb, 1997 : 381). Another finding of the Stoll and Whaley 
study was that stock prices tended to fall on these expiry dates and rise again in the first thirty minutes of 
trade on the day following a futures contract expiry day. Both the price effect and the volatility effect were 
statistically significant 
Stoll and Whaley (1987) repeated their study in 1987 that resulted in the same conclusions, that expiration 
day volatility is greater than other trading days. Again it was found that this was particularly prevalent on 
the last hour of trade on the expiration day. Santoni's study (1987) also examined the expiration day effect 
on market volatility. This study, however, found expiration day volatility not to be higher than other trading 
days. This suggests some degree of uncertainty as to whether expiration day volatility is indeed higher than 
other trading days. The below studies provide overwhelming support for the Stoll and Whaley fmdings that 
the volatility on expiration day does increase suggesting that one should conclude this to be the case. 
Edwards (1988) completed two studies during 1988 which both came to the same conclusions that 
expiration day volatility is greater than other trading days. This was supported by Feinstein and Goetzmann 
(1988) who came to the same conclusion when they studied expiration day volatility. Stoll and Whaley 
(1990) repeated their previous two studies in 1990. This time they noticed higher stock volume on 
expiration days, but similar price behavior for all stocks, whether represented by futures trading or not 
(Kolb, 1997 : 383). This seems to support the Santoni (1987) finding, but Stoll and Whaley (1991) repeated 
the study in 1991 and found that the change in the expiration day reduced trading activity and price 
volatility at expiration, which implies that there was increased volatility at expiration. 
The Hancock (1991) study supported the view that volatility increased on expiration, however, the fmdings 
were slightly different. Hancock found that for the last fifteen minutes of trading, volatility is higher on 
expiration days, but that volatility is not higher at the close of trading than earlier in the trading day (Kolb, 
1997 : 383). The study completed by Herbst and Maberly (1991) was simi1ar to the 1991 Stoll and Whaley 
study. The study examined changes to the expiration procedures where Stoll and Whaley (1991) examined 
changes to the expiration date. The Herbst and Maber ly (1991) study found that changes in the expiration 
procedures significantly reduced the volatility on expiration day (Kolb, 1997 : 383). This implies that there 
was excess volatility during the expiration day prior to the change in the expiration procedures. 
From the above studies one can conclude that futures close out leads to momentary increases in volatility. 
There is evidence to support the Samuelson Hypothesis as well as the jump volatility theory. In this thesis 
care will have to be taken to build in the effects of futures close out on volatility. The thesis examines the 
effects of increased volatility on the pricing efficiency of futures prices. As volatility is caused by futures 
close out it would be of value to isolate these periods when drawing conclusions on futures pricing 
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efficiency. By isolating the futures close out period one can identify the effects of seasonal excess market 
volatility (coming from futures close-outs) and external market shocks such as the emerging markets' 
crises. 
4.6 Securities Lending. 
There is a concern voiced by various market commentators, that securities lending increases market 
volatility and forces prices downwards. A notable proponent of this view is Donald Gordon, ex head of 
Liberty Life (Temkin, 1999) who argued that securities lending and arbitrage trading resulted in the Liberty 
Life stock price being depressed since the 1994 issue of Liberty Life convertible bonds in the European 
bond markets. As described in chapter three, securities lending facilitates arbitrage between the spot and 
futures prices. In response to these criticisms a report was commissioned by the Financial Services Board in 
January 1999 to investigate the securities lending industry in South Africa and whether the practice of 
securities lending should be curtailed or banned completely. The report is known as the Genesis Report and 
was completed by Counihan and Malherbe (1999). The scope of the report was three-fold. Firstly, the 
history, extent, composition and trend in securities lending facilitated by South African intermediaries was 
presented and analysed. The second perspective considered the role of securities lending in the relationship 
between futures and underlying markets, and in particular whether the arbitrage facilitated by securities 
lending is a stabilising or destabilising force. Thirdly, the risks faced by each participant in a securities loan 
were considered (Counihan and Malherbe, 1999 : 10). 
Given the concerns that had been voiced over securities lending and the practice of short selling, this report 
would have implications for the pricing efficiency of South Africa futures as a restriction in the lending of 
securities would have reduced the ability of the futures I spot arbitrage mechanism to operate. The 
investigation surrounding the second point is thus pertinent to this thesis. The nature of the concerns voiced 
over securities lending is that it leads to a "vicious circle" (Counihan and Malherbe, 1999: 33) that drives 
down prices artificially, the rationale being that securities lending results in increased market volatility. 
This in tum opens up arbitrage opportunities between the spot and futures market as the spot and futures 
prices diverge. This arbitrage is driven by securities lending, which, in tum, increases the short selling 
activity and thus artificially drives prices down further - hence the "vicious circle". 
Counihan and Malherbe (1999 : 33) examined the correlation between securities lending and market 
volatility as, according to them, one should expect to fmd a close correlation between securities lending and 
market volatility for the above to be true. This examination was done on using a two-pronged approach. 
Firstly, the market participants were approached to comment on the relationship between market volatility 
and securities lending. The second part of the approach involved the correlation of volatility and securities 
lending activity. 
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The results of the examination showed that securities lending does not increase volatility and in certain 
cases securities lending actually reduces market volatility. The discussions with the market participants 
revealed that in times of extreme volatility arbitrage activity actually declines, this was suggested to be due 
to an increased operational risk. This would be because in periods of heightened volatility one would need 
to make more margin calls, putting pressure on this administrative capabilities of market participants. This, 
in turn, increases the operational risk as margin calls could be missed or take to long to conclude. This 
increase in operational risk would result in the market participant withdrawing from the securities lending 
market and thus the dampening effect. 
The second part of the study where securities lending activity and volatility was correlated also concluded 
that securities lending does not contribute to excess volatility that a market might experience. In the study, 
the volatility of the ALSI40 was used as a proxy for the volatility of all spot equity prices. Other variables 
such as market activity were computed using trading volume. The results of the test not only confmned that 
securities lending does not contribute to increased market volatility but, over certain periods, it was seen to 
have a negative correlation with the increased levels of market volatility suggesting that securities lending 
has the ability to dampen market volatility. 
Further results were that the futures price leads the spot price with a lead of up to 40 minutes being 
recorded. This was found to be true even during crisis periods. No "vicious spiral" effect on prices was 
noted throughout the period tested which was June 1996 to December 1998. This included the emerging 
market crises. Convergence was noted between the spot and futures prices, which was found to come from 
arbitrage. The last significant fmding was that lending for bear sales purposes dampened high levels of 
volatility. 
The methodology employed in the second part of the study was to take daily data from June 1996 to the 
end of 1998, comprising of spot prices, number of contracts traded, trading volume in the futures and spot 
markets and the open position in futures and shares. The open position in shares was computed by looking 
at open securities loans. This was then followed by calculating volatility estimates. This was done using a 
statistical procedure called the Gauss-Seidel procedure that is an iterative process which stabilises the 
volatility measures which allow one to determine which variable determines the volatility. The final 
equation describing the volatility estimate was: 
4 n n 
at = a + L Ajdi + L 8k at - k + L OJmXt,m + V t (10) 
j=l k=l 
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Where (j denotes the estimated volatility in the spot market, di the day of the week effects and Xt a vector 
of the volume measures and dummies for the crisis period (Counihan and Malherbe. 1999 : 34). It was 
found that aU the volume measures were highly correlated with each other so it was irrelevant which one 
was used for the study. The volatility on the ALSI40 spot was constructed by taking the average standard 
deviation on the ALSI spot market over a Monday to Friday trading period (Counihan and Malherbe, 1999 
: 34). Three different volatility measures were then calculated: 
a) The volume of the total lending market. 
b) The volume of ALSI40 scrip lending market. 
c) The volume of bear sales on the ALSI40 scrip lending market. 
The test was then performed to see if there was a statistically significant link between the three volume 
measures and the volatility measure that was constructed. The results of the above test were as follows: 
In the case of a) above, there was no evidence of a statistically significant link between volatility on the 
ALSI40 and the total volume of scrip lending. In the case of b) above, there was no evidence ofa 
statistically significant link between volatility on the ALSI40 and the volume of ALSI40 scrip lending, In 
the case of c) above, there was some evidence ofa statistically significant link between volatility on the 
ALSI40 and the volume of ALSI40 bear scrip lending. This was, however, sensitive to the sample period 
chosen. Where the weeks starting the 20 October 1998 and 27 October 1998 are included in estimation, the 
first difference of the volume of bear scrip lending proves to be insignificant, suggesting that no link is 
present between volatility and volume of bear scrip lending, However, if the weeks starting the 20 October 
1998 and 27 October 1998 were excluded from estimation, the first difference of the volume of bear scrip 
lending proves to be significant, suggesting that a link between volatility and volume of bear scrip lending 
is present. More important than the finding of statistical significance, however, is the implication that rising 
volumes of bear scrip lending leads to falling volatility on the ALSI40 (Counihan and Malherbe, 1999 : 
46), 
The fmdings conclude that scrip lending provides "an important link between spot and futures markets" 
(Counihan and Malherbe, 1999 : 45). Without it, liquidity on both SAFEX and the JSE would drop and 
prices between the two exchanges would become uncoordinated. This would lead to institutional managers 
not being able to manage their exposures professionally. This results in the conclusion that given these 
benefits and the absence of any negative effects, securities lending ought not to be curtailed in SA. 
Counihan and Malherbe also note that in the event the practice of securities lending was to become 
curtailed, lending would still continue off shore that the South African authorities would be unable to 
control. This would lessen the effect of an on shore ban and possibly push the local practice off shore. 
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4.7 Measurement Issues. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the measurement of volatility will be divided into two distinct parts. The one 
part will involve the measurement of volatility using auto-regressive conditional heteroscedastic techniques 
(ARCH). These techniques will be grouped under the section ARCH below. The rest of the measurement 
techniques used for the purpose of this thesis will be examined under the section "traditional" below. The 
difficulty in measuring volatility is that it does not tend to be constant. In some periods it is high, and in 
other periods it maybe low, for the purposes of this thesis, what needs to be measured is the change in 
volatility so that this can be correlated with the change in the pricing efficiency. In determining the change 
in this volatility one needs to determine the trend in the volatility. The ARCH section below (5.7.2) will not 
be as detailed as the "traditional" section. This is because chapter 7 is dedicated to the ARCH model. 
4. 7.1 Traditional 
Volatility is traditionally measured as standard deviation. The standard deviation is the square root of the 





0'= IPJ(RJ -RE)2 ( 11) 
J=1 
= is the probability of the j'th outcome 
the deviation squared of the jth outcome from the expected return. 
The problem with this model is that it does not derive the standard deviation entirely from the data 
presented. The probability of the j'th outcome is determined using regression type analysis and personal 
judgment. An alternative to the above is the equation is to determine volatility by first calculating a historic, 
standardised volatility, and using this measure to determine variance and standard deviation. The historic, 
standardised volatility measure is determined next. The first step in this second formula is to determine the 
log normal percentage movements in the share price: 
u' =In(~J I ps 
H 
(12) 
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Where: 
= the current price of the security. 
= The continuously compounded return during day i (between the end of day i - 1 and the 
end of day i). 
The next step is to determine the unbiased estimate of the variance per day ( a; ) using the most recent m 
observations. The formula for this is (Hull, 1999: 369): 
(13) 
Where: 
m = The most recent m observations. 
u = Themeanofui 
The mean, U above, is calculated as follows: 
(14) 
To determine the standard deviation one must determine the root of the variance. This will give the 
instantaneous standard deviation (volatility). This can be demonstrated by the means of an example: 
Table 4.2 - Example of the Calculation of "Traditional" Volatility. 
The grid below shows an analysis of the price movements of a fictional security. The fITst column in the table 
records the date the observation was made. The second column shows the price of the security S; at the end of 
day i. The third column shows the proportional change in the price of the security between the end of day i-I 
and the end of day i. The fourth column shows the natural log of the proportional change calculated in column 
three. This is described by the equation U i = In(Si / SH)' The fifth column calculates the variance of the log 
normal proportional change for day i from the mean of the log normal proportional changes over the previous m 
days. This is described by the following equation Vi = u/ - u where Vi is the variance. The variance is squared 
in the sixth column. All the squared variances are added together and the mean is found. This is the log normal 
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variance of the share price over the past m days. The variance is then rooted to produce the volatility or standard 
deviation. 








7 20.875 1.000000 
8 20.875 1.000000 
9 20.75 0.994012 
10 20.75 1.000000 0.000000 (0.004766) 0.000022710076 
11 21 1.012048 0.011976 0.007211 0.000051993936 
12 21.125 1.005952 0.005935 0.001169 0.000001367091 
13 20.875 0.988166 (0.011905) (0.016670) 0.000277902619 





The variance per day, 0'; = _1_ i (u n- i -~r is thus 0.000151485114 and the volatility is 0.012307928893 
m-l i=1 
or 0.12% per day. 
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The volatility calculated in the example above can be expressed as both annual and daily rates. The above 
volatility is the volatility per day. The formula for the annual volatility is s = a A Ji , where t is the 
length of the time interval in years and a A is the annual volatility. In the above case one would set the 
length of time to be equal to the number of trading days. As per Hull (1999 :242) the period 't should be set 
to be the annual number of trading days and not the calendar days as using the trading days gives more 
accurate answers. To annualise the volatility in the above example: O.0123x .J252 = 0.195. The 
annual volatility is thus 19.5% per annum. In this case the number of trading days used was 252. The 
standard error of the estimate is 0.195/.J2 X 20 = 0.031 or 3.1% per annum. The standard error of the 
estimate is deftned as follows: 0' A /..j2;; . 
Formula (13) can be simplifted in the following ways (Hull, 1999 : 369): 
L Ui is deftned as the proportional change in the market variable between the end of day i-I and 
the end of day i so that: 
(15) 
2. u is assumed to be zero. 
3. m - 1 is replaced by m. 
The effect of the above changes is to change formula 13 to become: 
(16) 
For the purposes of this thesis the traditional method will be defmed as formula number 13 above. The 
simpliftcations that are made above are used in the determination of volatility using ARCH. The reasons for 
the above simpliftcations are as follows: 
1. According to Hull (1999, 369) this assumption has little effect on estimates of variance 
because the expected change in a variable one day is very small when compared with the 
standard deviation of changes. 
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2. Replacing m - 1 with m moves the estimate from being an unbiased estimate of the variance 
to a maximum likelihood estimate. A maximum likelihood estimate is explained in chapter 7 
below. 
The one characteristic of the above formulas 12 to 16 is that all the data is treated equally. In calculating the 
volatility for a particular day it would be reasonable to assume that more recent events in the market have 
more effect on the current price movements than events that occurred longer ago. The above formulas 
assign the same weighting to all the data that is processed to calculate current volatility, a logical step 
would be to weight the data in some way to take into account this relative importance of more recent data. 
Hull (1999 :369) suggests the following modifications to equation 16 above to take into account this time-
related phenomenon: 
m 
U; = La,U;-t (17) 
1",1 
Where: 
= the amount of weight given to the observation i days ago. (1)0 
The differences between this formula and formula 16 above are: 
1 
1. - has been removed. This is because the weighting of each data point has negated the need 
m 
to find an average of all the data points. 
2. a l has been added to take the place of the average. 
The weights given to each individual data point must sum to one. The older observations will have less 
weight assigned to them such that at < a j when i > j so that: 
(18) 
Source: Hull, 1999 : 370. 
Further to the assigning ofweightings to individual data points, one should take into consideration long-
term volatility levels. As stated earlier in the chapter, there exists a certain, natural level of volatility of 
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prices within individual markets. This should be taken into account in the weighting of the observations. 







0"; = ']'V + LaiU'~-i (19) 
;",1 
the weight assigned to the long run volatility. 
the long run volatility of the prices within the individual market. 
Note: the individual weights and the weight assigned to the long run volatility should sum to one. This can 
be expressed as follows: 
(20) 
Equation 19 above is known as the ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model and was 
fIrst suggested by Engle (1982: 1000). The essence of this measure is that the older the observations are 
the less weight they are given as well as the long-run average variance needs to be taken into account when 
estimating volatility. Hull simplifIes equation 19 to the following: 
(21) 
Where: 
ro = rV 
This is discussed below in section 4.7.2. The benefIts of using the traditional method to measure the 
volatility of the spot and futures prices are that it is easy to understand and implement. The actual results of 
nsing this measure are presented in chapter 10 below. The reasons for using the ARCH model is that it 
applies a weighting to the different observations, according to their position in the time series which takes 
into account the effects of time on the data. 
According to Hull (1999, 374) variance exhibits what is known as mean reversion. This is when the 
variance moves back to its long run moving average after experiencing short term fluctuations. ARCH 
takes into account long-term variance and thus makes some allowance for this phenomenon of mean 
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reversion. This is another reason for one using the ARCH model to determine the volatility of the share or 
futures prices. A discussion of the ARCH model can be found in the appendices (See Appendix 9.4) 
4.8 Reactions to Volatility. 
As can be seen earlier in this chapter, increases in volatility or any new innovations that are seen to be 
increasing volatility have been greeted with negative reactions. An example of this is index arbitrage and 
securities lending; both were seen as possibly contributing to increased volatility and both were subject to 
officially commissioned investigations. In the event they were seen to be increasing volatility levels one 
may have seen measures to curb their operation. In the cash of index arbitrage, the Brady report was the 
investigation into its impact on volatility. Index arbitrage was seen to lead to some increase in volatility and 
resulted in the Brady report recommending the implementation of circuit breakers. In the case of securities 
lending the South African Financial Services Board commissioned the Genesis report that concluded that 
securities lending was not to blame for increased market volatility. In Malaysia, the practice of securities 
lending was curbed after the Asian Crisis as securities lending was seen to be increasing market volatility 
and contributing to market volatility. 
The question one should ask is "why the negative reaction towards volatility?" The answer to this could be 
found in examining the role of the market regulators. Market regulators want to see the market functioning 
properly. This will be when price discovery occurs efficiently and unhindered. When there is increased 
market volatility, certain market participants are driven out of the market This is because of the increase in 
cost of capital as explained earlier in the chapter. With certain market participants being driven out of the 
market, price discovers will be negatively effected as not all parties will be bidding and offering for the 
quoted securities. This will result in a biased price discovery mechanism, which attracts the attention of the 
regulators. 
From a market participant's point of view, an increase in general levels of volatility and jump volatility 
result in the market possibly reacting differently to the manner in which it normally does. This would be 
because of the withdrawal of certain market participants. With the market changing during periods of 
heightened volatility, one could postulate that this should lead to new market opportunities arising. This 
thesis examines whether any opportunities arise through the incorrect pricing of futures when market 
volatility increases. 
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Chapter 5: Literature Review on Efficiency Studies. 
The studies that were reviewed included other efficiency type studies, such as studies of the foreign 
exchange market. This was done to get a better understanding of the methodology employed. In the case of 
South African studies, the scope was increased to include any studies that had anything to do with the 
futures market. The efficiency study that had the most impact on efficiency investigation in this thesis was 
the Lambrecht's (1990) study. Accordingly it will be afforded more discussion below. 
5.1 South African Efficiency Studies. 
Eleven South African studies were reviewed. On these, four were directly related to the study of efficiency. 
The efficiency studies were all grouped around the launch of SAFEX. This thesis will update the findings 
of these theses with regards to the efficiency of the pricing of SAFE X futures. The remainder of the studies 
looked at other aspects of the futures market. Table 5.1 below summarises the findings of the studies: 
Table 5.1 - Summary of the Findings of the South African Studies of the Futures Market. 
Author (8) and date. Findings. 
HA Lambrechts. 1990 I Efficiency of the futures market was tested and the 
results were inconclusive. Some of the tests showed 
the pricing structure to be efficient while some of 
them found the pricing structure to be inefficient. 
C.R. Mitchell, 1989 The efficiency of the BA and E168 futures contracts 
was tested. Each was seen to be inefficiently priced 
with both exhibiting arbitrage opportunity. 
P.Levett, 1991 The efficiency of stock index futures was tested. 
They were found to be inefficient but, after the 
construction of arbitrage bounds, the arbitrage 
opportunities were seen to be limited. 
A.T. Snell, 1990 The INDI, ALSI and GLDI contracts were 
examined and found to be inefficiently priced over 
the period 22 June 1987 to 18 December 1989. This 
resulted in effective hedging procedures being 
• difficult to implement. 
I 
B. A. C. Collings 1993 SAFEX was found to inefficient due to a lack of 
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market liquidity. It was concluded that the 
efficiency would not improve as trading volumes 
had peaked. 
J.P. van der Spuy (1989) Looking at the corporate management of interest 
rate risk, it was noted that there was significant 
potential for new market participants as many 
corporates did not use futures to hedge against 
interest rate risk. 
M.W. Arnold (l988) . Liquidity was identified as the main prerequisite for 
a successful futures market. This would also ensure 
the market was efficient. 
D. Botha (1988) The most appropriate futures to hedge against 
interest rate risk would be either notional bond 
futures or futures based on the underlying bond. 
P.L. Fourie (1991) There are arbitrage opportunities in the underlying 
spot market due to mispricings. This, however, is 
difficult to take advantage of due to a lack of 
liquidity in the underlying spot markets. 
C. de J. Correia (1990) After testing the efficiency of the South African 
Foreign Exchange market, it was noted that the 
market was efficient until the debt crisis of 1985. 
The methodology used in testing for efficiency was 
, 
similar to the other studies above. 
C . Counihan & S . Malherbe (1999) As part of an investigation into the securities 
lending industry the arbitrage opportunities in the 
futures market are examined. This study finds the 
futures to be efficiently priced through the 
mechanism of arbitrage. 
A. Swart (1998) The liquidity and volatility of the underlying spot 
market was examined to see what effect index 
futures trading had on them. He found that index 
. futures trading increased both volatility and 
i 
liquidity on the underlying spot market. 
I 
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5.1.1. B.A. Lambrechts (1990). 
This study entitled "Market Efficiency and Price Determination of South African Financial Futures 
Contracts" looked at the pricing efficiency of the Eskom Long Bond futures contract (the E168), the All 
Share Index futures contract (the ALSI), the Industrial Share Index futures contract (the JNDI) and the All 
Gold Index futures contract (the GWI). Along with looking at the pricing efficiency of these futnres 
contracts, Lambrechts stndied risk management using these financial futnres. This part of the stndy 
centered around the use of the above futures contract in the process of hedging. With regards the use of 
futnres in the hedging of risk, Lambrechts concludes that there are many different methods one can employ 
in the use of futures to hedge risk. The method used depends on whether the potential hedgers wish to 
hedge completely and the reason for the hedge being put in place. Two of the main issues arising out of 
Lambrechts' investigation into hedging are the calculation of the hedge ratio and the different methods that 
can be used to do this, as well as the exposure to basis risk when hedges are put in place. Lambrechts states 
that hedging could be seen as the exchange of price risk for basis risk. (See defmitions in chapter 1 for an 
explanation of basis risk). 
The thesis closes off with Lambrechts discussing the tax and accounting implications of trading in fmancial 
futnres contracts. With regards to the tax aspects, he examines the taxation of futures trading in other 
countries and compares it to the taxation of fmancial futures trading in South Africa. In this regard, he 
concludes that South African tax can benefit from the lessons learnt in other countries, notably the United 
States of America. The approach must be to develop a unified approach to taxing the trade in futures 
contracts and not, as in the case of the United States, a multi-pronged approach, where different interest 
groups lobby for their input into the tax law. Larnbrechts suggests that a similar approach is taken towards 
the development of accounting rules. Since the thesis was completed both issues have been resolved. In the 
case of the taxation of the trade and hedging using futures contracts, the South African Revenue Services 
have produced a clear method of determining the tax liability. In the case of the accounting rules to be 
applied to the trade in and hedging using futnres contracts, the solution has largely been provided by the 
international accounting community through the form of the International Accounting Statements. The 
South African authorities (SAICA - The South African Institute of Chartered Accountants) have adopted a 
harmonisation process whereby the South African accounting rules are to be "harmonised" with 
international standards. The international statements have a clear method of accounting for both speculating 
in and hedging using futures contracts. 
With regards to the actual determination of the pricing efficiency of the futures contracts, Lambrechts fIrst 
defined the formula to be used in determining the theoretical value of the futures contract The formula he 
used was: 
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FP(t, T) = CP(t Xer(T-t)(l- d/r) + d/r} (30) 
Where: 
FP ;::: The price of the futures contract with maturity date T time t. 
CP = The spot price at time t. 
d ;::: The dividend yield. 
r = The risk free annual effective risk free rate. 
e ;::: The continuously compounding rate. 
The next step was to determine the theoretical futures price. Once that had been done, four tests were 
performed. Firstly, the correlation between the theoretical futures price and the actual futures price was 
calculated, to see if there is a statistically significant relationship between the two. The second test 
examined the differences between the theoretical and actual futures prices. The difference was tested to see 
if it was statistically significant. The third test focused on the ability of the futures market to reflect all 
currently available information. This test was performed by examining the Durbin-Watson model for 
evidence of residual correlation. The last test looked at arbitrage opportunities between theoretical and 
actual futures prices. The hypothesis was that there are no arbitrage opportunities that are available over 
extended periods of time. 
The methodology used in the first test was to calculate the squared Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the theoretical and actual futures prices at a 95% level of significance. The second hypothesis, was tested 
by analysing the differences between the actual and theoretical futures prices. The methodology used for 
the testing of the third hypothesis is described above. The last hypothesis was tested using a regression type 
method. The daily returns on the three index stock futures contracts were regressed against an index of cash 
returns. Similar tests were performed on the E 168 future. 
The results were as follows: In the case of hypothesis number one, the three to six month futures contracts 
exhibited statistically significant correlations between the theoretical and actual futures prices. This 
suggested that over these contract periods the futures prices were efficiently priced. In the case of the 
contracts longer than 6 months, high correlations were found between the theoretical and actual futures 
prices. It was concluded that these contracts were also efficiently priced. This was found to be the case for 
both the index and bond futures contracts. 
In the case of hypothesis number two, the differences between the theoretical futures price and the mid-
market actual futures prices and the spot market prices were examined from the 1 July 1987 to 15 June 
1989. The differences were found to be significant for most of the period examined which pointed to the 
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conclusion that the stock index and bond futures market were inefficient. The testing of the third hypothesis 
revealed the stock index futures market to be an inefficient market. The futures' adjusted rates of return 
were regressed against returns on the underlying spot index. The Durbin-Watson method was used to 
examine the presence of residual correlation over the period. The residuals were found to be uncorrelated 
suggesting inefficiency in both the index and bond futures market. 
The last hypothesis involved the examining of the arbitrage opportunities. If the pricing mechanism was 
efficient there should be no evidence of any arbitrage opportunities. In the case of each contract examined 
no systematic excess returns were exhibited through implementing an arbitrage strategy. This implies that 
the stock index and bond futures market was priced efficiently over the periods under review. 
The fmal conclusion drawn on the efficiency of the futures pricing mechanism was that the results were 
inconclusive. Lambrechts suggests a number of reasons for this. The two main reasons were that the 
statistical tools used were possibly not sensitive enough and that, even though there were statistically 
significant differences between the theoretical and actual futures prices, the differences might not have 
been large enough to allow for profitable exploitation through arbitrage. 
5.1.2 C.R. Mitchell (1989). 
This study examined the efficiency of the Banker's acceptance (BA) and E168 futures contracts. The 
method used was similar to that of Lambrechts (note, however, that as this study was completed before the 
Lambrechts study, the methodology was not taken from Lambrechts) the efficiency was tested by 
examining the relationship between the actual and theoretical futures prices, 
In the determination of the fair futures prices certain transaction costs were taken into account. The costs 
taken into account were an approximate purchasing cost, an approximate bid! offer spread and any clearing 
house costs. In the case of the BA future the term structure of interest rates for the BA rate had to be 
estimated. This was done using NCD rates as a proxy. The reason for the estimation was that only the 
short-term BA rate was freely quoted. 
There were differences noted between the two contracts besides the differences in pricing standards (the 
BA rate is quoted on a discount basis whereas the E168 rate is quoted on a yield to maturity basis). The 
E168 futures contract traded approximately twenty times more heavily than the BA futures contract. This 
led Mitchell to also examine the effects of volume on the pricing efficiency of the contracts. One problem 
noted by Mitchell in the analysis was the determination of the mark - to "market prices. Theoretically the 
mid point of the bid offer spread should have been used when determining the mark - to " market prices, 
however, as these were not available the closing prices were used. 
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The results of the investigation into the pricing efficiency of the BA futures contract were: 
1. In the case of the difference between the actual return and the synthesised return on the future, 
the earlier stages of the contract's life exhibited significant differentials. 
2. The differentials were in excess of the transaction costs bands around the theoretical futures 
price, which in turn meant 
3. In the early stages of the BA futures contract there was significant opportunity for arbitrage 
profit due to pricing inefficiencies and ultimately 
4. The BA futures contract was inefficiently priced for most of the contract's life. 
5. This was also found in the case where the returns were annualised. 
6. The contracts were priced inefficiently by being overpriced for most of the contract's life. 
The results of the investigation into the pricing efficiency of the E168 futures contract were: 
1. The contracts exhibited a mispricing in the earlier parts of their lives (the different contracts 
examined were contracts of different maturities). 
2. The mispricings were, at times, more than the trading costs which in turn meant 
3. Arbitrage opportunities exhibited themselves from time to time. 
4. The mispricings were when the value of the E168 futures were significantly less than the 
bond. 
5. The E168 contract was more efficiently priced than the BA futures contract as inefficiencies 
occurred less often than in the case of the BA futures contract. 
Mitchell further drew conclusions on the effect of volume of trades on the pricing efficiency of the E168 
and BA futures contracts. He concluded that futures trading volumes do not necessarily effect the pricing 
efficiency of the two contracts. In the case of the BA futures contracts, it was found that the futures became 
more efficient while their trading volumes were declining. It was also found that the well-traded E168 
contract was sometimes inefficiently priced. These fmdings were further supported by the differential 
between the volumes being traded in the BA and E168 futures contracts. Mitchell argued that if volume 
was to have a positive effect on the pricing efficiency of the futures contracts, one should notice the E 168 
being significantly more efficient than the BA contract due to the fact that there are twenty times more 
E168 contracts being traded than BA contracts. Even though the E168 contract was found to be slightly 
more efficient than the BA contract, the difference in efficiency was not seen to be related to the difference 
in volumes being traded. 
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5.1.3 P. Levett (1991), 
This thesis examined the hedging effectiveness and efficiency of the share index futures market in South 
Africa. The focus of the thesis is on the hedging, the various hedging methods and its effectiveness. 
However, part of the thesis looks at the pricing efficiency of the futures contracts. The methodology is the 
same as in the previous two studies: a futures fair value formula is established and the theoretical value of 
the futures contract, based on the interest rates and the spot price. This theoretical value is than compared 
with the actual value and conclusions are drawn. 
Levett takes into account the different lending and borrowing rates as well as transaction costs. This allows 
him to establish the no-arbitrage bands around the theoretical futures price. In the study Levett also focuses 
on the effects of dividends on the pricing of index futures and notes the difficulty in determining the 
dividend effect on index futures. In the case of single stock futures the dividends are relatively easy to 
determine, whereas in the case of stock index futures there are more dividends that occur at different times. 
This makes the process more arduous as the dividends have to be tracked. The All Share Index, All Gold 
Index and Industrial Indexes are examined and their dividend payments are tracked over the period under 
examination that is April 1987 to December 1989. The conclusion was to use actual dividends rather than 
the dividend yield as a surrogate for the actual dividend payments. This conclusion was reached after 
assessing the resultant difference in the futures prices after using actual dividends and dividend yield. The 
results of the assessment of these differences were as follows: 
1. The estimation error of the GLDI and INDI futures contract were found to be greater than the 
ALSI futures contract. 
2. This was due to the smoother distribution of dividend payments on the ASLI shares. 
3. The materiality of the estimation error depends on the arbitrage bounds. 
4. The differences in the GLDI and INDI futures contracts due to the using of the dividend yield 
were nearly 20 basis points, which, in the case of an arbitrage type model, is large in relation 
to the average cost of carry calculated. 
The methodology was to fITst determine the futures price using the cost of carry pricing mechanism. The 
theoretical prices were then regressed against the actual prices, to see if there was a statistically significant 
difference. Part two of the methodology was to determine if there were any arbitrage opportunities that 
arose from the mispricings of the futures contracts. 
The regression was done using price changes and not actual price levels; the theoretical futures price 
changes were regressed against the actual futures price changes. If the slope of the regression line is 
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significantly different from one, then this signifies that there is not an equal relationship between the actual 
futures price and the theoretical futures price. The results of the regression revealed the following: 
1. Pricing of the futures contracts is sub optimal in 6 out of the thirty-three contracts tested over 
the three index futures contracts. 
2. Thirteen out of thirty three contracts exhibited statistically significant negative serial 
correlation. There is thus a bias in the correlation residuals. 
3. There is a substantial amount of unexplained variance between the index and the futures price 
after examining the ~ test owing to the introduction of basis risk. 
Even though there was statistically different actual futures prices when compared with actual futures prices 
one can only execute profitable arbitrage if the differences are large enough to be exploited, or outside of 
the arbitrage bounds. Levett, constructs arbitrage bounds, taking into account both transaction costs and 
SAFEX contract fees. The transaction costs are the bid I offer spread on the futures contract, the brokerage 
on the buying or selling of the underlying spot and related taxes. Building in the arbitrage bounds the 
following results were noted: 
1. In the case of the OLDI index, there were a number of arbitrage opportunities, but there were 
not many cases of this. 
2. There were significant arbitrage opportunities in the INDI and ALSI index. This was because 
the limitations in shorting the index and thus the ability to execute reverse cost of carry 
arbitrage. 
3. The bounds were revised to take into account limitations in shorting the underlying shares. 
Once this was taken into account the arbitrage opportunities in 2 above were mostly removed. 
4. Even though there was little opportunity for arbitrage there was still significant variability in 
the actual futures price around the theoretical futures price that introduces increased basis risk 
and increases the risk hedger have to absorb. 
5.1.4 A.T. Snell (1990) 
Snell looked at the efficiency of the South African Share Index futures market and its impact on ex post 
hedging. The thesis was similar to the above study by Levett in that it looks at the pricing efficiency of 
futures contracts and how this effects the ability and cost of hedging. The first step was to determine the 
pricing efficiency. This was done by determining the theoretical futures price as was done above. The flTst 
step was to defme the formula for the theoretical futures price. As part of this the treatment of dividends 
within the model had to be dealt with. Snell chose to use actual dividends after examining the dividends 
that were paid out on the All Share portfolio from 29 June 1987 to 15 December 1987. 
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The cost of carry interest rate that was used was the BA rate. This was assumed to be a proxy for the short-
term risk free rate. The interest rates were expressed as continuously compounded rates. As part of the 
efficiency measurement. Snell looked at the implied dividend yield estimation error as an efficiency 











The implied market dividend yield. 
The market price of the futures contract at time t. 
The value of the index portfolio at time t. 
The risk free rate expressed on a continuous basis. 
The time to contract expiration. 
(31) 
The above argument is fairly simplistic in that it assumes that the dividend yield estimation error is the only 
source of market inefficiency. 
As the period reviewed covered the 1987 "October Crash", the evidence of the pricing efficiency tests 
impact on this study. It was found that during the 1987 crash the pricing mechanism broke down for 
various reasons, the most significant being that, due to system failures from higher than usual trading 
volumes being put through, trading congestion caused the prices to move out of equilibrium. Snell thus 
concludes that pricing efficiency was not prevalent during the October 1987 crisis. 
As for the rest of the period under review it was found that, large and frequent violations of the cost of 
carry model were noted. These violations persisted in a one direction and tended to persevere over time 
before reversing back in the direction of fair pricing. The contracts tended to be undervalued most of the 
time. This was contrary to the findings in the OLD! contract which was found to be the opposite -
overpriced. Snell also noted evidence of statistically significant autocorrelations in the mispricing variable. 
A further fmding was that the mispricing tended to deteriorate from 1987 to 1989 which was concluded to 
be due to restrictions on short / bear sales as the mispricing was due to the fact that the futures contracts 
were under priced. The pricing inefficiencies were also assumed to arise out of the fact that the spot and 
futures markets were illiquid which did not allow for the taking advantage of the arbitrage opportunities 
that arose. 
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The effects of these findings on the ability to hedge effectively, was that it was seldom advantageous from 
a risk I return point of view to use a risk-minimising hedging strategy, due to the inefficiencies in the 
pricing of the futures contracts. Furthermore, it was found that implementing a traditional hedge, where one 
enters into a futures position that is exactly opposite to the spot market position, would lead to a suboptimal 
hedge where the portfolio return variability would not necessarily be minimised. The contracts examined 
by Snell in his study were, the ALSI contract, the INDI contract and the GLD! contract. 
5.1.5 B.A.C. Collings (1993) 
Collings looked at the economic impact of an efficient financial futures market on the South African 
economy. Part of the thesis dealt with the need for an efficient financial futures market. The focus of the 
thesis was not to look at the actual calculation of the efficiency but rather what the implications were for 
the need to have one. 
Collings concluded that the financial futures market was not contributing towards price discovery as, due to 
few market users, the market was inefficient. Furthermore, he reasoned that the lack of market participants 
resulted in sub-optimum information levels and therefore a breakdown in the price forecasting function of 
the futures market. He went on further to say that, in this situation the fmancial futures market is unlikely to 
provide reliable additional information to participants in derivative markets and this will lead to the futures 
market failing to communicate reliable, improved information about future spot prices on a specific asset. 
Collings, did, however support the need for an efficient futures market. The need was divided into three 
parts, namely the need to hedge and shift risk, the need for greater market efficiency in the spot markets 
and the need for price discovery. A futures market was also seen to support increased capital formation and 
new product development, which will, in tum, increase liquidity in the spot markets. 
Collings noted that volatility in the futures markets destabilise the underlying spot markets. He presented 
the view that futures markets have the ability to protect spot markets from the detrimental impact of 
volatility-increasing speculation by allowing this type of speculation to take place in the futures market and 
not the spot market. This view is questionable, as it implies that futures prices are not linked with spot 
prices and are free to wander in different directions to the spot prices. If this was the case the market 
pricing mechanism would be inefficient as futures prices are linked to spot prices by the cost of carry 
model. This inefficiency in the futures market would reduce their economic value to society as stated 
above. 
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Collings' main reason for the lack of efficiency in SAFEX is due to a lack of market liquidity. He predicts 
that the trading volumes within SAFEX will not rise too far beyond 1993 levels and result in the market 
remaining inefficient. Both the volumes and the efficiency are examined later in this thesis, which will 
allow for some conclusion on the accuracy of Collings' predictions. 
5.1.6 J.P. van der Spuy (1989) 
The focus of this study was on the management of corporate interest rate risk. This included the 
management of interest rate risk using futures. In order for the futures to be successful in the management 
of interest rate risk they would have to be efficiently priced The study did not look at the actual pricing 
efficiency of futures, but more at the need to be able to use futures in the management of interest rate risk. 
Vander Spuy noted that there was little sign of active interest rate risk management by non-banking 
institutions. Furthermore, he noted, there existed opportunity for these institutions to become involved in 
the practice, thereby increasing the market participants. This increase in market participants would increase 
market liquidity and aid the market in becoming more efficiently priced 
The main reason for the lack of non-banking organisations using futures to effectively hedge against 
interest rate risk was concluded to be due primarily to a lack of understanding of how to hedge using 
futures. Other reasons included a lack of systems that are able to support futures trading and hedging and a 
limited knowledge of the nature oflong-term markets. In the case of the corporates reviewed by Van der 
Spuy, all were limited in their knowledge of the long-term markets and their potential benefits to the 
organisation. 
5.1.7 MW Arnold (1988) 
In looking at the criteria for a successful financial futures market, Arnold noted that there would be a need 
for the futures market to be efficient. In looking at the other prerequisites for a successful fmancial futures 
market the following items were identified: 
1. A competitive spot market whereby many buyers and sellers determine a market related price, 
the volatility of which exposes the holder of the commodity to price risk. 
2. Sufficient market liquidity for hedgers to enter and leave the market without undue influence 
on the state of the market. 
3. The underlying spot market must be capable of being graded against the standard qualities as 
per the contract specification. 
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4. Sufficient supplies of the spot instrument must be capable of being made available should 
there be a sudden demand for its delivery. 
5. A willingness of institutions, corporations and other members of the fmancial community to 
participate in futures trading. 
6. The volatility in the price of the underlying spot instruments must attract speculative 
participation. 
7. The size of potential loss should an adverse event occur must encourage participants to hedge 
all, or at least part of the risk. 
When this study was undertaken there was no formal futures market in South Africa. Since then the 
SAFEX market has been functioning. Broadly speaking, one should be able to find evidence of the above 
prerequisites being met by SAFEX. 
At the time, Arnold sent a questionnaire out to a selection of potential market participants, whereby the 
respondents were required to rank the above prerequisites, along with others involving trading costs and the 
make up of the exchange, on a scale of 1 to 10 in importance. The following five elements were seen as 
being the most important: 
1. An exchange should have an independent clearing house. 
2. Some form of protection should be provided to investors by the financial futures exchange. 
3. The exchange should play an active role in educating potential participants to the benefits of 
futures trading. 
4. The contracts traded must be based on heavily traded financial instruments to promote 
liquidity. 
5. The size of the contracts traded must be tailored for the desired target market. 
Of the above, numbers one and two are provided in the structure of SAFEX and its related legislation. The 
remaining items point towards an interest in creating liquidity. The education would allow for more 
participants and therefore liquidity. The fourth point points directly towards a need to promote liquidity. 
With regards the last point, the creation of "market friendly" contract sizes would ensure no participants are 
restricted from being able to trade, which in turn, would promote liquidity. The focus therefore, of the 
market participants is the creation of liquidity as the most important prerequis ite for a successful futures 
market. 
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5.1.8 D. Botha (1988) 
Botha looked at the construction of hedging instruments for fixed-interest futures markets. The study was 
completed in July 1988, before SAFEX had formally begun and the fmdings of the thesis, as to what would 
be the most appropriate form of a fixed interest derivative, can be compared with the actual instruments 
that were subsequently designed. 
The study does not analyse the pricing efficiency due to a lack of formal futures trading. It does however 
construct the theoretical futures prices to determine the effectiveness of using futures as hedging tools. The 
model used to determine the futures price was the cost of carry model. The carry rate used in the exercise 
was the call rate and transaction costs were not taken into account. The model used was thus a simple 
version of the cost-of-carry model. 
Three theoretical spot portfolios were constructed for the purposes of determining the hedging effectiveness 
and were modeled on typical holdings of a bank. an insurance company and a pension fund. The portfolios 
were constructed of only three different assets of different terms: short term, a medium term and long term. 
The findings of the study were as follows: 
1. The price index futures were relatively poor at hedging the portfolios, which led to the 
conclusion that 
2. (Interest rate) Price index futures were possibly not the best types of instruments to be used in 
hedging transactions. 
3. The futures that were most successful in hedging against price movement were the notional 
bond future and the bond future based directly on the underlying bond. 
With regards point two, it was conceded that the limitations on the research may render this conclusion 
inappropriate. Comparing the findings of the study to the futures that are traded on SAFEX, one can see by 
looking at part 2 of appendix 3.1, the futures are based on the underlying bonds which suggests that the 
fmdings of the study were correct. This study is however limited in its discussion on which instruments 
should or should not be listed on SAFEX and to conclude whether Botha was correct or not based on 
subsequent findings would require further investigation. 
5.1.9 P.L. Fourie (1991) 
This study was also an investigation into interest rate futures. The title of the thesis "An investigation into 
fixed interest derivative instruments and their applicability to risk management" reiterates the importance of 
the use of futures in hedging transactions. As the title of the thesis suggests, Fourie looked at other 
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derivative instruments and their role in risk management The focus of this review was on the conclusions 
drawn on the applicability of futures in risk management 
Fourie examined the cost-of-carry model and the arbitrage opportunities available in the futures market. It 
was noted that there were frequent mispricings in the futures market and this was due to the market reacting 
to information at different speeds. Fourie also made the point that futures arbitrage is not always riskless as 
the arbitrage trader may face uncertain carry costs, this would primarily be due to movements in the basis 
due to fluctuations in the short term (carry) interest rates. The E168 bond was also noted to lack in liquidity 
that resulted in wide spreads that made arbitrage unprofitable, even though there were arbitrage 
opportunities available to be exploited. 
A further point of the study was to examine the cost-of-carry model as to whether it is appropriate as a 
model for pricing futures. The results of the investigation was that the model was appropriate for long dated 
futures contracts, but not for short-term contracts (carry's) that did not take into account the short term 
compounding effect. 
Fourie concluded that there was little use of derivatives in risk management by fund managers, primarily 
because of a lack of education amongst fund managers. This was further compounded by the lack of 
liquidity in the derivative markets, which was, in turn effected by the lack of institutional fund manager 
participants. It was noted, however, that the lack of knowledge amongst fund managers and pension fund 
trustees was being addressed and that liquidity should improve over time. 
5.1. 10 C. de J. Correia (1990) 
Correia's work was the only local study to be reviewed that concentrated on the currency market. The 
reason the thesis was studied was to look at the methodology employed. The nature of the arbitrage pricing 
structure is different from the cost of carry model in that it is in essence a swap. There are, however a 
number of similarities. The covered interest arbitrage transaction essentially involves an arbitrageur 
borrowing foreign currency offshore, to deposit in South African securities, the firm will simultaneously 
buy the foreign currency forward. To determine the arbitrage opportunity Correia had to establish the 
pricing equation. The pricing equation is based on the covered interest rate parity theorem (CIPT). 
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Where: 
x = initial amount stated in Rands. 
= domestic interest rate. 
I = foreign interest rate. 
S spot exchange rate (indirect quotation). 





= Forward Currency Premium 
= = Interest differential 
Once the variables had been described, Correia plotted the forward currency premium against the interest 
differential for the period August 1983 to February 1988. The forward currency premium and the interest 
differential were closely related over the period up to the currency turmoil of the late 1980's where the 
difference between them widened. 
The Forward currency premium and the interest differential were then regressed against one another. In 
performing the regression a degree of autocorrelation was noticed and removed. The results were similar to 
the analysis of the differential between the forward currency premium and the interest differential above. 
Correia concluded that the opportunity for arbitrage was limited during the period August 1983 to February 
1988, implying that the Rand was correctly priced over the period. This pricing efficiency, however. was 
deviated from during the sub period August 1985 to February 1988 more than in the first sub period 
(August 1983 to August 1985). This was due to political turmoil and structural changes in the trading 
environment. 
5.1.11 C. Counihan & S. Malherbe (1999) 
As part of the investigation into the practice of securities lending in South Africa, Counihan & Malherbe 
looked at the arbitrage transaction and the pricing efficiency of SAFEX futures. In determining the pricing 
efficiency the first step in the approach was to establish the cost of carry formula. 
In determining the cost of carry the dividend issue was solved using the ALSI dividend yield. Transaction 
costs were introduced in the equation and were set at 1.5%. The question of whether the futures were 
efficiently priced was answered by testing for the existence of three possibilities, namely: 
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1. The futures are efficiently priced and become so by the action of the cost of carry and reverse 
cost of carry arbitrage. 
2. The futures are priced through the arbitrage mechanism, but in times of market shock this in 
turn feeds back into the spot market, which is in turn, brought into the futures market through 
the arbitrage relationship. This would cause the markets to destabilise. 
3. There is no arbitrage and no feedback between the futures and the spot prices, in which case 
the futures are inefficiently priced. 
The above three propositions were examined by looking at the "co integrating vector". In the first case 
where the prices become more efficient as arbitrage is undertaken, the authors argue that there should be a 
convergence between the futures and spot prices. To measure this convergence between the two prices a co 
integrating vector is examined. In the second case, where the futures prices are determined by the 
movement in the spot prices, which in turn effect the spot prices once more, the authors argue that there 
should be evidence of two co integrating vectors. In the third proposition, there will be no co integrating 
vectors. 







= the natural log of the spot price. 
== the natural log of the futures price and 
the natural log of the cost of carry term which is defmed as: 
== the risk free interest rate on government bonds. 
= the dividend yield on shares. 
= the transaction costs. 
Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. 
(33) 
(34) 
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The three propositions were tested for over the period June 1996 to December 1998. The period was broken 
up into sub periods over when the emerging market crises were October 1997. May-June 1998 and August 
1998. In every case only one co integrating relationship was noticed and which was determined by the cost-
of-carry equation. 
From this the authors could conclude that arbitrage takes place in South Africa, and leads to the 
convergence of prices. There is no evidence of a feedback relationship from the JSE to the futures market 
in terms of which a downward spiral in prices might be precipitated. 
5.1.12 A. Swart (1998) 
The purpose of this study was to look at the impact of share index futures on the volatility and liquidity of 
the stocks on the underlying spot market. Swart noted that in previous research the answer to the above 
question was conflicting. Some studies had noted an increase in volatility and hence a destabilising effect 
while others noted an increase in liquidity and a reduction in volatility. 
Swart studied the period 1990 to 1997 (similar range to this study) and investigated the relationship 
between the volume and the value of index futures trading for the three main share indices and their 
underlying spot assets on the Johannesburg Stock exchange. 
It was found that volatility did increase for the All Gold and Industrial Indices while the relationship was 
not significant for the All Share index. Swart concluded that the results supported the view that index 
trading increases the volatility in the underlying assets. 
With regards the liquidity of the underlying stocks regression tests were performed using the volume of the 
trade in the underlying constituents as a measure of the liquidity of the underlying assets. Swart found 
significant relationships between the volume and value of the futures trades for all three indices. He then 
applied a further liquidity test: the liquidity ratio and found that there was no significant relationship 
between the liquidity of the underlying assets and the level offutures trading. 
He did conclude that the liquidity levels did increase as index futures trading increased, thereby supporting 
the hypothesis that index futures trading adds liquidity to the underlying spot markets. 
5.2 Other world - wide efficiency studies. 
Four international studies were reviewed with regards to futures pricing efficiency. There was a possibility 
to review more studies, but it was felt that this exhaustive approach would only achieve marginal benefits. 
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The quality of the Lambrechts, Mitchell, Snell and Levett studies meant that the need to look at 
international studies for guidance would be negated The four studies that were looked at covered a broad 
spectrum of efficiency studies. This was done to allow for focus on the methodology that was used in the 
measurement of efficiency. Table 5.2 summarises the ftndings below: 
Table S.2 - Summary of the Findings of International Studies of the Futures Market. 
Author (s) and date. Findings. 
D.A. Glassman, 1980 In studying the foreign exchange markets of various 
currencies, Glassman noted the markets were 
efficient where there was no structural impediment 
such as central bank intervention. Glassman also 
noted the existence of Heteroscedasticity when 
examining volatility. 
R.J. Hodrick, 1987 Hoderick examines a number of studies of 
efficiency in the foreign exchange futures market. 
The conclusion is that the studies provide different 
results. The methodologies of the different studies 
differ and the approach to determine an efficient 
price and regress the actual prices against this is not 
I solely used. 
B.A. Goss, 1992 In this study a number of papers concerning the 
efficiency of the futures market are reviewed. The 
majority of the papers investigate a Fama type 
efficiency of the futures market. One of these 
studies is examined to see if it takes pricing 
efficiency into account. The second of the papers 
investigated looks at the pricing of interest rate 
futures and concluded the cost of carry pricing 
equation does not take into account the peculiarities 
of the bond futures contract. 
A. Wong, 1986 The United States Treasury Bill futures market's 
pricing efficiency was examined. The methodology 
used was to look at the volatility of the market and 
determine if the market was "too" volatile to be 
efficient. Wong concluded that the Treasury Bill 
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I futures market is efficient. 
5.2.1 D.A. Glassman (1980) 
The Glassman study examined the same market as the Correia study. the futures markets in foreign 
exchange. The Glassman study, however, looked at different foreign exchange markets. The Glassman 
study differed further from the Correia study in that it examined the effects of volatility on the foreign 
exchange market. 
The market efficiency was tested by regressing a forecast error against elements of information on which 
the forecast is based. This is similar to the cost of carry model. In the case of the cost of carry model, the 
"information" would be the interest rate and other carry costs. The analysis of efficiency was conducted 
using two basic approaches· a single and multimarket approach. Glassman analysed the foreign exchange 
market over the 1972 to 1978 period and found there to be evidence ofheteroscedasticity in the results of 
the tests. To correct for this a procedure of weighted least squares was used. The conclusion was that 
foreign exchange futures markets were efficient over the period in the case of the single market and 
inefficient in the case of certain multimarkets. The most notable was the relationship between the Swiss 
Franc and the German Mark. It was suggested, however, that this could possibly be due to structural factors 
such as central bank intervention in the currency market. Glassman further concluded that the existence of 
daily price limits does not account for market inefficiencies. The existence of efficiency in the market leads 
Glassman to conclude that past values of variables in the information set are no help in forecasting future 
values if information is efficiently processed. 
With regards to the analysis of variance, Glassman noted evidence of a change in variance over the 
different quarters of the year and the days of the week. 
5.2.2 R.J. Hodrick (1987) 
Hodrick also examined the foreign exchange markets and their efficiency. The study is a review of the 
empirical studies of foreign exchange futures market efficiency rather than an actual testing of the 
hypotheses. 
The first section of the study was devoted to the analysis of asset pricing theory. It was noted that it is 
relatively easy to develop a rational expectations equilibrium model that allow for time-variation in 
expected returns on assets and each of the studies reviewed had done so in the approach to determine the 
pricing efficiency. 
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There were two approaches most noted in the determination of efficiency. The fIrst model examined the 
time series properties and distributiollS of exchange rates. The second approach was to consider the 
hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. Hodrick confrrmed that fact 
that exchange rates do not simply follow a random walk in an effIcient market. Currencies are related to 
each other by set relationships such as inflation and interest rates. This relationship is sometimes difficult to 
note, however, due to the volatility in some exchange rates. 
The relationship between forward prices and future spot prices was also examined. This was done by 
looking at whether futures prices on a given day are unbiased predictors of the futures prices on the 
following day. The conclusion was that this is not the case. It was noted further in this regard that the 
forecast horizon of the futures prices evolve continually since the maturity date of the contracts is fIxed. 
Hodrick also noted that the role of learning in determining interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices 
needs to be taken into account as well as the influence of government policies on asset prices. 
Finally, Hoderick notes that some of the studies claim the foreign exchange future market to be inefficient 
due to a bias existing in the market. He argues that some of the methodologies used to prove this are not 
sound and that, even though there is some evidence of bias in the foreign exchange futures market, the 
market does exhibit some efficiency. Consequently the conclusion is that it is difficult to prove whether the 
market is efficient or not. 
The studies Hoderick reviews have numerous approaches to the determination of efficiency. The approach 
is not only to determine the efficient price and regress that actual price against this. The models attempt to 
build in expectations and risk premiums. 
5.2.3 B.A. Goss (1992) 
Goss examines rational expectancy and efficiency in futures markets. The study comprises a set of papers 
by other authors. The studies are not confIned to one futures market and include studies on different 
underlying spot instruments, ranging from currency markets to commodity markets and interest rate 
futures. It must be noted that the various studies do not necessarily determine a futures market to be 
effIcient by 100king at the pricing relationship between it and the spot market. The approaches tend to look 
at the ability to earn excess profIts following a trading strategy and the future market's ability to absorb 
information timeously. In examining these two approaches one should still note the effect on the spot 
market. If the futures market absorbs new information quickly, this should be transferred into the spot 
market quickly or there is opportunity for arbitrage. For this reason the studies will have bearing on this 
thesis - even though a different approach is followed, the authors will still have to look at the relationship 
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between the spot and futures market. As the studies are broad and do not specifically focus on the pricing 
efficiency of the futures market only two studies will be examined, namely the studies done by Taylor and 
Yau, Savanayana and Scheeweis. 
The efficiency of the Yen futures market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is examined by Taylor. The 
author argues that efficiency should be dermed as "if the risk adjusted returns, net of all costs, from the best 
trading rule is not more than the comparable figure when assets are traded infrequently". The focus of this 
study is very much on a Fama type of efficiency and not specifically pricing efficiency. To test the 
efficiency of the currency market Taylor applies a trend following trading strategy based on time series 
models. The results are that the market is inefficient and that excess profits can be made trading Yen 
currency futures. Taylor does not investigate the effect of profiting from this trading strategy on the spot 
market 
Yau, Savanayana and Schneeweis examine alternative performance models in interest rate futures. In 
determining whether the pricing of interest rate futures are efficient or not one needs to determine the return 
of the future. The authors suggest that this is often done on an ad hoc basis. This combined with the 
peculiarities of bond futures, more specifically the cheapest to deliver bond issue, result in the pricing / 
return calculation become very important. In analysing the pricing issues for interest rate futures the 
authors conclude that a number of issues are not taken into account correctly, they are: 
1. Timing: cost of carry. This is where the short may deliver the bonds at any time during the 
delivery month. The short is thus able to benefit from pricing movements. 
2. Timing: wild card. This allows the short trader to select any time on delivery day to settle the 
contract. The short thus can benefit from price movements on delivery day. 
3. Switching. This is where there is an option as the type of bond that can be accepted in the 
settlement of the futures contract. 
The argument is that each of these contract peculiarities have some form of value and this should be taken 
into account when pricing the futures contr'dCt under the cost of carry model. The authors conclude that the 
most appropriate return formulation is determined in part by the loss function of the individual agent who 
elects to use the futures as part of an asset risk management strategy. 
5.2.4 A. Wong (1986) 
Wong's study, entitled "Futures-Forward price differences and efficiency in the Treasury Bill Futures 
Market" looks at two issues. First, it examines the ability of two models to explain the differences between 
futures and implicit forward prices in the thirteen week Treasury Bill market Second, the study determined 
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the efficiency of the thirteen-week Treasury Bill futures market using volatility and regression tests. The 
volatility tests use variance bounds to examine whether futures prices are excessively volatile for the 
market to be efficient. The regression tests investigate whether futures prices are unbiased predictors of 
future spot prices. 
The period covered by the tests was March 1976 to December 1984. The two models in the first test were 
developed by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross. The first model involved determination of whether changes in 
futures-forward price differences are related to changes in local covariances between Treasury Bill futures 
and spot prices. The second model was similar in that it built in the spot price into the analysis on the 
covariances. In the second test, the market efficiency was tested by examining the volatility of the futures. 
This involved the comparison of the mean variances on both sides of two inequality equations. The slope of 
the coefficients produced during the regression tests, were then examined to determine if they were 
statistically different from zero. 
It was found that the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross models are not able to explain the Treasury Bill futures-
forward price differences. The volatility study enabled Wong to conclude that the Treasury Bill futures 
market is efficient. There was evidence of autocorrelation existing in the nine-month futures contract 
tested. Wong suggests that this could be due to a missing variable related to information costs or default 
risk. 
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Chapter 6: ARCH - an Explanation and Literature Review. 
The ARCH acronym is used to denote all ARCH type models. This chapter will examine the GARCH (1,1) 
model as well as the basic ARCH model. The explanation of the ARCH model can be seen in chapter five. 
This chapter will deal with some of the more advanced issues that need explaining and will examine the 
literature in the development of ARCH and GARCH (I, 1) models. The last section of the chapter will deal 
with the application of the ARCH, GARCH (1,1) and basic volatility measurement models. In this section 
both South African and international studies will be reviewed. 
6.1 ARCH & GARCH (1,1) - Explanation of Advanced Issues and 
terminology. 
In chapter 5 the modelling of volatility was developed from a basic model, which does not take into 
account the long run, and time weighting of volatility to the ARCH model that takes these factors into 
account. The ARCH model was further developed into the GARCH (1,1) model where the long run and 
time-weighted volatility was adjusted to take into account the exponential decay of the weighting of the 
volatility observations over time. The chapter finished with a brief analysis of which model is the most 
appropriate in measuring volatility. 
Chapter 5 did not deal with the estimation of the GARCH (1,1) parameters and the constant variance. 
Chapter 5 also dealt with the development of the model but did not explain the use of the terminology 
(Auto-Regressive and Conditional Heteroscedasticity). This section of chapter 7 will cover these areas. 
6.1.1 Maximum Likelihood Methods 
The approach applied to the estimation of the parameters is called the maximum likelihood method. It 
revolves around the maximization of the chance of an observation occurring. Hull (1999, 374) explains this 
by means of an example. Suppose that a selection of10 stocks is sampled at random on a specific day. In 
looking at the stocks, one will be able to determine three possible price movements, namely: increase, 
decrease and no movement. Assume that during the day the price of one of the stocks decreased. Based on 
this data, if one had to estimate the future proportion of stocks with price declines, the most informed 
answer would have to be 10% based on the information available. Using the maximum likelihood method, 
one first looks at the probability of the decline in the price for one of the shares. If one defines the 
proportion of shares with a price decline asp, the probability that the remaining nine stocks do not decline 
is p( 1 - P )9 . The best estimate of p is when the probability of it occurring is at its highest. This is 
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accomplished by maximising p. To maximise p the expression needs to be differentiated with respect to p 
and setting the result to nil. The result of this is p = 0.1. This shows what the maximum likelihood ofp is, 
which is the same as the original estimate. 
6.1.2 Application of Maximum Likelihood Method 
The frrst application of this methodology is in determining a figure for constant variance. The problem is in 
the estimating of a constant variance from m observations when the underlying distribution is normal and 
the variance is assumed to be constant (Hull, 1999: 374). Hull (1999,374) follows the above example and 
first determines the probability equation for a given variance observation: 
1 (-u~) Pu =--exp --' 
I .J21tV 2v 
(35) 
Where: 
Uj = The ith observation. 
~'I = The probability density for the ith observation, Uj. 
V = The variance of the probability density functionPu, • 
The observations are assumed to be UI, U2, •.•••.•.. Um and the mean of the underlying distribution is zero. 
This equation (35) only takes into account an individual observation. To equate it to the example in 7.1.1 
above it would be p. This single probability density function now needs to take into account the other 
observations. This is provided in the following formula: 
til [1 (_u 2 )] Pm = II --exp -' 
;=1 .J21tV 2v 
(36) 
Where: 
= The probability density of the m observations occurring in order as observed. 
Now that the probability density function has been described for all the observations, the next step, in 
accordance with the maximum likelihood method is to maximise the right hand side of the equation. The 
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best estimate of v that maximises this expression needs to be determined. Maximising an expression is 
equivalent to maximising the logarithm of the expression. Taking the logarithms of equation 36 and 
ignoring constant multiplicative factors, the following expression results: 
'II [ u
2
] ~ -In(v)-~ (37) 
Or 




(Hull. 1999 : 375) 
The above two formulas (37 & 38) are the maximising equations. These now need to be maximised This is 




The function of the maximum likelihood estimate ofv is thus equation 39. This is the estimate of the 
constant variance on day i over a period of m observations. One can thus see how the maximum likelihood 
method can be used to estimate variance. Now this must be applied to GARCH (1,1) to a) estimate the most 
likely GARCH (1,1) figure (defined as o} ) which will then allow for b) the u, ~ and ro parameters to be 
estimated. The a, ~ and ro variables would have then been estimated using a maximum likelihood 
methodology. In applying the above to the GARCH (1,1) model the constant variance v must be expressed 
as a fluctuating variance Vi. The fluctuating variance is described by the GARCH (l, 1) formula and so, Vi = 
0'/2 .We then substitute v with vi in the maximising expression and the following results: 
'II [ u~] I -lnv; --' 
1=1 VI 
(40) 
An iterative search is then performed to find the parameters in the model that maximise the expression in 
equation 40 above. This is known as estimating the parameters in a volatility-updating scheme. Hull (1999, 
376) produces an example of this use of the volatility-updating scheme to determine the parameters; the 
example is reproduced in table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1- Estimating of GARCH (1,1) parameters using a Volatility Updating Scheme. 
The grid below shows an analysis of the Japanese Yen exchange rate between January 6 1988 and August 15 
1997. The numbers in the table are based on trial estimates of three GARCH (1,1) parameters: ro, a and ~. The 
flrst column in the table records the date the observation was made. The second column assigns a number to the 
date. The third column shows the exchange rate 81 at the end of day i. The fourth column shows the proportional 
change in the exchange rate between the end of day i-I and the end of day i. This is U i = (Sf - Si-l)/ Si-l . 
The fifth column shows the estimate of the variance rate, Vi a} for day i made at the end of day i - 1. On day 
three the process is started by setting the variance rate equal to u; . On subsequent days equation 28 (the 
GARCH (1,1) equation) is used. The sixth column calculates the likelihood measure -In(vt ) - u; IVt . The 
values in the fifth and sixth columns are based on trial estimates of ro, a and ~. The aim is to choose the values of 
the parameters that maximise the sum of the values in the sixth column (thereby achieving the maximum of the 
maximisation formula). 
"i 2 "I = 0'1 
0.007728 
2 0.007779 0.006599 
3 0.007746 -0.004242 0.00004355 9.6283 
1l·Jan-88 4 0.007816 0.009037 0.00004198 8.1329 
12·Jan-88 5 0.007837 0.002687 9.8568 
13-Jan-88 6 0.007924 0.011101 7.1529 
Total (Max) 22,063.5763 
In determining the values of of ro, a and ~ which maximise the total of column six an iterative procedure must be • 
used. Hull recommends a special purpose algorithm, such as the Levenberg-Marquardt method, should be used 
to do this. In this example the optimal values of the parameters are: 
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{() 0.00000176 
Ct 0.0626 
~ = 0.8976 
Once the parameters have been detennined, one is able to calculate the long-tenn variance V. In the above 
example V is: 
OJ = 0.00000176 = 0.00004422 
l-a- f3 0.0398 
The long-tenn volatility is then: ..J0.00004422 or 0.665% per day. 
To conclude, column five is the GARCH (1,1) output (taking into account the estimated parameters) while 
column six is the mechanism that is used to detennine the GARCH (1,1) parameters, while relying on the output 
of column five. The solution to this problem is achieved by using an iterative procedure. 
Source: Hull (1999:376) 
From the above example and explanation, the following steps must be followed when estimating the 
GARCH (1,1) parameters: 
1. Using the maximum likelihood methodology, detennine the maximising expression to be used in 
estimating a constant variance (fonnulas 37 and 38). 
2. Relax the assumption of the constant variance and allow the variance to fluctuate. Set the new 
fluctuating variance to (Jj2 which is detennined by the GARCH (1,1) fonnula. 
3. Redefine the maximising expression using the new fluctuating variance. 
4. Detennine the maximum as done in table 6.1. 
5. Using the maximum, detennine the optimal values for the GARCH (1,1) parameters (again, see 
table 6.1). 
According to Hull (1999:377) there is a more robust method that can be used to estimate the parameters in 
GARCH (1,1) called variance targeting. To employ the variance targeting technique, one must first set the 
long run variance rate, V. to a value deemed to be reasonable (a reasonable value for this would be the 
sample variance calculated from the data). This allows one to solve for {() because {() = V ( I - a - ~). This 
reduces the number of parameters that have to be estimated. With {() known, the only parameters that have 
to be estimated are a and~. The sample variance for the data in the above table (6.1) is 0.00004341 which. 
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when rooted, produces a volatility of 0.659%. By substituting the sample variance for V, one is able to 
estimate new parameters for u and ~ that maximise the objective function in equation 40. The new 
parameters for u and~, using the above example, are 0.0607 and 0.S990 respectively. The value of the 
objective function (the summation of the individual -In(vi ) - u; Iv; terms) is 22,063.5274, which is 
slightly below the actual value calculated in table 6.1 of22,063.5763. 
6.1.3 GARCH (1,1) model-does it suffer from autocorrelation? 
As will be seen below, the u; (the square of the percentage change in the price from day i ~ 1 to day I) data 
set suffers from autocorrelation. Does the GARCH {1,1) model solve this problem? In answering this 
question one must frrst start at the assumption underlying the GARCH (1,1) model, which is that volatility 
changes with the passage of time. During some periods volatility is relatively high; during other periods it 
is relatively low. When u; is high there is a tendency for U~l' U;+2 , ..... to be high; when u; is low there 
is a tendency for U ;+1' U ~2 , ..... to be low (Hull, 1999 : 37S). This suggests some form of autocorrelation. 
To examine this one first assumes that u; exhibits autocorrelation. Does GARCH (1,1) remove the 
autocorrelation? The autocorrelation structure for the variables uj
2 I (J'; is examined to determine if this is 
true. If these variables show little autocorrelation the model for (J'j explains the autocorrelation in the 
u; term. The below example in table 6.2 shows the analysis of the autocorrelation. 
Table 6.2 - GARCH (l,l) aod autocorrelation. 
Time Lag Autocorrelation for u; Autocorrelation for u; I (J'j2 
1 0.072 0.000 
2 0.041 -0.010 
3 0.057 0.005 
4 0.107 0.000 
5 0.075 0.011 
6 0.066 O.OOS 
7 0.019 -0.034 
S 0.OS5 0.015 
9 0.054 0.009 
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10 0.030 -0.022 
11 0.038 -0.004 
12 0.038 -0.021 
13 0.057 -0.002 
14 0.040 0.004 
15 0.007 -0.026 
Source: Hull (1999: 378) 
The table refers to the yen-dollar exchange rate analysis performed in table 6.1. The fIrst column in table 
6.1 shows the time lag (in days) over which the autocorrelation was tested. The second column shows the 
autocorrelation results for u: . The third column shows the autocorrelation results for the variables 
u j
2 /(1'; . Column two shows the autocorrelation observations are positive for u; for all lags between 1 
and 15. In the case of u; /(1'/2 , some of the autocorrelation measurements are positive and some are 
negative. They are also predominantly smaller in magnitude to the observations in column two. For this 
reason one can conclude the GARCH (1,1) model appears to have been successful in explaining the data by 
signifIcantly reducing the evidence of autocorrelation. 
There is a more scientifIc test that can be used to test for the existence of autocorrelation called the Ljung-
Box statistic (Hull, 1999: 378). The Ljung-Box statistic can be described as follows: if a certain series has 
m observations the Ljung-Box statistic is: 
(41) 
Where: 
The lag in the data tested. 
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For k = 15 zero autocorrelation can be rejected with 95% confidence when the Ljung-Box statistic is 
greater than 25%. For table 6.2 above, the Ljung-Box statistic for the u; term is approximately 123. This 
shows evidence of autocorrelation as the result is greater than 25. For the u; /(1; tenn the Ljung-Box 
statistic is 8.2 that suggests that the autocorrelation has been largely removed by the GARCH (1,1) model 
(Hull, 1999: 379). 
6.1.4 Explanation of terminology 
The name (G)ARCH stands for (General) Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. The purpose of 
this section of the chapter is to explain the meaning of the terminology. The "conditional" part of the 
(G) ARCH term comes from the fact that the determination of the variance is conditional on past 
infonnation. This has been demonstrated in both chapter 5 and chapter 7. The conditional variance is a 
function of three tenns, namely: 
1. The mean or long term variance: 0), 
2. The volatility in the previous period measured as the lag of the squared residual from 
the mean: U;_l (this is known as the ARCH tenn), 
3. The last period's forecast variance: (1;_1 (this is known as the GARCH tenn). 
The "auto-regressive" tenn means that the individual variance observations automatically regress to the 
level of the long-tenn variance, which is 0). This is shown by the presence ofllie long-term variance tenn in 
the (G)ARCH fonnula. 
Heteroscedasticity is a non-random pattern in the residual error tenn. When analysing data, variability in 
the error term is assumed not to depend on any factor included in the analysis. This assumption is called the 
assumption ofhomoscedastic errors and when violated, heteroscedasticity is said to exist 
Heteroscedasricity affects the size of the standard error of the regression coefficient, thereby biasing the 
results of any hypothesis testing. The problem of heteroscedasticity is solved by giving different weights to 
the observations in the test. This is done under both ARCH and CARCH. In the case of the CARCH 
fonnula the weights are exponential while the ARCH weightings are not (Schroeder, Sjoquist & Stephan, 
1986: 76) 
To sum up: the volatility will always retum to its long-term moving average if it is apart from it. It is 
conditional on past observations of volatility and events of the past and when a regression is perfonned, the 
variance in its error tenn is not constant for all values of the independent variables. 
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6.2 ARCH & GARCH (1.1) - Literature review of model development. 
Three of the main papers that have impacted on the development of the ARCH and GARCH (1,1) models 
are reviewed in this part of the chapter, namely 
1. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United 
Kingdom Inflation" by Robert F. Engle, 
2. "Estimating Time-Varying Risk Premia in the Term Structure: The ARCH-M Model" by 
Robert F. Engle, David M. Lilien and Russell P. Robins and 
3. "Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity" by Tim Bollerslev. 
Other authors and papers may be mentioned but are taken from the references from the above papers. The 
frrst and third papers are the papers in which the ARCH and GARCH models are first produced 
respectively. 
6.2.1 ARCH by Engle. 
Prior to the existence of the ARCH model, economic forecasters have found their ability to predict the 
future varies from one period to another. It is suggested that the inherent randonmess associated with 
different forecast periods seems to vary widely over time. NcNees (1979) notes that large and small errors 
tend to cluster together over different periods. This suggests that there is a usefulness in applying the 
ARCH model where the underlying forecast variance may change over time and is predicted by past 
forecast errors. 
In monetary theory and the theory of finance. portfolios of financial assets are held as functions of the 
expected returns and variances of the rates of return. Any shifts in asset demand must be associated with 
changes in expected means and variances of the rates of return. If the mean is assumed to follow a standard 
regression the variance is constrained to be constant over time. 
Prior to the development of the ARCH methodology, the manner in which variance was measured over 
time was done on an ad hoc basis. Klein (1977) obtained estimates of variance by constructing the five-
period moving variance about the ten-period moving average of the annual inflation rates. Kahn (1980) 
looked at the concept of variability. which was defined to be the absolute value of the frrst difference of the 
inflation rate. 
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With regards to the observations noted about the characteristics of the variance data points above, Engle is 
of the opinion that the first order linear ARCH process is well suited to take these characteristics into 
account. This is because the frrst order linear ARCH process generates data with fatter tails that the normal 
conditional density function. Engle notes that many statistical procedures have been designed to be robust 
to large errors, but to his knowledge, none of the literature has made use of the fact that temporal clustering 
of outliers (as noted by McNees above) can be used to predict their occurrence and minimise their effects. 
This is the approach taken by the ARCH model. 
Engle uses the maximum likelihood methodology to determine the weighting parameters in the ARCH 
equation similar to how the methodology is used earlier in the chapter as he determines it to be the most 
efficient way to measuring the weightings. In the paper he compares using the maximum likelihood 
methodology to using an ordinary least squares (OLS) method and concludes that the OLS method is less 
efficient in determining the parameters. The OLS methodology is, however, more appropriate if the 
disturbances in the data are not conditionally heteroscedastic. To prove that the data is conditionally 
heteroscedastic, Engle uses the Lagrange multiplier test procedure. The results of the test are that the data is 
conditionally heteroscedastic and the ARCH procedure is applicable. 
Once Engle determines that ARCH is the applicable tool to estimate the variance in the United Kingdom 
inflation rate, he moves on to actually applying the model. In analysing the data and economic theory 
concerning inflation, Engle notes that economic agents do not only respond to the mean, but to "higher 
moments ofrandom economic variables". He further argues that portfolio decisions are not only 
determined in response to the mean of the rate of return, but the variance as well. Friedman (1977) notes 
that high inflation will generally be associated with high variability of inflation. For this reason Engle notes 
that variability in inflation needs to be measured. The ARCH method allows a conventional regression 
specification for the mean function, with a variance that is permitted to change over the sample period. A 
linear declining set of weights was formulated after applying the Lagrange multiplier test. A two-parameter 
variance function was chosen because Engle anticipated the weightings (a) would not necessarily be 
stationary and non-negative in an unrestricted model. 
Engle then looks at the difference between using the maximum likelihood methodology versus the ordinary 
least squares method to determine the sizes of the weightings. He noted that the maximum likelihood 
methodology decreases the sizes of the short-run dynamic coefficients (weightings) and increases the 
coefficient in the long run. Engle notes that these seem to be reasonable results since much of the 
inflationary dynamics are estimated by a period of very severe inflation in the middle 1970's. This, however 
is also the period of the largest forecast errors and, hence, the maximum likelihood estimator will discount 
these observations. By the end of the sample period, inflationary levels were rather modest and one might 
expect that the maximum likelihood estimates would provide a better forecasting equation. 
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Finally, Engle examines whether the confidence intervals arising out of the ARCH model were superior to 
the least-squares modeL He notes, after examining the observations exceeding one standard deviation, that 
the number of outliers for the ordinary least squares method is reasonable; however, the timing of their 
occurrence is far from random. The ARCH model comes closer to truly random residuals after 
standardising for their distributions. 
The application of the ARCH model to the inflation data illustrates the usefulness of the ARCH model for 
improving the performance of a least-squares method for obtaining more realistic forecast variances. 
6.2.2 ARCH-M a collaboration between Engle, Lilien and Robins. 
This paper extends Engle's ARCH model to allow the conditional variance to become a determinant of the 
mean and results in a new model called ARCH.M(ean). The model explains and interprets recent 
econometric failures of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. 
The authors are of the opinion that as the degree of uncertainty on asset returns varies over time; the 
compensation required by risk averse "economic agents" for holding these assets must also be varying. 
Time-series models of asset prices must therefore both measure risk and its movement over time, and 
include it as a determinant of price. Any increase in the expected rate of return of an asset as it becomes 
more risky will be identified as a risk premium. 
Relating this to the term structure of interest rates, traditional expectations hypothesis is deemed to be 
inadequate to explain the observed data. This results in conclusions that there is some form of less than 
fully rational expectations, or time varying premia on different term debt. The aim of the ARCH·M model 
is thus to introduce the possibility of time-varying term premia. A review of the literature reveals, 
according to the authors, that most of the changes in the slope of the yield curve reflect changing liquidity 
premiums or expectations that do not satisfy the standard postulates of rationality. The results of the 
different studies suggest the importance of developing models capable of explaining fluctuating liquidity 
premiums. 
The key postulate in the paper is that time-varying premia on different term-debt instruments can be 
modeled as risk premia where the risk is due to unanticipated interest rate movements and is measured by 
the conditional variance of the one~period·holding-yield. The paper introduces the ARCH-M model that 
allows the conditional variance to affect the mean. In this way changing conditional variances directly 
affect the expected return on a portfolio. The authors found that variables which were useful in forecasting 
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excess retums are correlated with the risk premia and loose their significance when a function of the 
conditional variance is included as a regressor. 
The ARCH-M model is applied to six and two-month treasury bills and to 20 year Aaa rated corporate 
bonds to determine if there is any time-varying risk premia and how large they are. The authors then move 
on to developing a theoretical model of the relationship between means and variances, which is formulated 
as a statistical model. This is followed by a defming of the ARCH-M model and a presentation of its 
applications. 
In looking at the relationship between risk and return the authors examine the simplest set-up of one risky 
asset with normally distributed returns and one riskless asset. The risk is measured by the variance of the 
returns from holding the asset and the compensation by a rise in the expectation of the return. The 
relationship between the mean and the variance of the returns will ensure that the asset is fully held in 
equilibrium, which will depend on the utility function of the economic agents and the supply conditions of 
the assets. The authors then look for empirical evidence on the relationship between the proportion of 
movement in the mean in relation to the movement in the variance given the risk preferences of the agents 
and the supply elasticity. 
In developing the model it was assumed that the risk of holding the long-term bond was not diversifiable so 
that only variance matters. The initial specification takes the mean as a linear function of the standard 
deviation. 
The results of the testing reveal the following: 
i) The precision with which economic agents can predict the future varies significantly over 
time. In relatively quiet periods, like the mid 1960's, relatively quiet forecasts can be made 
and agents can speculate on the future without absorbing large risks. In volatile periods, like 
the early 1970's and early 1980's forecasts are less certain and speculation is riskier. Risk 
premia therefore adjust to induce investors to absorb greater uncertainty with holding the 
riskier asset. 
Ii) ARCH was present in the forecast errors of bond-holding yields indicating substantial 
variation in the degree of certainty over time. 
iii) The measure of certainty proved very significant in explaining the expected returns in two of 
the data sets, and was significant only at slightly more than the 5 percent level for the third. 
This enable the authors to conclude: 
iv) Risk premia are not time invariant; rather they vary systematically with the agent's 
perceptions of underlying uncertainty. 
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The authors finally conclude that while their initial results suggest the promise that the ARCH technique to 
applications that require the measurement of uncertainty, they feel that the current ARCH model is but a 
first step. The ARCH framework may be applied to more general models of uncertainty and risk. It may be 
extended to allow conditional covariances to vary, resulting in time varying risk betas. This generalisation 
of the ARCH model is achieved in the GARCH model proposed by Bollerslev. 
6.2.3 GARCH by Bollerslev. 
Bollerslev proposed a natural generalisation of the ARCH model proposed by Engle, to allow for past 
conditional variances in the current conditional variance equation. In his paper, Bollerslev derives 
stationary conditions and an autocorrelation structure for this new class of parametric models. The 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques are also considered. Bollerslev finally presents an empirical 
example relating to the uncertainty of the inflation rate. 
Bollerslev argues that in the applications of Engle's ARCH model the authors use a rather arbitrary linear-
declining lag structure in the conditional-variance equation to take account of the "long memory" typically 
found in empirical work. This is because estimating a totally free lag distribution often will lead to 
violation of the non-negativity constraints. Bollerslev's GARCH model allows for a much more flexible lag 
structure. In the empirical applications of the ARCH model a relatively long lag in the conditional variance 
equation is often called for, and to avoid problems with negative variance parameter estimates a fixed lag 
structure is typically imposed. Bollerslev argues that, in light of immediate practical interests, the ARCH 
class of models should be extended to allow for both a longer memory and a more flexible lag structure. 
In examining the GARCH (1 ,1) process Bollerslev notes the following: 
1. It is leptokurtic and shares this property with the ARCH model. 
2. The GARCH(p,q) process can be interpreted as an autoregressive moving average process. 
3. The maximum likelihood methodology is the best to use in determining the GARCH (1, I) 
parameters. 
4. In determining the parameters, the iterative procedure that is most convenient to use is the 
Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausmann (1974) algorithm. 
5. Because of the complication involved in estimating the GARCH process, it seems of interest 
to have a formal test for the presence of GARCH. 
6. The test applied by Bollerselv (relating to 5 above) is the Lagrange multiplier test. 
Bollerslev applies the GARCH model to the observation of inflation. He notes that the uncertainty of 
inflation is an unobservable economic variable of major importance, and within the ARCH framework 
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several different models have already been constructed to deal with it. Bollerslev concentrates on the model 
Engle and Kraft (1983) produced where the rate of growth in the implicit Gross National Product deflator 
in the United States is explained in terms of its own past. 
The paper analyses the period second quarter 1948 to fourth quarter 1983 (a total of 143 observations) 
using ordinary least squares regression methodology. Bollerslev notes that the model is stationary and none 
of the first ten autocorrelations or partial autocorrelations of the error term are significant at the 5% level. 
In comparing the fmdings of GARCH (1,1) model with the fmdings of the ARCH model of Engle and Kraft 
(1983), Bollerslev notes that the GARCH (1,1) model provides better fit for the lag and also exhibits a 
more reasonable lag structure. 
Bollerslev further graphed together with 95 per cent asymptotic confidence intervals for the one-step-ahead 
forecast errors the GARCH model. He noted that from the late 1940's to the mid 1950's the inflation rate 
was very volatile and hard to predict. This is reflected in the wide confidence intervals for the GARCH 
model. The 1960's and 1970's, however, were characterised by a stable and predictable inflation rate. 
During this period Bollerslev felt that the ordinary least squares method was much too wide. Starting with 
the second oil crisis in 1974 there was a slight increase in the uncertainty of the inflation rate, although it 
does not compare in magnitude at the beginning of the sample period. Bollerslev concludes that the 
GARCH (1,1) model is better suited to the data. 
6.3 ARCH. GARCH (1,1) & Volatility - Literature review of model 
ap,plication. 
The aim of this section is not to have an exhaustive review of the literature, but to get an insight into the 
basic volatility, ARCH and GARCH (1,1) models through examples of their application. Four studies are 
examined. The first two deal with the studying of volatility in a South African context (but do not apply the 
GARCH or ARCH methodology). The second two studies look again at the (G)ARCH application. The 
studies are: 
1. "The Jmpact of Trading Volume of Share Price Volatility" by Garth Saloner. 
2. "Evaluating the Empirical Bias, Efficiency and Forecasting Properties of Various Volatility 
Estimators for the Futures Contracts Traded on SAFEX" by Suzette Esterhuyse. 
3. "Measuring and Testing the Impact of News on Volatility" by Robert F. Engle and Victor K. 
Ng. 
4. "Stock Market Volatility and the Information Content of Stock Index Options" by Theodore 
E. Day and Craig M. Lewis. 
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In the case of the last study the focus of the review is not on the information content of stock index options 
but on the calculation and estimation of stock market volatility. 
6.3.1 Volume and Volatility by Saloner. 
Saloner focuses on the capital asset pricing model and how volatility increases the cost of capital. The 
nature of trading volume was investigated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In achieving this attention 
had to be paid to the measurement of the frequency with which a share is traded. Saloner found that the 
different methods of measuring trading volume (average annual trading volume, the number of deals 
consummated and the number of days on which a share is traded) were shown to be equivalent in their 
measurement of trading volume. 
Saloner discovered further that there is a small positive correlation between a company's issued share 
capital and its trading volume. This was discovered while looking for a relationship between the absolute 
price level of a share and the frequency with which it is traded. Saloner discovered that these two variables 
are mutually independent. 
The next part of the study concentrated on the empirical data after the salient characteristics of trading 
volume had been established. Saloner found, after examining a sample of fifty ordinary shares listed on the 
JSE, that whereas highly traded shares seemed to exhibit behavior consistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis, at low volumes several important changes occurred. 
The changes noted were: 
i) The correlation between the share and market returns becomes a function of volume with the 
relationship becoming stronger the lower the volume. 
ii) Correspondingly, the beta coefficient of the systematic risk also becomes volume-dependent. 
The lower the recorded volume the lower the recorded beta. 
iii) In portfolios the low volume dependency of measured systematic risk manifests itself in 
greater diversiftable risk. 
iv) The measured ex-post risk-return relationship breaks down at low volumes. 
These findings had an impact on the efficient markets hypothesis, the absence of an identifiable risk-return 
trade-off rendered the common tests inoperable as, in effect, there was a trading volume limit to tests of the 
efficient market hypothesis based on the mean-variance market equilibrium model. 
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The above fmdings were prior to Saloner applying statistical methods to the measurement of volatility. In 
looking at the volatility, Saloner noted that the behavior of the share returns becomes significantly non-
random at low volumes with the distributions of returns becoming manifestly leptokurtic with long tails. 
This occurs while the time series of monthly returns exhibit non-random runs. 
The methodology applied by Saloner, in the measurement of volatility, was to examine the relationship 
between the log volume and the beta for individual shares. This was done by performing a regression 
analysis between the two (the log volume and the beta for the individual shares). The results of this showed 
that no significant correlation could be found between the two. Saloner also examined the relationship 
between trading volume and the standard deviation of returns as a measure of risk. He found that no 
significant relationship exists between the two. The only reference to the actual measure of volatility in the 
Saloner study is the reference to the standard deviation of the returns. This suggests that Saloner used the 
traditional methodology to determine the volatility in the underlying shares. This was partly due to the lack 
of sophisticated statistical techniques (such as ARCH and GARCH) when the study was completed (ARCH 
was developed in 1982 whereas the Saloner study was completed in 1977). 
6.3.2 Evaluation o/Volatility Estimators by E'Sterhuyse. 
In her examination of various volatility estimators, Esterhuyse did not look at either of the ARCH or 
GARCH model. She did, however look at Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) models whose 
principles are incorporated into the GARCH model. The study aimed to evaluate the relative efficiency, 
bias and forecasting properties of extreme-value estimators of the volatility of the futures contracts traded 
on SAFEX for the period May 1990 to December 1994. Esterhuyse claims that theory predicts these 
extreme value estimators could be more efficient than the traditional close-to-close estimators when trading 
is continuous, always monitored and the price movements are small relative to the price of the stock. Close-
to-close estimators based on the differences between the closing price of the previous day and the close of 
the current day. 
The extreme value estimators tested were the Parkinson's extreme-value estimator and the Garman and 
Klaus extreme-value estimator. An extreme value estimator is an estimator based on the high and low 
prices observed during the trading day. This differs from the traditional close-to-close estimator that does 
not place emphasis on intra day movements. The Parkinson's extreme-value estimator looks at generating a 
diffusion constant, which characterised the random walk pattern of a stock. The diffusion constant is 
defined as: 
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The model employed by Garman and Klass (1980) assumed that stock prices are governed by a diffusion 
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a diffusion process with differential presentation, dB = adz 
Where 
dz = standard Gauss-Weiner process and 
unknown constant to be estimated. 
(45) 
Esterhuyse found both models to be downwardly biased when trading is discreet. High trading volumes and 
small minimum price increments can minimise these biases, leading to conditions under which these 
extreme-value estimators could potentially outperform to traditional close-to-close estimator. The above 
models were tested against data on the ALSI, GLDI and INDI contracts. Due to outliers (mainly in the 
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reported high low prices) two sets of results were presented for these three contracts. The effect of 
eliminating the outliers was to reduce the standard errors significantly. 
Esterhuyse found the results of the bias tests for the weekly and monthly volatilities to be fairly similar. 
The amendment of the outliers had very little effect on the bias properties of the two extreme value 
estimators. In looking at the ARMA tests, Esterhuyse found instances where these tests yielded different 
conclusions to the efficiency tests. Only in a select few cases could a "best" estimator (that is an estimator 
that is the best estimator if itself and the traditional close-to-close estimator) be determined. 
Off all the results presented, Esterhuyse could not point to a single estimator outperforming aU others in all 
cases. Whilst the traditional close-to-close estimator is still the accepted one in practice, Esterhuyse noted 
that the extreme-value estimators do show some promise. This is given that the data sets to which they are 
applied are of sufficient quality (that is exclude extreme outliers) and that the basic assumptions behind 
these estimators are satisfied. 
Based on the results of the study, Esterhuyse drew the following conclusions: 
1. Financial data needs to be validated carefully (preferably from a secondary source) when 
outliers are found, their treatment should be statistically correct and consistent. 
2. The ARMA forecasting equations were presented on the basis of comparing the extreme-
value estimators "in sample" To compare how accurate the ARMA forecasting equations are 
"out of sample" forecasts should be done for the various estimators. 
6.3.3 News and Volatility: Engle and Ng. 
In this paper Engle and Ng defme the news impact curve which measures how new information is 
incorporated into volatility estimates. Various new and existing ARCH models, including a partially 
nonparametric one, are compared and estimated with daily Japanese stock return data. Engle and Ng 
examine the response of volatility to news and find that, through the presentation of new diagnostic tests, 
the volatility response is asymmetric. This asymmetry is captured using a new model - EGARCH 
(Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity). In assessing the applicability of 
the new model the authors note that there is evidence of a high variability if the conditional variance 
implied by the EGARCH. 
The authors look at the different methods of predicting volatility and note an approach that they call the 
"asymmetric" or "leverage" model that is based on the premise that good news and bad news have different 
predictability for future volatility. The aim of this paper is to build on the work of previous authors in this 
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area by focusing on the asymmetric effects of news on volatility. Specifically, the authors provide new 
diagnostic tests, a partially nonparametric model for discovering the empirical relationship between news 
and volatility, and a metric for interpreting the differences between volatility models. 
In their review of the ARCH and GARCH models the authors note that the ARCH(P) model gives no 
weight to news p periods ago whereas the GARCH model does but on a geometrically reduced basis. 
Despite all the success of these simple parameterisations, the authors are of the opinion that the ARCH and 
GARCH models cannot capture some of the important features of the data. The most interesting of these 
being the asymmetric effect discovered by Black (1976). Statistically, this effect occurs when an 
unexpected drop in price (bad news) increases predictable volatility more than an unexpected increase in 
price (good news) of similar magnitude. This effect suggests a symmetry constraint on the conditional 
variance function in past error terms is inappropriate. One model proposed to capture such asymmetric 
effects is Nelson's EGARCH model. The EGARCH model is defined as: 
Where: 
hi == volatility at time t. 
ro, ~, y and a = constant weighting parameters. 
collective measure of news at time t. == 
When comparing the GARCH and the EGARCH model the authors notice an interesting metric by which 
to analyse the effect of news on conditional heteroscedasticity. Holding constant the information dated t - 2 
earlier, they examine the implied relationship between £1-1 and ht which produces a curve they call the 
news impact curve. This curve relates the past return shocks (news) to current volatility and measures how 
new information is incorporated into volatility estimates. The news impact curve differs from the standard 
GARCH model in two main respects: 
1. The EGARCH model allows good news and bad news to have a different impact on volatility, 
while the standard GARCH model does not, and 
2. The EGARCH model allows big news to have a greater impact on volatility than the standard 
GARCH model. 
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The effects of this is that the GARCH model produces results which dictate that positive and negative 
return shocks of the same magnitude produce the same amount of volatility, whereas the EGARCH gives a 
higher weighting to bad news. 
The authors then apply their theory to the estimation of Japanese stock volatility for the period 1 January 
1980 to 31 December 1988. Their findings were that the negative shocks introduce more volatility than 
positive shocks, with this effect particularly more apparent for the largest shocks. The diagnostic tests 
employed by the authors, however, indicated that in many cases the modeled asymmetry was not adequate. 
The authors also found that for reasonable shock values, the volatilities forecast by EGARCH and a 
partially nonparametric ARCH model were similar. However, for more extreme shocks, the forecasts 
differed more dramatically. The standard deviation of the EGARCH estimated conditional variance was 
even higher than that of the squared residual itself The result was interpreted as evidence against the 
EGARCH model, because the variability of the conditional variance, if correctly specified, should not be 
higher than that of the squared residual. 
The authors finally conclude that the news impact curve is a good measure of how news is incorporated 
into volatility estimates. They also conclude that there could be several different types of asymmetry of the 
news curve and that a partially nonparametric ARCH model is a useful approach to modelling conditional 
heteroscedasticity. 
6.3.4 Stock Market Volatility by Day and Lewis. 
The Day and Lewis study looked at the information content of implied volatilities from can options on the 
S&P 100 index in comparison to the GARCH and EGARCH models of conditional volatility. They found 
that by adding the implied volatility to the GARCH and EGARCH models as an exogenous variable, the 
within sample incremental information content of implied volatilities can be estimated using a likelihood 
ratio test of several nested models for conditional volatility. The ability of these models to predict volatility 
is also examined by regressing the ex post volatility on the implied volatilities and the forecasts from the 
GARCH and EGARCH models. 
The authors contend that the ex ante forecast of the average volatility of an underlying asset over the life of 
an option is interpreted from the implicit instantaneous variance of the price of the call option. The ability 
of implied volatilities to predict the future volatility of an underlying asset is considered to be a measure of 
the information content of call prices. This predictive content of implied volatility is examined by adding it 
to the GARCH model as an exogenous variable. This enables the authors, through the construction of a 
nested model, to statistically assess whether implied volatility is an important determinant of conditional 
volatility. 
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The methodology employed was to first measure the OARCH parameters. This was done by using a 
maximum likelihood methodology called the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm. The authors examined 
two separate time series of weekly returns on the S&P 100 index. The first time series was simply the 
unadjusted returns computed from the closing index level, which reflects any positive serial correlation 
induced by nonsynchronous trading. The second time-series of index returns is computed using estimates of 
the index level implicit in the price of stock-index call options. Once the parameters had been measured the 
implied volatilities were calculated. 
The implied volatilities were calculated using the can options on the Standard and Poor's 100 index from 11 
March 1983 to the 31 December 1989. The data was adjusted to eliminate bias by eliminating 
nonsynchronous trading, option quotations with a daily volume of less than 100 contracts and/or contracts 
where the absolute value of the difference between the closing price and the contract's exercise price 
exceeds $15. In addition, option contracts with closing prices less than $0.25 were eliminated because of 
the size of the bid-ask spread being large relative to the price of the option. The implied volatilities were 
calculated using the dividend-adjusted version of the Black-Scholes model. 
The authors note that the stochastic nature of the volatility captured by the GARCH models suggest that 
their estimates of implied volatility may be subject to specification error, since they use a European option 
pricing model that assumes that volatility is nonstochastic. A second source of potential specification error 
arises from the possibility of early exercise attributable to the discreet nature of dividends on the S&P 100 
index. With regards the first potential error, the authors note that the specification error in the estimates of 
implied volatilities can be minimised by focusing on at the money options. The second potential error is 
insignificant because since the likelihood of dividend-related exercise of S&P 100 call options is fairly low, 
the use of a European option-pricing model is adequate for the purposes of the study. 
In their conclusion, the authors found that the interpretation of the results became complicated by model 
misspecification and expiry date effects that add noise to the forecasts of future volatility implicit in option 
prices. The (within-sample) results suggest that implied volatilities may contain incremental information 
relative to the conditional volatility from OARCHand EGARCH models. The authors also found strong 
within-sample evidence that the conditional volatility estimates from OARCH and EOARCH models 
reflect incremental information relative to implied volatility. These results all suggest that neither implied 
volatility nor the conditional volatilities from OARCH and EGARCH models completely characterise the 
within-sample stock market volatility when the excess market return is assumed to be a linear function of 
conditional market volatility. 
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The authors explored this further by performing out-of-sample comparisons of the relative predictive power 
of the volatility forecasts to ex post volatility. From this they were able to conclude that weekly volatility is 
difficult to predict. The authors also found that the GARCH and EGARCH forecasts are unbiased, but were 
unable to make strong statements concerning the relative information content of GARCH forecasts and 
implied volatilities. The results did provide limited evidence that, in certain circumstances GARCH models 
provide better forecasts than EGARCH models. 
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Chapter 7: Empirical Testing of Market Efficiency - Closing rate 
data. 
This chapter examines the empirical evidence of the efficiency of the SAFEX listed futures using closing 
rate data. It is useful as it can be compared to earlier closing rate studies performed by Lambrechts (1990), 
Levett (1991) and Snell (1990). As part of this examination the relationship between the spot and futures 
price is examined to see if they indeed are correlated. The time delay between the time it takes the one 
instrument to react to news relative to the other should give some indication as to the efficiency with which 
the spot and futures markets react to news. The market efficiency is then further tested by calculating the 
arbitrage gap that is the difference between the bounds of the theoretical futures price and the actual futures 
price. In the event of a persistent arbitrage gap existing an attempt will be made to examine as to why this 
is the case. As part of this the market mechanics will be examined as well as the influences on the market 
such as the different market shocks described in chapter two. The arbitrage gap analysis was performed 
using a "fair value calculator" which was developed for the purposes of this thesis. The calculator is 
attached in Appendix 8.1 and the calculations it performs are explained in 8.4 below. 
7.1 Objective. 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold, namely to first test for the efficiency of the SAFEX listed futures 
through the examination of how the spot and the futures prices move together and secondly to test the 
efficiency of the SAFEX listed futures prices by determining if there is any evidence of persistent arbitrage 
opportunities. In an efficient market one should note a high degree of correlation in the movement of the 
spot and futures prices. A further characteristic of an efficient futures market is that there will be a lack of 
persistent arbitrage opportunities. In an efficient market arbitrage opportunities should be eliminated soon 
after they have arisen. Typically, one should not observe them occurring for more than a few hours. In this 
chapter the analysis is performed on closing rate data, in the event there are arbitrage opportunities they 
will have been open for a long period of time (the market closing period and some of the market open 
period). If these arbitrage opportunities prevail for a number of observations this implies that the arbitrage 
opportunities exist for more than 1 day which would enable one to conclude the market is inefficient. In 
chapter nine the focus is in intra day data which allows one to look at the opening and closing of arbitrage 
"gaps" during the course of the trading day and conclude on the pricing efficiency with greater confidence. 
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7.2 Introduction and Hypotheses. 
Various methods can be used to test for futures market efficiency. Lambrechts (1990) uses four methods 
ranging from correlations between the spot and the futures price to the calculation and examination of the 
residual correlation in the futures market. The approach taken by this study is twofold, frrstly the 
correlation between the spot and futures prices is examined to determine if the two are indeed linked 
through some fixed mechanism. Secondly, once a conclusion has been drawn on the correlation and 
anticipating it to conclude that the spot and futures prices are correlated, the arbitrage gap is calculated. If 
the first test returns a result that the spot and future are not correlated the second test looses relevance as 
this tests the extent to which the futures price remains in its fixed position (relative to the spot price). The 
hypotheses are: 
7.2.1 Hypothesis One - Spot / Future Correlation. 
The spot and futures price are related by means of a pricing formula (the cost of carry formula) for this 
reason one should note a similarity between the movement in the spot and the futures prices. The 
hypothesis to be examined is that there is a statistically significant correlation between the movements in 
the spot price and the futures price of the futures contract. 
7.2.2 Hypothesis Two - Arbitrage Gap. 
In the event futures markets are efficient there would be no opportunity for traders to make arbitrage profits 
from exploiting price discrepancies between the spot and futures market. The second hypothesis is thus that 
there is no economically significant arbitrage gap to be exploited between the spot and futures prices over 
any period of time. 
7.3 Theoretical Background and Methodology. 
The data for the examination has been supplied by a number of different sources. In determining the data to 
use consideration needs to be given to the theoretical requirements of the cost of carry model and the 
correlation calculation. In the case of the cost of carry model one needs to tailor it to the specifics of the 
market (in this case the South African Financial Markets) before initiating the test. This section of chapter 
eight looks at the cost of carry model and how it evolves to describe the cost of carry relationship in the 
South African fmancial markets. Before undertaking this tailoring process we look at the correlation 
calculation. The methodology employed in testing hypothesis one was to first break down the data into 
contract periods then calculate the correlation. Due to data constraints, thirty-eight contract periods were 
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identified, namely the June 1990 contract to the September 1999 contract. For each contract the spot and 
futures prices were graphed and a reasonability check was performed by examining the convergence of the 
spot and futures prices (the diminishing of the basis). This can best be seen in the following figure 7.1: 
Figure 7.1- September 1999 ALSI Future vs ALSI Spot. 
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In the above figure one can see the futures price and the spot price converging (the basis reducing), which 
is a good example of what to expect over the life of a futures contract. This graph was produced for all the 
contracts in the series as well as the other futures contracts that are examined in this study (See appendix 
8). This was done as a reasonability test of the accuracy of the data. Once the graphs had been produced the 
log normal changes in the prices of the spot and futures prices were calculated. At this point the correlation 
calculations were performed. The correlation was calculated by using the square of the Pearson correlation 
coefficient (the coefficient of determination) between the actual futures and spot prices. The square of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient is the square of the product moment correlation coefficient through data 
points in known_y's and known_x'S. The r-squared value can be interpreted as the proportion of the 
variance in y attributable to the variance in x. Returns the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, 
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r, a dimensionless index that ranges from -1.0 to 1.0 inclusive and reflects the extent of a linear relationship 





One set of data points. 
The second set of data points to be regressed against the first one. 
By squaring the Pearson correlation coefficient, one determines the coefficient of determination which 
shows to what extent one variable is explained by the other. 
7.3.1 Tailoring the Cost o/Carry Model. 
In examining the basic cost of carry model as outlined in chapter three the first variable one needs to be 
aware of is the interest rate. The interest rate used in this research was determined after discussions were 
held with a number of arbitrage traders at South African Investment Banks. The interest rates they use (i.e. 
what they have to borrow and lend at) are linked to the negotiable certificate of deposit (NCO) interest rate. 
The NCD rate used was the three-month rate as the rate faced by the traders is the short-term rate. For the 
purposes of ensuring a spread between the borrowing and investing interest rate the lending (investing) rate 
was assumed to be fifty basis points below the NCD rate and the borrowing rate was assumed to be fifty 
basis points above the NCO rate. This would vary from trader to trader and bank to bank. 
The next variable that needs to be fmalised is that of the dividends. According to P. Levett (1991) actual 
dividends should be used rather than the dividend yield. This was found after a comparison was performed 
using both methods. Traders tend to use the dividend yield due to the computational and administrative 
burden inherent in using the actual dividends. The actual dividends tend to be "lumpy" in nature and as the 
cost of carry model is based on the time value of money the effects of spreading the dividends (by the use 
of the dividend yield) can distort the cost of carry fair value. In this study both methods have been 
employed. This allows for a comparison between the values generated by the dividend yield cost of carry 
model and the actual dividend cost of carry model. To set up the actual dividend model the dividends paid 
by the underlying spot instrument(s) have to be determined. For single stock futures this is fairly easy 
information to compile. In the case of index futures the administrative burden increases substantially. One 
first has to reconstruct the index over the period oftime that is under analysis. The indices are monitored 
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and changed (if necessary) quarterly by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. To reconstruct the index one 
needs to take these changes into account In between the index changes the companies within the index can 
undergo corporate actions such as takeovers and share issues. These need to be taken into account and 
adjusted accordingly when calculating the constituents of the index. Once the index has been reconstructed 
the dividends paid by each constituent of the index have to be calculated and reduced to a single dividend 
payment Due to the administrative burden of doing this the fair value of the futures using actual dividend 
cost of carry model will only be calculated for the single stock futures and the ALSI futures contract for the 
period June 1995 to July 1999. 
In order to execute the cost of carry and reverse cost of carry arbitrage one needs to be aware of certain 
practical constraints. The constraints could be discussed under the heading "transaction costs". The 
transaction costs are made up of two different types, namely direct and indirect transaction costs. Direct 
transaction costs would involve costs such as brokerage and trading taxes. For the purposes of this study 
these have been ignored because the trading houses and banks often have seats on the various exchanges 
and are thus able to avoid the brokemge costs and related taxes thereon. With regards indirect trading costs 
the situation becomes more complicated. Indirect trading costs would primarily arise out of one of the two 
following situations: Firstly where the liquidity in the underlying stock is low and the bid offer spread is 
subsequently wide. This causes the actual traded price to vary significantly from trade to trade. One also 
will notice an adverse movement in the market price as the traded volume increases in relation to the daily 
market size. The second "cost" affects index futures and involves the creation and liquidation of baskets. In 
order to execute a cost of carry arbitrage strategy one must borrow and buy the underlying stock and sell it 
forward. In buying the underlying stock in the case of an index share one must buy a proportional amount 
of stock so as to mirror the index. This can result in the purchase of odd lots as wen as there will be 
differences in liquidity across the different stocks within the index. An added complication is the time it 
will take to buy the whole index ~ this may jeopardise any attempt to take advantage of the arbitrage gap. In 
the case of reverse cost of carry arbitrage one lUust borrow the basket of shares representing the index and 
sell it short and enter into a contract buying it forward. In this case one must borrow a basket of shares that 
mayor may not be available in the market. If lenders are in the practice of creating baskets (which is not 
the currently case in the South African securities lending market) one must still liquidate the basket. If the 
lenders do not offer baskets one must first borrow the proportional amount of the index shares so as to 
construct a basket. This is both slow (which could see the trader miss the arbitrage opportunity) and can be 
expensive. Once the basket has been created the trader must sell the basket into the market. In this case one 
is faced with the same problems as the trader who is buying the basket - liquidity and odd lot constraints. 
These problems outlined above are not to be ignored and lead one to ask the question: "How does arbitrage 
trading take place given these significant practical constraints?" In answer to the question traders currently 
perform a proxy type of arbitrage. A selection is made of a number of shares within the index (determined 
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by the trader) that will give the trader an approximate index exposure. For example, the trader may buy 
Didata. DeBeers and Anglo Gold as a proxy for the ALSI40 index. This allows the trader to execute the 
"arbitrage" without having to buy. borrow or sell a large variety of shares. This proxy form of arbitrage 
comes with its set of problems too, one does not get an exact arbitrage risk exposure and within an index 
shares may rise and fall at different rates. This may lead to a share lagging or leading the index. If the share 
selected for the proxy arbitrage lags or leads the index it open up the possibility to perform a systems based 
"arbitrage" trade where one can trade-off the fact that the leaders and laggards will have to come back to 
the average of the rest of the group within the index. All this leads to less than perfect index arbitrage. An 
obvious answer to this would be for one to have "basket" trading. In this case a selection of market 
participants would create baskets of shares that directly replicate the index and then trade in complete 
baskets. The creation of a market in these baskets would result in a more risk efficient type of arbitrage. For 
the purpose of this study the effects of the practical limitations or costs involved in index arbitrage have 
been ignored in the calculation of the arbitrage gap. This is because it will vary from trader to trader and 
there is a new basket type product that has recently been introduced into the market. 
During the course of 2000 a basket type product was introduced into the South African fmancial markets by 
Gensec Bank and Gensec Asset Management (now known as Sanlam Investment Management), 
CorpCapital Bank and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The product, called the SATRIX 40, is an 
instrument that represents a basket of underlying ALSI40 shares. The SATRlX 40 is traded as a separate 
instrument on the JSE and is directly convertible into the underlying shares that make up the index 
(providing one converts a minimum of one million SATRIX 40 shares into the underlying index shares). 
The SATRIX 40 product should see a more efficient type of ALSI40 index arbitrage as one is now able to 
execute an arbitrage strategy where one can directly replicate the index. As the SA TRIX 40 is a directly 
convertible instrument one should also see some form of arbitrage taking place between the underlying 
basket of shares and the SATRlX 40. This will ensure the price of the SATRlX 40 remains efficient and 
thus effective in spot I future arbitrage trading activities. One slight difference between the SATRIX 40 and 
the underlying basket of shares is the timing of the dividend payments: The SATRlX 40 accumulates the 
di vidend flows from the under1ying shares and pays them out on a quarterly basis, where one would receive 
the dividend payments as they occur if one was to hold the underlying basket. Spot / futures arbitrage is 
based on the time value of money mechanism so any change in the timing of cash flows would have an 
impact on the valuation. For this reason using the SATRlX 40 instrument in ALSI40 arbitrage would yield 
slightly different results than if one was to use the actual underlying spot basket of shares. 
One of the fmal practicalities one needs to take into account when performing analysis on spot and futures 
prices is the timing of the observations. The spot equities market opens from 9:00 am to 4:00 pm each 
business day. The futures market stays open for longer than this. During the time that the spot market is 
closed and the futures market is open the US markets are normally open. Thus any changes in the US 
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market can be reacted to by the portfolio managers through the futures market. For this reason the close in 
the spot market (taken as the closing price for the day) cannot really be compared to the closing price in the 
futures market (taken as the closing price for the day in the futures market). One cannot draw conclusions 
from a comparison between the two prices as there have been other market events that the futures have 
been allowed to react to where the spot has been unable to. For this reason any meaningful spot I futures 
analysis must take the futures mark - to - market rate to represent the price of the futures. The mark - to -
market rate in the futures market is taken at around 4:00pm each day to coincide with the close in the spot 
market which allows one to draw comparisons between the prices on the two different exchanges at the 
same (or similar) time. 
All of the adjustments outlined above impact on the fair value futures formula. The fmal fair value formula 
that has been used for the purposes of this study is as follows: 
S-A+D+B+C-E+GSFSS+A-D-B+C-E (48) 
For defmition of variables see below. This formula is constructed by f)fst defming the cost off carry bounds 
as being: 
Future Spot + interest on cash borrowed - dividend received - interest on dividend received + interest 
payable on mismatch of funds - SAFEX interest received on margin deposit. 
This is an evolved form of formula 1 outlined in chapter 3 which simply dermes the future as the spot 
multiplied by one plus the cost of carry rate (expressed as a percentage). The above definition takes into 
account some of the market imperfections. The primary source of the interest payable on the mismatch of 
funds is the futures margin. The cost of carry fair value is the upper bound when derming the fair value of 
the future. For this reason the future must lie somewhere below the above defined price for it to be fairly 













Fair value of the future. 
Current market price of the spot instrument. 
Interest payable on borrowings. 
Dividend received from shares that are held in accordance with the arbitrage strategy. 
Interest received on the above dividends. 















Interest payable on net financing (primarily cash needed to finance the initial margin), 
Interest earned from SAFEX on the margin deposit. 









(Contract expiry date - transaction date)l365 x continuously compounding borrowing 
interest rate x borrowings. 
Number of shares x dividend per share in cents / 100. 
Summation of all the dividends [(Contract expiry date - dividend receipt date)/365 x 
continuously compounding investing interest rate x D.] 
(Contract expiry date - transaction date)/365 x continuously compounding borrowing 
interest rate x (initial margin deposit + any other excess cash requirements). 
(Contract expiry date· transaction date )/365 x continuously compounding SAFEX 
interest rate x initial margin deposit. 
The continuously compounding interest rate was defined as: LN(1 + effective annual interest rate). The 
effective annual interest rate is defined as: [1 + (PI Q)f -1. P is the annual nominal interest rate and Q 
is the number of compounding periods per year (this applies to both the investing, borrowing and SAFEX 
interest rates). 
The cost of carry formula has now been established. The next step it to establish the reverse cost of carry 
arbitrage bounds. The basic formula is: 
Future:::: Spot· interest on cash invested + dividend received on shorted stock + interest on dividend + 
interest payable on mismatch of funds - SAFEX interest received on margin deposit + securities lending 
fee. 
This is an evolved form of the reverse cost of carry formula outlined in chapter. The above definition takes 
into account some of the market imperfections and practicalities (such as securities lending). In this case 
the primary source of the interest payable on the mismatch of funds is the futures margin and the excess 
collateral required for the securities loan (the excess collateral is the amount by which the collateral 
exceeds the initial value of the underlying loan when the loan is made). The reverse cost of carry fair value 
is the lower bound when defining the fair value of the future. For this reason the future must lie somewhere 
above the above defined price for it to be fairly priced in terms of the reverse cost of carry arbitrage 
mechanism. The above formula can more simply be described as follows: 
F?,S-A+D+B+C-E+G (50) 


























Fair value of the future. 
Current market price of the spot instrument. 
Interest received on the invested cash. 
Dividend that would have been received from shares that were borrowed and sold. These 
dividends now have to be paid across to the lender even though they have not been 
earned by the arbitrageur (due to the fact that the shares were sold). 
Interest that would have been received on the above dividends. 
Interest payable on net financing (primarily cash needed to finance the initial margin and 
the excess collateral on the securities loan). 
Interest earned from SAFEX on the margin deposit. 
The secvrities lending fee payable on the borrowing of the shares needed for the 
transaction. 












(Contract expiry date - transaction date)/365 x continuously compounding investing 
interest rate x cash received from shorting the borrowed stock. 
Number of shares x dividend per share in cents / 100. 
Summation of all the dividends [(Contract expiry date - dividend receipt date)/365 x 
continuously compounding investing interest rate x D.] 
(Contract expiry date - transaction date)!365 x continuously compounding borrowing 
interest rate x (initial margin deposit + any other excess cash requirements such as excess 
collateral on securities loan). 
(Contract expiry date - transaction date)i365 x continuously compounding SAFEX 
interest rate x initial margin deposit. 
Initial Rand value of shares borrowed x annual securities lending fee x (Contract expiry 
date - transaction date)/365. 
At this stage one is able to defme a more detailed version offormula 48: the fair value bounds of the future. 
The fmal formula (formula 51) is: 
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Date of expiry of contract. 
Date of transaction. 
Nominal annual investing interest rate. 
Compounding periods per year for the investing interest rate. 
Spot share price at date of transaction. 
Number of shares purchased for transaction. 





Number of dividends received during period the contract was held for. 
Date of dividend receipt. 

































Nominal annual borrowing interest rate. 







Collateral as a percentage of the initial value of the underlying securities lending loan. 





Compounding periods per year for the SAFEX interest rate. 
Annual securities lending fee. 
7.4 Buildini a Futures Fair Value Calculator. 
In determining the theoretical value of the futures as explained above, a futures fair value calculator was 
built. The purpose of the calculator is to show the arbitrage "bands" above. and below which, arbitrage can 
take place (see figure 3.1 in chapter three above). The first step was to design this in a spreadsheet format 
that was then transported to an application more able to handle large quantities of data being fed through it. 
The spreadsheet version is in table 7.1 below, there were no logical changes between this and the final 
calculator that was used in the analysis. The fmal calculator can be found in appendix 7.1 on the 
accompanying CD-ROM. 
Table 7.1 - Futures Fair Value Calculator: Spreads beet Version. 
Futures Fair Value Calculator 
Input Variables 
Borrowing Interest Rate 
Compounding periods per year 
Effective Rate 
Continuous Compounding Rate 
Investing Interest Rate 
Compounding periods per year 
Effective Rate 
Continuous Compounding Rate 
Interest earned on margin 
Compounding periods per year 
Effective Rate 
Continuous Compounding Rate 
Transaction Date 
Contract Expiry Date 


















Margin on contract: R 1 200 per contract 
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Share Name: Didata 
Share Code: DDT 
Current Price: R 64.10 
Futures Name: Didata 
Futures Code: DDTQ 
Current Price: R 6 421 
Amount being applied to strategy R 1 000 000 
Actual amount being applied to strategy R999960 (Net of Rounding) 
Gross up applied to dividends on Securities Loan: 100% 
Dividends 
Date of first dividend 30-Jun-00 
Dividend per share (c) 356.00 
Date of second dividend 01-Sep-00 
Dividend per share (c) 378.00 
Cash and Carry Arbitrage 
Borrow R 1 million 
Buy R 1 million Didata 
Receive Didata dividend 
Enter into September contract to sell DDT 
Futures Margin Cash flow required 
Borrow excess cash needed for margin and excess SL 
collateral 
Sell DDT according to future 
Return R 1 million 
Pay interest on R 1 million 
Receive interest on dividend 
Return excess cash 
Pay interest on excess cash borrowed 
Receive margin 
Receive interest on margin 
# Contracts I Shares Cash Flow 
Z R 999 960.00 
AA 15600 -R 999 960.00 





-R 187 200.00 









-15600 R 1 001 676.00 
NN 
-R 999 960.00 
-R 46140.47 
R 1860.58 
-R 187 200.00 
-R 8 637.84 
R 187 200.00 
R4948.17 
Net Total a R 68 250.44 
00 Optimum maximum 5983 
Reverse Cash and Carry Arbitrage 
Strategy: 
Borrow R 1 million Didata 
Put up security for shares 
Enter into September contract to buy DDT 
Futures Margin Cash flow required 
Sell R 1 million Didata 
Borrow excess cash needed for margin and excess SL 
Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. 









-R 1 049 958.00 
-R 187 200.00 
R 999 960.00 
R 237158.00 
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collateral 
Buy R 1 million Didata according to futures contract w (156) 
Deliver Didata shares to Lender of scrip 
Receive capital cash flow from lender 
Receive interest cash flow from lender 




15 600 -R 1 001 676.00 
(15600) 
Receive margin back 
Pay dividends earned across to lender 








R 1 049958.00 
R 33 012.00 
-R4972.60 
R 187200.00 
-R 114 504.00 
Receive interest on margin cash flow 
Repay excess borrowings 
Repay interest on excess borrowings GGG 
INet Total 
HHH Optimum minimum 
The calculator is divided into three distinct parts. The first part is where the variables needed for the 
calculation are entered. These are then used to produce two figures, namely the profit or loss from the cost 
of carry strategy and the profit or loss from the reverse cost of carry strategy (These are the bold "Net 
Total" figure in the second and third parts to the table above). If the future is fairly priced both the figures 
will be equal to or less than zero. If there is an arbitrage opportunity the one figure will be positive while 
the other will be negative, the negative figure must be ignored, as this strategy will not be applied - only the 
profitable one will. Ifboth figures produce positive values, there is an error in the data that has been 
entered. One will not be able to profitably apply both the cost of carry and reverse cost of carry arbitrage 
strategies simultaneously due to the fact that they are mutually exclusive. 
7.4.1 Futures Fair Value Calculator - Explanation. 
A, B, C & D: The borrowing interest rate that has been used for the purposes of the study is the rate on the 
three month Negotiable Certificate of Deposit (NCO) plus fifty basis points. This is to take into account 
different borrowing and lending rates. The compounding period is then required as part of the calculation. 
This is done to convert the nominal annual rate to an effective one. The compounding period of the NCD 
rate depends on the way the NCD is quoted. The NCD can either be quoted on a NACQ (nominal, annual 
compounded quarterly) or NACS (nominal, annual compounded semi-annually) basis. This will be 
identified in the results. To convert the nominal interest rate into an effective one the following formu1a is 
used: 
(52) 
Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. Julian Williams, 2001 
-R 1860.58 
R 4 948.17 


















Effective interest rate. 
Nominal interest rate. 
Compounding period. 
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Finally, once the effective interest rate is established it must be converted into a continuously compounding 
interest rate. This is done so as to achieve standardisation between the different interest measures. The 
formula to convert the effective interest rate into the continuously compounding rate is: 
ce = In(1 + re) (53) 
Where: 
re Effective interest rate. 
ce = Continuously compounding interest rate. 
The same approach is applied to the rate at which the arbitrageur can invest at: E, F, G & H. The only 
difference is the investment interest rate. For the purposes of this study this is deemed to be the NCD rate 
less fifty basis points. Again, the reduction in basis points is done to make allowance for the differential in 
the borrowing and lending interest rates in the market. 
I, J, K & L: In chapter three the fact that the futures exchange pays interest on the margin it holds for the 
market participants was disclosed. This rate is obtained from SAFEX and is also converted into an 
effective, then continuously compounding interest rate. The rate quoted by SAFEX is an overnight call rate. 
M and N are the transaction date and the maturity date of the futures contract. The transaction date is the 
date on which the arbitrage transaction is entered into. It is assumed that all the different parts of the 
arbitrage transaction are entered into simultaneously. In practice this may not be the case as it may, for 
example, take some time to locate the shares to be sold short in the reverse cost of carry arbitrage strategy. 
Even in practice, however, it should not take more than twenty-four hours to put the transaction in place. 
Any time longer than this could possibly result in the arbitrage opportunity disappearing with the normal 
day to day movement in prices. Care must be taken not to confuse the settlement date of the transaction 
with the actual transaction date. The settlement date is assumed to be the same as the transaction date for 
the purpose of this study. In practice, it may be a day or two later. This would have implications on the 
funding costs of items such as collateral on the securities loan under the reverse cost of carry arbitrage 
strategy. The expiry date is obtained from the futures contract (See Appendix 3.1 below). 
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o and P relate to the securities loan that is put in place to facilitate the reverse cost of carry arbitrage 
strategy. 0 is the annual securities lending fee that is paid to the lender by the borrower (as described in 
chapter three above). There is no market data relating to the size of this fee. However, Counihan and 
Malherbe (1999: 9) examined this and concluded the fee typically ranges from 75 to 150 basis points with 
securities in demand rising up to 300 basis points. For the purpose of this thesis an annual rate of 150 basis 
points (one and a half percent) has been used. P relates to the collateral percentage required by the lender 
for lending out the shares required for the arbitrage strategy to the lender. The collateral levels also vary. 
As per the Counihan and Malherbe (1999 : 69) report the collateral required in South Africa is typically as 
follows: 
Collateral in the form of Cash: 105% of the value of the underlying securities. 
Collateral in the form of Bonds: 110% of the value of the underlying securities. 
Collateral in the form of Equities: 115% of the value of the underlying securities. 
The collateral is market to market on a daily basis. So, as in the case of the SAFEX margin, there will be 
further fmancing requirements as the value of the loan varies. This is not taken into account - it is assumed 
the margin requirements do not increase over the period of the arbitrage transaction. The securities loan fee 
does not change as the value of the underlying instruments change, it is based on the initial value of the 
loan. For the purposes of this thesis the collateral will be assumed to be ofa cash nature and the collateral 
margin will be 105% of the value of the underlying securities. 
Q comes from the notices issued by SAFEX from time to time on the required margin levels. The current 
level of margins can be seen in chapter three, table 3.4. R is the name of the underlying instrument that is 
being used as part of the arbitrage strategy. This is not used in the calculations; it is an identifying variable. 
S is used in a similar manner - it is the JSE code of the underlying security. The current price of the 
underlying security: T is the price that the transaction takes place at. It is used to determine the arbitrage 
profit, how many shares can be bOUght and sold as well as how many shares need to be borrowed if the 
reverse cost of carry arbitrage strategy is followed. 
u, V & Ware the same as the previous three variables, the only difference is that they are the name, code 
and price of the future. Again the future's price must be the price at the date the transaction is entered into. 
The futures price and the underlying spot price should be the simultaneous price when the transaction is 
initiated. X is the amount, as described, being applied to the strategy. This is more of practical use and does 
not affect the returns that are calculated. Y relates to securities lending. When an institution lends out a 
share and the share attracts a dividend while it is lent out; the borrower must remit the dividend to the 
lender. South African tax law does not, however, see this remitted dividend as a dividend. It sees this 
remitted dividend as a "manufactured dividend". The significance of this is the manufactured dividend 
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looses its tax status. Dividends are not taxed in the hands of the recipient, but manufactured dividends are. 
For this reason the borrowers compensate the lenders by the amount of the tax benefit lost by the creation 
of the manufactured dividend. This is called the dividend "gross up". The dividends are remitted along with 
the amount of tax that lost. The amount oftbe gross up depends on the tax status of the lender. In some 
cases the dividends do not need to be grossed up at aU. As tax is being ignored for the purposes of this 
thesis the dividend gross up is set at 100%. This means that there is no compensation paid from the 
borrowers to the lenders for the tax benefits lost on dividends on shares being lent out. 
Z is the first step in the cost of carry arbitrage leg of the fair value calculator - the borrowing of the cash to 
be applied to the strategy. The calculator is designed to track both the cash flow and the flow of the number 
of (futures) contracts / shares in the implementation of each leg of the arbitrage. The number of contracts I 
shares should be zero at the unwinding of the strategy. The only amount that should be left is an amount in 
the cash flow column. This cash flow depicts the total profit or loss made from the arbitrage. Z occurs at T 
::;: 0, which denotes the trading date and is the same as the transaction date M above. T::;: 1 is the maturity 
date and is the date upon which the trade is unwound and the transaction is brought to a close. It is the same 
as the expiration date - N above. AA shows the purchase of the underlying shares. This is calculated by 
dividing the amount applied to the strategy (X) by the current share price (T). For the goal of keeping the 
calculator as accurate as possible the number of shares and contracts are not rounded off. The cash flow in 
this case is an outflow of R 1 million as the cash that was borrowed is applied to the purchase of the shares. 
BB is the dividend declared by the underlying share. In the case of the above example the dividend is 
assumed to have been paid out in two installments. Practically the dividend date will vary. This will affect 
the interest earned I paid on the dividend which is dealt with in JJ below. The dividend received is 
calculated by multip lying the dividend yield by the share price on the date the dividend is paid (In this case 
the share price on the transaction date). The dividend-received date becomes complicated in the case of 
index futures. In this case there is no one dividend date - there are numerous. For the purposes of this thesis 
an average dividend is assumed to be earned / paid. This is done by multiplying the dividend yield per day 
on the index (dividend yield divided by 365) by the index each day the arbitrage transaction runs for. Each 
"dividend" received is assumed to be a separate cash flow and is treated separately for interest purposes, 
again, see JJ below. In the case of the above example the table has allowed for two different dividend dates, 
the actual futures fair value calculator (see attached CD-Rom) allows for more. 
The next step in the transaction is to enter into the futures contract: CC. In the case of the cash and carry 
arbitrage one must enter into a futures agreement to sell the stock forward The entering of the contract 
does not incur any direct cash flow other than what is required for margin purposes (which is outlined in 
DD below). CC is the number of futures contracts that are needed to enter into the hedged position to the 
underlying which is the number of shares divided by 100. The margin (DD) is determined by SAFEX from 
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time to time. The margin requirements for the different contracts can be seen in the margin table of chapter 
three. The margin requirements per contract are multiplied by the number of contracts to determine the total 
margin cash flow required. The study does not take into account any margin relief due to there being any 
evidence of set off between the different contracts that a trader may hold (for example an offsetting spread 
position). 
Due to further cash requirements such as the need to put up margin, the arbitrage trader will be exposed to a 
fmancing requirement. This is shown in EE. This is where the futures trader borrows the excess that is 
needed to complete the transaction. For the cash and carry arbitrage trade the excess needed will only be 
the margin requirement. This can be seen in the example above where the cash requirement is the same as 
the margin payment. 
At this point the arbitrage trader is locked into the trade, the next step is to unwind the trade once the 
futures contract reaches expiry. This is shown to occur at T = 1 which is equal to the expiry date. The first 
step in winding up the arbitrage position is to reverse the trades made previously. FF and GO show the 
expiry of the futures contracts and the sale of the shares respectively. The shares are sold at the 
predetermined price (the price of the future when the contract was entered into). This will result in a cash 
flow to the trader that is shown next to the liquidated shares. 
-
From this cash the trader will need to repay the debt used to construct the position. This is shown in HH 
and II, with II being the interest on the debt. The interest is calculated on a continuously compounding 
basis as described above (A, B, C & D). 
The dividend that was earned during the course of holding the underlying shares is used to set off the 
effects of the financing requirements. The interest on the dividends is shown as JJ. The interest on the 
dividends is determined using the continuously compounding investing rate from the date the dividends 
were received to the expiry date. 
The fmal step in the transaction is to receive the margin from SAFEX and repay it to the party who lent the 
cash for the margin. The interest on the margin is determined using the continuously compounding SAFEX 
rate for the period the contract was in place. The interest on the excess cash requirements is determined 
using the continuously compounding borrowing rate for the period of the contract. The variables covering 
this are KK, LL, MM and NN in the example above. 
The summation of all the cash flows for the transaction are shown by the summary box above the variable 
00. This is the total profit or loss made by entering into the cash and carry transaction. In this case the cash 
and carry transaction yielded a profit ofR 68 250.44 which shows the future to be overpriced at the date the 
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arbitrage transaction was entered into. The fair price of the future as calculated by the cash and carry 
arbitrage model is shown by 00 to be 5983. This is the upper bound of the fair value of the future, any 
price above this means the future is overpriced and is open to being exploited by a trader applying the cash 
and carry arbitrage strategy. 
The reverse cash and carry arbitrage price is determined in a similar way to the above. The transaction is 
broken down into its relevant components and the cash flows are summed to determine if there is a net 
profit or loss. 
The first step in this transaction is the borrowing of the underlying share, which in the above example is the 
Didata shares. The number of shares is determined by rounding down the number of shares that can be 
acquired by the amount that is to be applied to the strategy (which is, in this case R I million). This is 
shown by variable PP. As part of the securities loan the trader must put up collateral for the shares, which is 
shown by variable QQ. This variable is determined by multiplying the value of the loaned shares at the 
inception of the transaction by the collateral percentage, which in this case is 105%. 
As part of the arbitrage cover the shares must be purchased forward. The next step is thus to enter into a 
long futures contract. The number of contracts is determined by dividing the number of shares by 100 (see 
appendix 3.1 to see actual ratio of shares to futures contract). This variable is RR. As in the cash and carry 
arbitrage, there is no movement of cash on the entering into of the futures contract, the only initial cash 
flow is the initial margin flow which is dealt with under variable SS. Variable SS is calculated by 
mUltiplying the number of contracts entered into by the margin per contract as in the cash and carry 
arbitrage transaction. 
The underlying stock that has been borrowed is then sold as part of the reverse cash and carry arbitrage 
strategy. This is sold at the market price (see variable TT). This releases a cash flow that can be set off 
against the collateral needs. The cash received from the sale of the shares does not entirely set off the cash 
requirements for the collateral. The difference between the two is attributed to the collateral margin over 
the value of the underlying shares (typically 5% in the case of cash collateral). This excess cash collateral 
and margin requirements are borrowed by the trader at the borrowing rate. This can be seen in the W 
variable. 
At this point the trader has constructed the reverse cash and carry arbitrage position. The next step is to 
reverse out of the position and realise the arbitrage profit or loss. This is deemed to occur at time T = 1 
which is when the futures contract expires. To realise the profit or loss the trader must reverse the positions 
entered into above. The first of which is shown by variable VV where the number of futures contracts is 
reduced to nil as they expire. WW shows the purchase of the shares according to the futures contract as 
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well as the related cash flow. This cash flow would typically not occur due to the mark to market of the 
futures contract which would ensure the cash flow would occur in stages as the market price of the 
underlying shares moved rather than as one single movement at the end of the contract. For the purposes of 
the study the margin cash flow is assumed to occur at expiry where the entire cash flow takes place. 
Once the shares have been purchased they are delivered back to the original lender. This is shown by 
variable XX, which shows the reduction in the number of shares on hand. On returning the shares to the 
lender the trader will receive the collateral cash flow back as well as any interest earned on it. The 
collateral cash flow is shown by variable YY. The interest on the collateral is shown by variable ZZ. ZZ is 
calculated by multiplying the continuously compounding borrowing interest rate by the number of days 
between the date the arbitrage transaction was entered into (when the shares were frrst borrowed) and when 
the futures contract expired. This is then multiplied by the initial value of the collateral. 
AAA is the fee the lender receives for the loan of the shares. It is determined by multiplying the number of 
days the shares were out on loan as a fraction of a year (365 days) by the initial value of the shares and the 
annual securities lending fee that would have been negotiated at the inception of the securities loan. 
BBB and EEE are receipts from SAFEX. On the closing of the transaction any margin cash flow (BBB) 
and the interest thereon (EEE) will be transferred to the trader as part of this model. The interest is 
calculated by multiplying the continuously compounding SAFEX interest rate by the number of days the 
transaction took place over and the initial amount of margin paid over to SAFEX. Again. it is assumed that 
there are no movements in the margin during the period of the loan. 
The core principle or rule of a securities lending transaction is that the lender of the shares should be in the 
same situation after a securities loan has been conducted than if the securities loan was not made at all. This 
is bar the receipt of the securities lending fee. This means that if the shares, which have been out on loan, 
attract dividends the lender must be compensated for this. Variables CCC and DOD take this into 
consideration. Even though the trader did not actually receive the dividends on the borrowed shares (the 
shares were sold as part of the arbitrage transaction) the trader must still compensate the lender of the 
shares for the lost dividends. This is a direct cost to the trader and is shown as such. The dividends are 
calculated by multiplying the number of shares by the dividend per share for each of the dividends that are 
declared during the period of the transaction. The trader must further compensate the lender by the interest 
that would have been forgone on the dividends that the lender did not receive (variable DOD). This is 
calculated by multiplying the continuously compounding borrowing interest rate by the number of days 
between each dividend receipt date and the futures contract expiry date and the value of the dividend. 
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The last step in the arbitrage transaction is to repay the cash flow used to flnance the margin on the futures 
contract and the excess cash collateral on the securities loan as well as any related interest. This is shown 
by variables FFF and GGG respectively. The excess cash repayment is equal to the W above as it is the 
repayment ofW. The interest (GGG) is calculated by multiplying the continuously compounding 
borrowing interest rate by the number of days the transaction took place over by the initial excess 
borrowings. 
The summation of all the above cash flows allows one to determine the proflt or loss from the transaction. 
In the case of the above transaction there is a loss when one applies the reverse cash and carry arbitrage 
transaction. This is correct as only one of the arbitrage transactions can be profitable at anyone time. IN 
this case the cash and carry strategy is the profltable one. The reverse cash and carry strategy must be 
applied when the price of the future is below the optimum minimum price. In this case the optimum 
minimum has been calculated to be 5805 (variable HHH) - any futures price below 5805 would yield a 
profit if the trader applies a reverse cash and carry arbitrage transaction. One is now in a position to 
determine the range of the fair value of the futures contract. The fair value of the future in the above 
example lies between 5805 and 5983. 
The remaining variables relate to practicalities when one executes the arbitrage trade. Variable III relates to 
the actual amount that can be applied to the strategy, this is constrained by the fact that one cannot trade in 
fractions of shares. JJJ, KKK, LLL and MMM are self explanatory, they are the details of the dividends 
that are declared while the shares are being held or sold as per the arbitrage strategy described above. 
7.5 Data. 
The data was obtained for the period 4 May 1990 to 30 September 1999. The data is closing rate data taken 
at the close of the market each day. In the case of the futures prices the data is mark - to - market data 
which is taken at 4 o'clock in the afternoon each day which is the time the JSE closes. There was no data 
available for the period prior to the 4 May 1990. This period has been adequately covered by other studies, 
notably Lambrechts (1990). 
The period covered resulted in the following contracts being studied: 
Contract Period Year 
• March I 1991,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
• June 1990, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
September 1990,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 
December 1990,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
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The following contracts were reviewed: ALSI, ALSI40, !NDI, INDI2S, GLDI, FINI, ANGQ, GFLQ, 
SABQ, SOLQ, AGLQ, AACQ, BOEQ, DBRQ, DDTQ, FSRQ, LLAQ, PQHQ, RCHQ and CPXQ. 
7.6 Hypotheses. 
The theory and the data used are described above. Upon this, the hypotheses need to be to be built. The 
hypotheses were tested by: 
7.6.1 Hypothesis one 
The square of the Pearson correlation coefficient (r squared) between the theoretical futures price and the 
spot price was determined. This was done by first measuring the log normal movement between the data 
points for both the spot and the futures prices for each day. The r-squared was then calculated between the 
log normal movements in the spot and the futures prices. A conclusion was then drawn on the relationship 
between the two for each contract. 
The testing of hypothesis one was further extended to perform time series analysis on the r-squares. Each 
contact was broken down into a series of moths. The r-squares were then calculated between the daily log 
normal movements in the spot and futures prices for each month. The r-squares were then compared across 
all contracts to examine whether any deviation in the ability of the future to track the spot (or the other way 
around) was specific to one contract or a phenomenon affecting the whole market represented by the series 
of futures contract trading for that given month. This had the effect of allowing some conclusions to be 
drawn on the state of the market and the correlation between the movements between the spot and the 
futures market. It is a high level analysis of the market and how its efficiency (represented by the ability of 
the spot and futures to track one another) is affected by market shocks. 
This final analysis was then reduced into a single graph where the mean of the log normal r-squares was 
calculated and the variance of the individual contracts from the mean was determined The purpose of this 
was to examine how the contracts' efficiency moved together. If there was a market shock and the contracts 
moved together one should note a low variance in the log normal r-squares (even if this meant that the 
correlation coefficients dropped and the contracts each became more inefficient in terms of pricing). The 
purpose of this last part of the analysis was to allow conclusions to be drawn to if and how a series of 
contracts reacts in unison to a market event. 
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7.6.2 Hypothesis two 
Hypothesis two was tested by the futures fair value calculator that was developed (see accompanying CO-
Rom). For each day the bounds of the theoretical futures prices were calculated using the spot price and the 
carry variables (such as the interest rate and securities lending fee). This was compared with the actual 
futures price and the resulting arbitrage gap was calculated. The arbitrage gap was graphed so that analysis 
could be performed by comparing the arbitrage gap with the volatility in the spot. 
7.7 Results. 
In analysing the results the overall objective of the study must be kept in mind: to determine how the 
pricing efficiency on SAFEX reacted to the various market shocks of the late 1990's. This means that an 
exhaustive discussion of each of the contracts for each of the contract periods is unnecessary. For this 
reason a sample of contracts and contract periods have been selected for analysis with the focus being 
placed on the periods during the market shocks. The inclusion of the futures calculator and the data in CD-
Rom will allow the reader to perform further analysis in the event the reader wishes to do so. The below 
analysis of the results should allow for conclusions on how the market shocks affected the market and how 
the market has changed or progressed over the past ten years. 
7.7.1 Hypothesis One. 
The calculations of the R squared for each of the contracts over the period June 1990 to September 1999 
shows low R squares for the early nineteen nineties which move closer to one as the decade progresses. 
This suggests the contracts become more efficient as the decade moves towards the year 2000. See the 
below table (table 8.2) for the average annual squared Pearson correlation coefficients (r squared) for the 
various contracts. 
Table 7.2 - Annual Average Squared Pearson Correlation Coefficients (R Squares) for the 
ALSI and ALSI40 Futures Contracts. 




1993 ! 68.5% 
1994 56.7% 
















Graphically the movement of the contract to a higher level of pricing efficiency can best be seen in the 
example of the ALSI contract (see figure 7.2 below). Also note, for the sake of continuation the ALSI and 
the ALSI 40 contract have been combined to provide better time series analysis. This was also done for the 
INDI and IND125 as it allows for comparison of the index over the period. 
In the case of the ALSI, the efficiency of the contract seems to improve over the period. The average log 
normal R Squared moves from an average of around 0.6 to 0.9. This shows the movements in the spot and 
futures contracts tend to track one another closer as the decade progresses. This can best be seen 
graphically in the below figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 - Average Log Normal R Squares for the ALSI and ALSI40 Future 
Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. Julian Williams, 2001 
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This closer relationship between the spot and the future suggest increased arbitrage to ensure the prices act 
in concert. This is backed by the fact that the ALSI futures contract was changed from being a future based 
on the whole market index to one based on the 40 largest companies. This occurred in 1996 and would 
have enabled the arbitrageurs to exploit any arbitrage gaps more efficiently. Prior to the introduction of the 
ALSI 40 index and related futures contract, for an arbitrage trader to take advantage of an arbitrage gap, he 
or she would have had to purchase (or borrow and sell) more shares to take advantage of a price 
discrepancy. This would have made the process time consuming and expensive. This would have widened 
the arbitrage bounds around the fair value of the future where the trader would have been willing to trade. 
With the introduction of the ALSI 40 there now are less shares that need to be purchased (or borrowed and 
sold) for a trader to take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity. The ALSI 40 would also make it easier for 
the trader to approximate the index with the use of a small number of shares and thus increase arbitrage 
activity and thus price efficiency. This would have played a role in the increase in the "long run" average 
log normal R squares in the change in prices of the future and the spot prices from 0.6 to 0.9. 
The Second part of hypothesis one was the creation of an R squared matrix. The matrix consisted of the 
monthly R squares for each contract over the period under analysis. This was done so as to examine how 
the contracts act in concert as the broader market moves and absorbs news. The result of this matrix was 
graphed and can be seen in the below figure 7.3. The graph shows each contract in a different colour and 
allows one to see how each contract moves in relation to the others. This allows for a high-level efficiency 
type of analysis. In figure 7.3 below the ALSI and ALSI 40 index R squares have been graphed. One is able 
to see the trend that was identified in the above analysis (in figure 7.2) where the average R squared 
increases from around 0.6 to 0.9 during the period covered. 
The disadvantage of the graph in figure 7.3 below is the existence of a single figure or variable which will 
show how closely the contracts are related from month to month. One can see that from May 1993 to 
September 1994 the different ALSI contracts seems to track one another closely. This pattern is broken 
between May 1996 to May 1998 where the contracts become more varied, however it is difficult to say 
whether the contracts are more or less related over this period than in the early nineteen nineties where the 
contracts also exhibit a lack of equality. For this reason a second level of analysis was performed. The 
mean of the monthly contracts was determined and the variation of the individual contracts from the mean 
was calculated and graphed in figure 7.4 below. The above analysis is for the ALSI and ALSI 40 contract. 
The other futures contracts are included in the accompanying CD Rom where more extensive analysis 
can be performed and the individual graphs can be found. 
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Figure 7.3 - ALSI & ALSI40 monthly R Squared for all contracts from June 1990 to 
September 1999. 
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Figure 7.4 allows for clearer analysis, the variance of the R Squares shows bow the different contracts were 
affected by the same market news. Furtber analysis could be performed on tbe reasons for the variation but 
this is outside the scope of this study. Tbe relationship between the movements and the spot prices for the 
different contracts bolds for the period July 1992 to September 1994 and again from May 1997 to the end 
of the period under review - September 1999. The log normal movements in the spot and futures contracts 
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for the series of traded contracts do not track each other closely for the period May 1990 to July 1992 and 
again from October 1994 to April 1997.Tbis is in contrast to the market shocks which were predominantly 
experienced during the period where the contracts track one another closely. The fIrst period of high 
variance can be explained through the market being still relatively new and the fact that the future was 
based on the all share index rather than a more compact and manageable ALSI 40 index. Tbe second period 
is influenced by contracts that originate and terminate. If one looks back at fIgure 7.3 one can see that 
where the variance is at is highest is when new contracts are launched such as in the case of the December 
995 and December 1996 contracts. They are launched in June 1995 and June 1996 respectively - months 
where the variance is at a high level in figure 7.4 below. There is no plausible explanation for tbis as in the 
periods where the variance is at a low point contract are launched and terminated with no signifIcant 
change in the variance. If one removes the originating and terminating contracts the trend over the period 
October 1994 to April 1997 is one of lower variance that is reinforced by the troughs between the variance 











Figure 7.4 - Variance in Monthly Log Normal R Squares for the ALSI and ALSl40 Spot 
and Futures Contracts 
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7.7.2 Hypothesis Two. 
The daily closing data was run through the futures fair value calculator and the fair value bounds were 
determined for each trading day. These fair value bounds were graphed and the actual futures price was 
graphed with them. The graph for the combined ALSI and ALSI 40 futures contract is graphed below 
(figure 7.5) . The green line represents the actual futures price, the blue line represents the cost of carry fair 
value bound and the red line represents the reverse cost of carry fair value line. 
Figure 7.5 - September 1998 ALSI 40 Future and Fair Value Bounds. 
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From the above graph one can see that there are periods where the future is mispriced and open to 
arbitrageurs entering the market to exploit the difference. An example of this can be seen between the 
period 22 September 1997 and 20 October 1997 where the actual future is above the fair value bounds. 
Here the arbitrageur would apply the cost of carry arbitrage trade to exploit the pricing inefficiency. 
Between the period 2 February 1998 and 22 February 1998 one can clearly see the actual futures price is 
below the fair value bounds which indicates that an arbitrageur is able to profit from applying the reverse 
cost of carry arbitrage strategy. It is, however difficult to draw conclusions on the arbitrage gap as it is 
difficult to see on the above graph. For this reason a second graph is produced by the futures fair value 
calculator - the arbitrage gap. For the same September 1998 ALSI 40 contract the arbitrage gap is graphed 
in figure 7.6 below. 
Figure 7.6 - Arbitrage Gap for the September 1998 ALSI 40 Futures Contract. 
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opportunities which fell away between November 1997 and mid December 1997 when they were replaced 
by reverse cash and carry opportunities until the end of the contract. The above contract suggests that South 
African Futures contracts are mispriced from most of their lives. This is not necessarily the case, if one 
looks at the March 1998 ALSI 40 contract (figure 7.7 below) one can see that for the bulk of its life tbe 
contract is fairly priced. In this case the first significant mispricing occurs in October 1997 at the time of 
the Asian crisis. 
Figure 7.7 - Arbitrage GaD for the March 1998 ALSI 40 Futures Contract. 
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The graphs for eacb of the contracts examined (as mentioned earlier in the chapter) can be found on the 
accompanying CD-Rom in appendix 7.2. To be able to draw a conclusion a table was drawn up sbowing 
tbe percentage of arbitrage opportunities (by type) for each of the contracts over the period. The table is 
produced below (table 7.3). In the table COC represents cost of carry opportunities, RCOC reverse cost of 
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The table shows a number of arbitrage opportunities that are significant. The predominant arbitrage strategy 
that is open to be applied is the reverse cost of carry model. The data suggests that there is a limitation on 
the application of the reverse cost of carry strategy, which thus results in the predominance of the arbitrage 
gap on the reverse cost of carry side of the fair value of the future. The main reason for this is the lack of 
liquidity and the prevalence of general restrictions in the securities lending industry. There are few 
legislated restrictions on the securities lending industry and the ones that do exist, do so as part of a broader 
fmancial market's regulatory framework. This has resulted in restrictive credit risk policies being applied 
by the lending market participants. This suggests that there are arbitrage traders who wish to borrow stock 
for purposes of arbitrage trading, but are unable to do so due to the "unacceptable" state of their balance 
sheets (from a credit risk perspective). 
Table 7.3 - Percentage Arbitrage Opportunities per Contract. 
ALSI & ALSI40 INDI & INDI 25 
COC RCOC None COC RCOC None 
Jun-90 15 2 14 18 5 8 
Sep-90 6 31 61 3 39 55 
Dec-90 18 54 76 14 50 84 
Mar-91 22 59 107 9 53 53 
Jun-91 29 34 59 5 68 49 
Sep-91 15 45 78 1 76 49 
Dec-91 1 71 57 0 89 40 
Mar-92 28 82 362 10 78 94 
• Jun-92 1 55 50 6 71 68 
Sep-92 I 3 84 39 3 82 27 
• Dec-92 0 63 14 0 69 11 
! Mar-93 0 80 267 0 10 0 
• Jun-93 8 94 20 3 115 5 
• Sep-93 14 82 28 2 121 3 
Dec-93 I 30 44 52 7 115 2 
Mar-94 30 162 302 9 112 18 
Jun-94 34 12 0 8 120 28 
• Sep-94 42 56 14 8 93 22 
I Dec-94 17 73 8 12 83 3 
Mar-95 71 121 45 12 110 23 
! Jun-95 14 73 24 3 103 4 
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Sep-95 44 ! 45 24 
1
37 64 
~ Dec-95 91 31 16 62 19 Mar-96 123 88 186 99 156 
Jun-96 65 86 38 41 110 38 
• Sep-96 38 41 36 48 46 21 
Dec-96 30 41 4S 29 34 53 
• Mar-97 181 87 149 63 33 174 
Jun-97 55 17 94 39 I 34 93 
• Sep-97 59 19 94 70 I 10 102 , 
I Dec-97 32 47 114 39 41 112 
Mar-98 29 82 236 52 62 184 
Jun-98 26 120 37 30 105 48 
Sep-98 45 165 41 71 121 S4 
Dec-98 1 10 211 41 8 150 14 
Mar-99 55 217 241 33 I 150 14 
Jun-99 5 139 86 10 I 136 222 
Sep-99 6 132 32 11 84 43 
The above table has been graphed below (figure 7.8) to show the trend in the arbitrage opportunities over 
the period under review. One can see the cash and carry arbitrage opportunities diminish over the period 
whereas the reverse cost of carry arbitrage gaps fluctuate with little or no downward trend. This suggests 
that the futures market is becoming more efficient as the cost of carry arbitrage opportunities have become 
less over the years. This means that arbi1rageurs are taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities to force the 
actual value of the future to within its fair value bounds. The cost of carry arbitrage is easier to construct 
than the reverse cost of carry position. The fluctuation of the reverse cost of carry suggests that the reverse 
cost of carry is restricted in its application. One plausible answer for this restriction is the lack of securities 
lending activity as it accounts for the main difference between the cost of carry and reverse cost of carry 
arbitrage strategies. The fluctuation in the no arbitrage opportunities line is mainly caused by the reverse 
cost of carry opportunities. When combined with the cost of carry opportunities, the fluctuating reverse cost 
of carry line forces the no arbitrage indicator to zero in June 1994 which shows that there are arbitrage 
opportunities within the South African Futures market and the futures market is not priced efficiently. 
Between June 1998 and September 1999 the arbitrage opportunities available through the application of the 
reverse cash and carry strategy suggest that the persistence of market shocks caused a break down in the 
pricing efficiency of the futures. Because the inefficiency was predominantly due to the reverse cash and 
carry strategy this is evidence that there could be bottlenecks in the securities lending market that restricted 
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the necessary reverse cash and carry strategy. This period, during which the market shocks were 
experienced, is examined in more detail below. 
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7. 7.3 Comments on the Crises. 
For each of the crisis periods the above graphs will be zoomed in on to determine the effect of the crises on 
the pricing efficiency of the futures market. The first crisis period had an initial drop between the 22 and 28 
October 1997 (the Eastern Crisis) which continued until the 12 January I 998.During this period the 
variance in the log normal R-Squares for the series of contracts dropped close to nil over the month of 
October, rising to a low 0.0 I in December and back down lose to nil in January 1998. From this high level 
examination of the efficiency of the contracts, the market's pricing efficiency seems to have held during the 
frrstmarketshock. 
Looking at the arbitrage gap one should first examine figure 7.9 below. Figure 7.9 shows the period of the 
Asian crisis magnified for the theoretical fair value bounds for the future and the actual futures price. This 
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graph shows the actual value and the fair value bounds of the March 1998 INDI contract for the period 22 
October 1997 to 4 November 1997. The green line represents the actual price of the future, while the red 
line represents the reverse cost of carry line and the blue line represents the cost of carry fair value. 
From the graph one can see that the future initially remained within its fair value bounds as the crisis began 
have effect on the South African market. This was broken between the 27 October and the 31 October 
when the future dropped below the fair value bounds indicating reverse cost of carry arbitrage opportunities 
were not being taken. This would lead one to conclude that as the market shocks increased in severity so 
the pricing efficiency broke down due to problems with the reverse cash and carry arbitrage mechanism. 
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This is further expanded on in figure 7.10, which shows the arbitrage gap for the INDI contract between the 
22 October 1997 and the 12 January 1998. Here one can more clearly see the market inefficiency. When 
the crisis begins the INDI future remains efficiently priced. As the market deteriorates further the arbitrage 
gap opens to a point where it achieves its widest gap on the 28 October 1997 (which is consistent with 
figure 7.9 above). The pricing mechanism then does go on to recover and the pricing becomes more 
efficient, however, the reverse cost of carry arbitrage opportunity persists throughout the period of the 
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market shock. This again supports the observation that the pricing efficiency breaks down as market shocks 
persist due to problems with the reverse cost of carry arbitrage strategy. 
Figure 7.10 - The Arbit rage Gap for the March 1998 IND} future during the Asian Crisis. 
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The Russian Crisis took place over the period 21 April to 11 September 1998. This can best be seen 
through figure 7.11 which shows the effects of the crisis through the fair value arbitrage bounds and the 
actual value of the future. As above. the red line represents the reverse cash and carry arbitrage fair value 
bound while the blue line represents the cash and carry fair value. The actual futures price is the green line. 
After the Eastern Crisis the arbitrage gap persists for most of the period. This can be seen as the actual 
future remains below the fair value bounds in figure 7.11 below. 
This persistence of the reverse cash and carry arbitrage opportunity as the market deteriorates would lead 
one to again conclude that there are inefficiencies in the reverse cash and carry mechanism. As the main 
difference between the cash and carry and the reverse cash and carry strategies involved the borrowing of 
shares a fair comment to make would be that the shares are more difficult to borrow than the cash. leading 
one to suggest there being liquidity problems in the securities lending market. 
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The last emerging market crisis was the Brazilian Crisis which took place between the 6 November and the 
17 December 1998. At this stage the reverse arbitrage mechanism had improved. This can be seen in the 
below graph in figure 7.13 where the December 1998 INDI future and its theoretical bounds have been 
graphed. The arbitrage gap is smaller than in the two previous shocks and fluctuates between being a 
reverse cost of carry gap and a cost of carry gap. This can better been seen in figure 7.14. 
Figure 7.13 - The December 1998 INDI Futures Contract and Fair Value Bounds During 
the Brazilian Crisis. 
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Figure 7.14 shows the arbitrage gap over the same period as above. One first notes the gap oscillating 
around the zero axis showing a more efficiently priced contract. This is counter to the above two crises 
where the trend was for the arbitrage gap to increase in size (on the reverse cost of carry side of the fair 
value bounds). In this case the gap is smaller than the previous two examples and there is clear evidence of 
there being a cash and carry arbitrage gap which is contrary to the previous examples which only exhibited 
large reverse cash and carry arbitrage gaps. 
Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. Julian Williams, 2001 
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Figure 7.14 - The Arbitrage GaD for the December 1998 INDI future during the Brazilian Crisis. 
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The combined effect of the crises can best be seen through the March 1999 INOI future arbitrage gap (see 
figure 7.15 below). There is a delay between when the first crisis (Asian) begins and when the arbitrage gap 
opens. The gap is predominantly on the side of the reverse cost of carry arbitrage. The gap continues to 
widen as each crisis occurs with it reaching its widest at the beginning of September 1998 (when the drop 
suffered by the market due to the second shock was at its worst). The gap then begins to disappear as the 
markets re<:over. By the time the Brazilian crisis occurs the market has recovered to a point where it is 
more efficient and the gap disappears altogether for a short period of time. 
Prior to the crises the future is predominantly efficiently priced with the occasional cash and carry arbitrage 
opportunity presenting itself. After the market shocks (January 1999) the market does not return to the 
same level of stability as before the shocks were experienced. This could be due to increased uncertainty in 
the market after the shocks had been experienced. 
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Figure 7.15 - The March 1999 INDI Arbitrage Gap Showing the Combined Effect of the Crises. 
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7.8 Conclusions. 
The conclusions drawn have been separated between general conclusions concerning the market since 1990 
and the conclusions concerning the period during which the emerging market crises were experienced. 
Over the period there is evidence of the market becoming more efficient. This is most evident through 
figure 7.8, which shows the percentage of arbitrage opportunities per contract over the period. The earlier 
contracts generally have more arbitrage opportunities than the later contracts for the cash and carry 
arbitrage strategy. The exception to this is the period 199 October 1991 to October 1993 which this study is 
unable to explain. From November 1993 to September 1999 there is clear evidence of a reducing trend in 
the number of cash and carry arbitrage opportunities. This has been further supported by the introduction of 
the more focused indices that allowed arbitrage traders to construct arbitrage trades easier and thus promote 
more efficiently priced futures. 
In the case of the reverse cash and carry arbitrage strategy there is no clear reducing trend. The number of 
opportunities per contract fluctuates and results in the total number of arbitrage free days remaining 
relatively low for the period. This leads one to conclude that the reverse cost of carry arbitrage transaction 
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needs to be looked at closer in determining market efficiency. In comparing the two arbitrage transactions 
the main difference is that where the cash and carry results in the arbitrage trader borrowing cash, the 
reverse cash and carry arbitrage trader borrows shares. The above results point to the share borrowing 
mechanism being deficient during the period. This could be either due to restrictive credit policies on the 
part of the institutional lenders and market agents or simply a lack of adequate liquidity in the market. 
With regards the emerging market crises, the following facts have been ascertained: the market is 
inefficient and the inefficiency is caused by a failure in the reverse cost of carry arbitrage mechanism. This 
can be seen by looking at the arbitrage gaps of the contracts that were being traded during the period 22 
October 1997 to 17 December 1998. In each case there were large arbitrage gaps in the direction ofthe 
reverse cost of carry arbitrage trade. Without a detailed study of the liquidity and general market conditions 
experienced by the securities lending market it is difficult to draw conclusions. However one postulate that 
does seem to flow from the findings above is the following: as the market suffers shocks the available 
supply of loanable securities is used up so that as either more market shocks are experienced or the extent 
of the market shocks increases there are no securities available for arbitrageurs to maintain efficient 
pricing. This leads to an opening of the arbitrage gap in the direction of the reverse cash and carry arbitrage 
trade until the supply of shares increases and arbitrageurs are able to rectify the inefficiencies through 
profitably exploiting the arbitrage gap which, in turn, leads to a closure of the gap. 
This postulate is only an attempt to explain the above fmdings. For it to be the defmitive answer a detailed 
study would have to be undertaken on the efficiency and liquidity within the securities lending market. The 
theory does, however, help explain the seeming lag in the arbitrage gap and its widening as the market 
deteriorates. When the arbitrage gap reduces as the Brazilian shock occurs the above theory explains this in 
terms of the lag in the securities lending market. By the time the Brazilian shock has occurred the securities 
lending market has increased its supply of loanable stock to the point where the reverse cash and carry 
arbitrage strategy can be efficiently carried out. 
The conclusion that the market is inefficient is not complete. In order for a clearer understanding of the 
market to be had the nature and extent ofthe market shocks needs to be examined. This is done in the next 
two chapters, which look at the market volatility during the three emerging market crises. 
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Chapter 8: Empirical Testing of Volatility - Traditional. 
In this chapter the volatility of the market is examined by using traditional volatility measures as explained 
in chapter five. Given the inefficiencies identified in the previous chapter, this chapter is an attempt to 
explain what part the market conditions played in these inefficiencies occurring. The volatility and the 
market inefficiencies are regressed to determine if there is any correlation between the two. This should 
help the understanding of both the pricing inefficiency and how volatility affects it. An attempt wi11 be 
made to establish if there is a causal relationship between the market volatility and the opening or closing 
of the arbitrage gap identified in the previous chapter. A further part in the analysis will be to examine 
leads and lags in any relationship between volatility and the arbitrage gap. 
8.1 Objective. 
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. namely to first model the market volatility during the past 10 
years, secondly to determine the market volatility as the emerging market crises occurred and thirdly to 
determine the correlation between the calculated volatility and the arbitrage gap. 
One would expect the volatility to be correlated with the market inefficiencies given the above fmdings. A 
market shock would be associated with periods of high volatility, this would then mean that as the market 
shocks were experienced the volatility in the market would have been above its long run average. This in 
turn would mean the inefficiencies would be correlated with the market volatility. The objective of the 
chapter is to either confirm or refute this theory by examining the relationship between the arbitrage 
opportunities and the volatility in the underlying share prices. 
As noted in the previous chapter the market efficiency improved in one case (cash and carry arbitrage) and 
remained inefficient in another (reverse cash and carry arbitrage) during the period under examination (see 
figure 8.8 and related commentary). In this chapter an attempt will be made to identify any long-term trends 
in the volatility of the underlying share prices over the IO-year period. The study will attempt to explain 
any changes in long-term volatility as well as how this affected the pricing efficiency within the futures 
market (it at all). 
The conclusion in the previous chapter was that the inefficiencies in the market were caused largely by a 
lack of liquidity in the underlying securities lending market, especially during periods of market shocks. As 
a market shock is a period where volatility spikes an examination of the volatility will allow for a clearer 
analysis of the theory that as market shocks persist so the pricing mechanism breaks down. 
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8.2 Introduction and Hypotheses. 
As mentioned in chapter 5, there are numerous methods that can be used to determine market volatility. 
This chapter will use the traditional method and ignore the more advanced methods such as GARCH( 1,1) 
and ARCH. This is because this chapter is firstly an attempt to gain a fundamental understanding of the 
volatility within the markets and secondly is backed by further volatility calculation in chapter 9 below 
(which looks at the more advanced calculation mechanisms). 
Various methods can be used to test for futures market efficiency. Lambrecht .. (1990) uses four methods 
ranging from correlations between the spot and the futures price to the calculation and examination of the 
residual correlation in the futures market. The approach taken by this study is twofold, firstly the 
correlation between the spot and futures prices is examined to determine if the two are indeed linked 
through some fixed mechanism. Secondly, once a conclusion has been drawn on the correlation and 
anticipating it to conclude that the spot and futures prices are correlated, the arbitrage gap is calculated. If 
the first test returns a result that the spot and future are not correlated the second test looses relevance as 
this tests the extent to which the futures price remains in its fixed position (relative to the spot price). The 
hypotheses are: 
8.2.1 Hypothesis One - Spot I Futures Correlation. 
The spot and futures price are significantly correlated. This is examined to allow for the second test to take 
place: if the hypothesis is rejected the volatility of the spot and futures prices will have to be modeled 
against the arbitrage gap independently in the second test 
8.2.2 Hypothesis Two - Arbitrage Gap I Spot Volatility Correlation. 
The arbitrage gap and the volatility of the spot prices are significantly correlated. 
8.3 Theoretical Background and Methodology. 
The data used for the examination came from the same source as what was used for the arbitrage gap 
calculation in the previous chapter. The spot data is for the period 4 May 1990 to 17 May 1999. The focus 
of this chapter is to determine if there is any relationship between the spot or futures price and the volatility 
of the spot or futures. The first step is to examine the correlation between the spot and futures prices. If this 
correlation is higb the remainder of the study will use the volatility of the spot prices to mean the volatility 
of both the spot and futures prices. The volatility is, in turn compared with the periods of market turbulence 
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identified in chapter two to identify any obvious relationships. Given the spot and futures prices are closely 
correlated, the next step is to correlate the spot volatility and the arbitrage gaps calculated in the previous 
chapter to detennine if market volatility causes the arbitrage gap to open. This is done by correlating the 
data points at different time lags to see if there is any relationship whether it be instantaneous or delayed. 
Where there is a high correlation between the volatility of the spot prices and the arbitrage gap a regression 
analysis is performed to detennine the extent of any relationship for a given time lag (whether it be nil or 
longer). Again, due to data constraints, thirty-eight contract periods were chosen, namely the June 1990 
contract to the September 1999 contract. 
For the calculation of the traditional volatility a period of20 trading days was taken to approximate a 
monthly volatility. This was done to allow short-term volatility spikes to be accentuated so to allow for any 
relationships between this and the arbitrage gap to be identified easier. The volatility of the ALSI spot 
prices for the period 4 May 1990 to 17 May 1999 can be seen below: 
Figure 8.1 - ALSI Spot Volatility 4 May 1990 to 17 May 1999. 
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The volatility was further examined by the annualized volatility being calculated (as shown in chapter 5). 
This was based on 252 annual trading days and can be seen in the figure below: 
Figure 8.2 - Annualised ALSI Spot Volatility 4 May 1990 to 17 May 1999. 
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In the above graphs one can quite clearly see the slight increase in volatility in 1994 when the Mexican 
Peso crisis occurred. The first item to note is that the volatility spikes before the Peso Crisis actually takes 
place (at the end of 1994) but when it was building up. When the crisis finally breaks in late 1994 the 
volatility subsides, suggesting the market had taken into account any fallout from the Mexican Crisis. 
When the emerging market crises break the volatility increases significantly. Looking at both the above 
graphs, the volatility peaks during late 1997, early 1998 which is at the same time the Asian crisis occurs. 
The next peak in volatility is mid 1998 - the same time of the Russian crisis which suggests a link between 
the two. The last "mini" peak in volatility occurs at the end of 1998, which is the same time the Brazilian 
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crisis occurs. From the above, basic analysis there seems to be a relationship between the crises and 
volatility levels. When the crises occur, volatility seems to increase accordingly. The actual calculation of 
the volatility was performed by the futures calculator that has been included in the appendices on an 
attached CD Rom. The last module in the futures calculator calculates the traditional volatility levels for a 
given time period. The above finding does tie up with what one would expect - that market shocks would 
result in an increase in market volatility. 
The objective of this analysis is to look for a relationship between the volatility calculated above and the 
arbitrage gap. Before moving on to this, the relationship between the spot and futures prices needs to be 
investigated as described above. To this end the ALSI contract was investigated over the same period that 
the volatility was calculated over and the correlation between the futures prices for each contract and the 
spot prices was examined. The results are shown below: 
Table 8.1- ALSI & ALSI40 SPOt I Futures Correlation 
Future Spot Correlation Future Spot Correlation 
Jun 90 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.9831478 Mar 95 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.863207446 
Sep 90 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.967258881 Jun 95 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.92976346 
Dec 90 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.985284512 Sep 95 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.680005162 
Mar 91 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.976213173 Dec 95 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.970164171 
Jun 91 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.966308156 Mar 96 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.905201524 
Sep 91 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.985148167 Jun 96 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.677798519 
Dec 91 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.826112016 Sep 96 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.90331511 
Mar 92 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.842761934 Dec 96 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.830351589 
Jun 92 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.920158838 Mar 97 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.372346293 
Sep 92 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.970534264 Jun 97 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.540220933 
Dec 92 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.984722242 Sep 97 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.324284081 
Mar 93 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.643719712 Dec 97 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.968750576 
Jun 93 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.958122477 Mar 98 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.897022661 
Sep 93 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.990249542 Jun 98 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.947443353 
Dec 93 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.967813923 Sep 98 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.946296687 
Mar 94 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.979151753 Dec 98 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.985318961 
~un 94 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.981833653 Mar 99 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.935849723 
Sep 94 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.942718934 Jun 99 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.93622919 
Dec 94 ALSI Future Spot (ALSI) 0.910500744 Sep 99 ALSI40 Future Spot (ALSI40) 0.992670581 
The average correlation coefficient for the above 38 ALSI futures contracts is 0.88 which indicates a close 
relationship between the spot and futures contracts. For this reason either the spot of futures prices can be 
used to calculate volatility to be compared with the arbitrage gap. 
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Now that the spot volatility has been accepted as a proxy for volatility of the instruments (both spot and 
future) and the volatility has been measured, the next step is to measure the relationship between the 
arbitrage gaps and the market volatility. 
8.4 Results. 
The analysis of the relationship between the arbitrage gap and the underlying market volatility was 
performed using the statistical analysis package EViews. The correlation between the arbitrage gap for each 
ALSI futures contract calculated in chapter eight and the volatility of the underlying spot market was 
established at different time lags. Fifty different time lags were used, where each lag was increased by one 
day from the previous one. The correlations were calculated and cross correlograms were produced for 
each lag. An example of this can be seen in figure 8.3 below, in this case the contract is the December 1994 
ALSI futures contract. From figure 8.3 one can see that the maximum correlation between volatility and the 
arbitrage gap for the December 1994 futures contract is 0.38, which occurs at a lag of35 days. This means 
that volatility occurring 35 days before has a 0.38 correlation with the size of the arbitrage gap. For each 
contract the highest correlations (and respective lags) were: 
Table 8.2 - ALSI Soot I Arbitrage Gap: Highest Correlations over 50 Lags 
Number Contract Higbest Correlation Lag (days) 
1 Jun-90 0.66 11 
2 Sep-90 0.94 32 
3 Dec-90 1.00 3 
4 Mar-91 1.00 3 
5 Jun-91 0040 45 
6 Sep-91 1.00 3 
7 Dec-91 0.64 4 
8 Mar-92 0.59 24 
9 Jun-92 1.00 9 
10 Sep-92 1.00 25 
11 Dec-92 0049 17 
12 Mar-93 0.16 45 
13 Jun-93 1.00 11 
14 Sep-93 0.78 17 
IS Dec-93 1.00 3 
16 Mar-94 0045 28 
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17 Jun-94 0.44 28 
18 Sep-94 0.52 14 
19 Dec-94 0.38 35 
20 Mar-95 0.14 50 
21 Jun-95 0.45 7 
22 Sep-95 0.24 49 
23 Dec-95 0.27 42 
24 Mar-96 0.34 28 
25 Jun-96 0,60 35 
26 Sep-96 0.41 14 
27 Dec-96 0.21 42 
28 Mar-97 0.48 49 
29 Jun-97 0.16 42 
30 Sep-97 0.12 42 
31 Dec-97 0.31 7 
Mar-98 0.23 7 
33 Jun-98 0.48 35 
34 Sep-98 0.38 35 
35 Dec-98 0.51 49 
36 Mar-99 0.18 49 
37 Jun-99 0.60 49 
38 Sep-99 0.62 0 
The above table shows that the highest correlations are not particularly significant, even when one takes 
different lags into account. The above table illustrates that there is no one lag where the correlations are 
significant. The individual correlograrns are included in the appendix (see appendix 9.1). The only 
incidence of high correlations are in the earlier contracts. This is most likely due to the reduced sample 
sizes. For this reason the contracts pre March 1994 are ignored for the rest of this analysis. 
For correlations in excess of 0.6 a regression was performed to confirm the above findings where the 
vo latility of the spot was regressed against the arbitrage gap for the respective futures contract. In the case 
of the above this was applied to the June 1996, June 1999 and the September 1999 contracts. The 
regressions are presented in table 8.3 below. In the case of the June 1996 contract the R Squared was 
calculated to be 0.28 while the June and September R Squared's were calculated to be 0.01 and 0.13 
respectively. This confrrmed the fact that any relationship between the underlying volatility of the spot / 
futures prices and the spot futures arbitrage gap is not particularly significant. 
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Table 8.3 - Regression Analysis for the June '96, June '99 and September '99 ALSI40 
Futures Contracts between their underlying Spot Volatility and their Arbitrage Gaps. 
Dependent Variable: JUN96 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 9/14/1995 6/18/1996 
Included observations: 189 
Excluded observations: 90 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stati stic Prob. 
C -468.0963 41.61300 -11.24880 0.0000 
VOLATILlTY( -28} 2811.533 330.5931 8.504511 0.0000 
R~squared 0.278902 Mean dependent var -131.1601 
Adjusted R-squared 0.275046 S.D. dependent var 205.5190 
S.E. of regression 174.9876 Akaike info criterion 13.17783 
Sum squared resid 5726065. Schwarz criterion 13.21214 
Log likelihood -1243.305 F-statistic 72.32672 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.379106 Prob(F-stati stic} 0.000000 
Dependent Variable: JUN99 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted}: 7/09/19986/17/1999 
Included observations: 229 
Excluded observations: 115 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -16.22241 9.261999 -1.751502 0.0812 
VOLATILITY -51.89440 32.88232 -1.578185 0.1159 
R~squared 0.010853 Mean dependent var -29.76213 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006496 S.D. dependent var 52.98619 
S.E. of regression 52.81383 Akaike info criterion 10.78012 
Sum squared resid 633171.1 Schwarz criterion 10.81011 
Log likelihood -1232.324 F-statistie 2.490668 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.154778 Prob(F-stati stie) 0.115916 
Dependent Variable: SEP99 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 2/01/1999 9/15/1999 
Included observations: 150 
Excluded observations: 77 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 7.405671 6.723808 1.101410 0.2725 
VOLATILITY -197.2874 41.70801 -4.730205 0.0000 
R~squared 0.131327 Mean dependent var -23.29219 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125458 S.D.dependentvar 23.03162 
S.E. of regression 21.53847 Akaike info criterion 8.990802 
Sum squared resid 68658.06 Schwarz criterion 9.030944 
Log likelihood -672.3102 F-statistic 22.37483 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.817664 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000005 
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8.4.1 Comments on Volatility during the Crises. 
Looking at the correlograms of the ALSI40 futures contracts over the period 28 August 1997 to 28 August 
1999 (see appendix 9.1) one does not notice any significant events or correlations. The September 1997 
contract has a low correlation (at all lags) between the spot volatility and the arbitrage gap. The December 
1997 and March 1998 contracts have slightly higher correlations at the earlier or shorter lags, once one 
moves past 20 days of lags the correlations reduce to insignificance. The June 1998 contract has low 
correlations (below 0.05) for the first 10 lags. As the lags increase the correlation increases and peaks after 
35 days. This pattern is also followed by the September and December 1998 contracts though the 
December 1998 has lower correlations. As in the case of the previous contracts, there does not seem to be a 
relationship between the volatility of the underlying spot and futures prices and the arbitrage gap calculated 
in chapter eight for the contracts that existed during the period of the emerging market crises. 
8.5 Conclusions. 
The fmdings above lead one to conclude that there is no relationship between the volatility of the 
underlying spot prices and the arbitrage gap. This does seem counterintuitive, as a reasonable expectation 
would be that periods of high volatility result in a break down in established pricing mechanisms (such as 
the spot / futures cost of carry model). One could argue that the above fmdings do support an alternative 
theory - that there is another factor that leads to the opening and closing of the arbitrage gap that has a 
greater effect than the volatility of the underlying share I futures prices. The alternative factor outlined in 
chapter eight could be the missing variable - the liquidity in the underlying stock lending market. 
Before a fmal conclusion is drawn on the volatility I arbitrage gap relationship one needs to examine the 
issue closer. There are possible weaknesses in the above measurements of volatility that need to be 
addressed and the exercise (undertaken in this chapter) re-performed before a final conclusion is reached. 
This is dealt with in chapter nine below. 
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Chapter 9: Empirical Testing of Volatility - (G)ARCH. 
As mentioned in the conclusion of the previous chapter, there is a need to examine the volatility of the 
underlying closer in order to be able to draw firm conclusions. In this chapter the volatility of the market is 
examined by using the GARCH measurement technique as explained in chapter seven. The main problems 
associated with using the traditional volatility measurement techniques is that there is a) the possibility that 
the data is heteroscedastic and b) the issue of what time period to use when calculating the volatility. In the 
chapter above the period was set to one month (approximately 20 trading days), this leads one to ask the 
question "is this enough. too much or too little?" The GARCH measurement tool takes into account long 
run volatility levels that the traditional technique does not and thus removes the problem of what period to 
select. The reason behind choosing the period to measure the volatility over is to acknowledge that there is 
some effect from historic price movements in the current movements of the share - GARCH does this more 
efficiently that an arbitrary selection of a number of days. 
As in the previous chapter, this chapter will attempt to explain the part market conditions played in the 
inefficiencies identified in chapter eight. The GARCH determined volatility and the market inefficiencies 
are regressed to determine if there is any correlation between the two as in the previous chapter. This 
should help the understanding of both the pricing inefficiency and how volatility affects it. An attempt will 
be made to establish if there is a causal relationship between the GARCH determined market volatility and 
the opening or closing of the arbitrage gap identified in chapter eight. A further part in the analysis will be 
to examine leads and lags in any relationship between the GARCH volatility and the arbitrage gap. 
9.1 Objective. 
The objectives of this chapter are similar to the objectives of the previous chapter which were threefold, 
namely to flrst model the market volatility during the past 10 years, secondly to determine the market 
volatility as the emerging market crises occurred and thirdly to determine the correlation between the 
calculated volatility and the arbitrage gap. The difference in this case is that the modelling of volatility is to 
be done using the GARCH model. 
Before the above objectives can be fulfilled the data in the previous chapter must flrst be examined to see if 
it indeed does suffer from heteroscedasticity. This is dealt with in section 9.3 below. This should justify the 
use of the GARCH model in measuring volatility. The application of the GARCH model in this study will 
not result in the forecasting of volatility. The GARCH model will simply be used to model the volatility of 
the underlying spot prices. 
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As in the previous chapter the objective of the chapter is to either confirm or refute the theory that volatility 
destabilized the spot / futures pricing mechanism by examining the relationship between the arbitrage 
opportunities and the GARCH volatility in the underlying share prices. 
As GARCH takes into account long term volatility an attempt will be made to identify any long-term trends 
in the volatility of the underlying share prices over the 10 year period. This should be done with more 
accuracy than in the previous chapter. The study will attempt to explain any changes in long-term volatility 
as well as how this affected the pricing efficiency within the futures market (it at all). 
The previous chapter found that volatility is not conclusively related to the deterioration in the spot / futures 
pricing mechanism during the emerging market shocks. This chapter will seek to either confrrm this or 
refute it and place volatility as a significant reason for the breakdown in market efficiency. 
9.2 Introduction and Hypotheses. 
This part of the chapter will follow a similar route to that in the previous chapter. The main differences are 
frrstly that we examine, in this chapter, if the findings from chapter nine do indeed suffer from 
heteroscedasticity. In the event they do, this would add to the justification that one should use GARCH to 
model the volatility. This investigation results in the first hypothesis below. 
In the previous chapter the correlations between the spot and futures prices were calculated to determine if 
it would be possible to use just one of the spot or futures prices in the volatility calculation exercise. These 
results will be relied on for this chapter. The fmdings were that the correlation was high enough between 
the spot and futures contracts to allow one to use just the volatility spot price to act as a proxy of volatility 
for both spot and futures process. 
The hypotheses are: 
9.2.1 Hypothesis One - Traditional Volatility and Heteroscedasticity. 
The "traditional" volatility of the spot prices suffers from heteroscedasticity that the application of 
GARCH(l,I) is able to remove. This is examined to allow for the second test to take place: if the 
hypothesis is rejected the significance of the second test is reduced as the need for the GARCH modelling 
is reduced (because it does not need to counter the traditional volatility measure being heteroscedastic). 
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9.2.2 Hypothesis Two -Arbitrage Gap / Spot (GARCH) Volatility 
Correlation. 
The arbitrage gap and the GARCH(1,l) volatility of the spot prices are significantly correlated. 
9.3 Theoretical Background and Methodology. 
The data used for the examination is again, the same as what was used in the previous chapter. The spot 
data is for the period 4 May 1990 to 17 May 1999. The focus of this chapter is to determine if there is any 
relationship between the spot or futures price and the volatility of the spot or futures. The first step is to 
examine the heteroscedasticity in the traditional volatility measure. 
The study of whether the data suffers from heteroscedasticity was performed along similar lines to the 
methodology employed by Hull (1999: 378). The data was fIrst assumed to exhibit heteroscedastic 
tendencies that would mean that a GARCH(l, 1) model would be more suited from a modelling perspective. 
The next step would be to examine any autocorrelation in the data for both the traditional model and the 
GARCH(1,l) model. If the GARCH(l,l) model resulted in less autocorrelation then one could conclude 
that the GARCH( 1,1) model was a better fit for the data and that the data suffered from heteroscedasticity. 
Figure 9.1 below shows the autocorrelation in the traditional data (the autocorrelation in the U l
2 term) 
while figure 9.2 below shows the autocorrelation in the GARCH modeled data (the autocorrelation in the 
u; j(J; term). 
One can see from examining both the figures that the autocorrelation reduces significantly in the case of the 
autocorrelation in the GARCH model. This shows that the GARCH model is a better fit for the underlying 
data and that the data does have heteroscedastic tendencies. This proof is similar to the one employed by 
Hull (1999: 378) to prove GARCH is a better model to use in the case ofheteroscedasticity. 
In the case of the autocorrelation figures produced from the traditional data set, the highest autocorrelation 
reading is 0.24, which is taken at a lag of 1 day. There are 9 lag days in total where the autocorrelation 
figure exceeds 0.1. In the case of the autocorrelation figures for the GARCH data set, the highest reading is 
0.13 at a lag of 13 days. There are no other lags where the autocorrelation exceeds 0.1. This clearly 
illustrates a drop in the autocorrelation readings from the one data set to the other. 
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Figure 9.1 - Autocorrelation in the Traditional ALSI Spot Volatility Data Set. 
SamplE/: 51D4/199C1,1'VOSJ4000 
Included obseptatitios:'28\3S 
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From the above, one can see that the results in the previous chapter did indeed suffer from 
heteroscedasticity. This adds to the justification to use a GARCH model for the measurement of the 
volatility of the spot prices. For the purposes of the study a GARCH(1,I} process was used. This is 
because, according to Hull (1999: 372) the GARCH (1,1) is the most appropriate model for the analysis of 
volatility, This is in preference to the more general form of the GARCH model: the GARCH (p,q) model. 
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Using EViews the GARCH(l,l) model of the volatility in the spot prices was fitted over the period. It has 
been broken down into two distinct periods to help focus on the emerging market crises. EViews was also 
used to derive the parameters of the GARCH(l,I) model. The fmal GARCH(l,l) formula (as derived by 
EViews) is as follows: 
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(54) 
Once the GARCH( I , I) model has been justified, the analysis of the GARCH-determined volatility over the 
needs to be undertaken. This yielded the following results: 
9.3.1 Period One: 4 May 1990 to 28 August 1997 
The comparison between the traditional volatility and the GARCH( I, I) volatility can be seen in figure 9.3 
below. The GARCH(I , I) volatility has more extreme movements and some of the market shocks of the 
period are picked up more clearly using the GARCH( I, I) volatility measurement. An example of this is the 
political shocks that destabilized the market at the end of 1992. These shocks are not that clear using 
traditional measurement techniques but stand out when one looks at the GARCH(l, 1) model. The market 
rally, which occurred at the end of 1995, is not really picked up that clearly when one uses the traditional 
volatility technique, however. the GARCH(I , I) model picks it up visibly. 
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9.3.2 Period Two: 28 August 1997 to 28 August 1999 
The analysis for this period can be seen in figure 9.4 below. During this period the GARCH(I , l) volatility 
tracks the traditional volatility fairly closely but with a persistent lag . 
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From the above one can see that the market volatility spiked during the Asian crisis at the end of 1997. This 
compares favorably with the volatility calculated in the previous chapter. The traditional volatility also 
determined the Asian crisis to produce the highest market volatility. The GARCH(1,I) volatility is 
marginally higher when compared with the traditional methodology. 
Surprisingly the volatility remains fairly low during the bulk of 1998 (Russian crisis). The volatility then 
picks up towards the time of the Brazilian crisis. This is not quite the same as the traditional volatility 
measures. The difference is that the increase in GARCH(1 , I) volatility appears to occur after the pickup in 
the traditional volatility picks up. 
On completion of the time series analysis of the GARCH( 1,1) volatility model the next step is to detennine 
the relationship between the GARCH( 1, I) volatility data and the arbitrage gap. 
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9.4 Results. 
The analysis of the relationship between the arbitrage gap and the underlying GARCH(l,l) market 
volatility was performed using the statistical analysis package EViews as in the previous chapter. The 
correlation between the arbitrage gap for each ALSI futures contract calculated in chapter eight and the 
GARCH(1, 1) volatility of the underlying spot market was established at different time lags. Fifty different 
time lags were used. where each lag was increased by one day from the previous one. For the earlier futures 
contracts there were a limited number of observations and in some cases less than 50 lags could be 
calculated. The correlations were calculated and cross correlograms were produced for each lag. An 
example of this can be seen in figure 9.5 below, in this case the contract is the September 1998 ALSI 
futures contract. From figure 9.5 one can see that the maximum correlation for the September 1998 ALSI 
futures contract is 0.44 which occurs at a lag of 33 days. This means that GARCH( 1, I) volatility occurring 
33 days before has a 0.44 correlation with the size of the arbitrage gap. For each contract the highest 
correlations (and respective lags) were: 
Table 9.1- GARCHO,l) Volatility of ALSI Spot I Arbitrage Gap: Highest Correlations 
over 50 Lags 
I Number Contract Higbest Correlation Lag (days) 
1 Jun-90 0.59 1 
2 Sep-90 0.75 3 
3 Dec-90 0.62 25 
4 Mar-91 0.70 50 
5 Jun-91 0.47 32 
6 Sep-91 0.73 12 
7 Dec-91 0.57 36 
8 Mar-92 0.36 47 
·9 Jun-92 0.47 46 
I 
10 Sep-92 0.75 11 
11 Dec-92 0.62 0 
I 12 Mar-93 0.16 33 
13 3 0.67 2 
14 Sep-93 0.55 50 
15 Dec-93 0.40 34 
16 Mar-94 0.45 6 
17 Jun-94 0.66 19 
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18 Sep-94 0.60 12 
19 Dec-94 0.36 I 
20 Mar-95 0.16 49 
21 Jun-95 0.44 18 
22 Sep-95 0.35 1 
23 Dec-95 0.31 36 
24 Mar-96 0.33 50 
125 Jun-96 0.54 50 
26 Sep-96 0.44 15 
27 Dec-96 0.37 48 
28 Mar-97 0.45 50 
29 Jun-97 0.21 1 
30 Sep-97 0.24 35 
31 Dec-97 0.36 2 
32 Mar-98 0.28 1 
33 Jun-98 0.52 33 
34 Sep-98 0.44 33 
35 Dec-98 0.57 50 




38 0.25 30 
The above table shows that the highest correlations are not particularly significant, even when one takes 
different lags into account. This is similar to the fmdings of the traditional volatility modeL The above table 
illustrates that the only significant correlations are pre March 1994, which was ignored in the previous 
chapter as the number of observations per contract was not enough to allow for robust conclusions to be 
drawn. The individual correlograms are included in the appendix (see appendix 9.2). A general comment is 
that, even though the individual correlation scores are not significant to allow one to draw a conclusion that 
the arbitrage gap and the GARCH(l,l) volatility is related, the GARCH(l,l) volatility has, on average, 
higher correlation data points at the different lags when compared to the traditional volatility measurement. 
For correlations in excess of 0.6 a regression was performed to confirm the above fmdings where the 
GARCH( 1,1) volatility of the spot was regressed against the arbitrage gap for the respective futures 
contract. As mentioned above, this was only done for the contracts after March 1994. In the case of the 
above this was applied to the June 1994, September 1994 and the June 1999 contracts. The regressions are 
presented in table 9.2 below. In the case of the June 1994 contract the R Squared was calculated to be 0.002 
while the September and June R Squared's were calculated to be 0.11 and 0.01 respectively. This 
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confIrmed the fact that any relationship between the underlying GARCH(l, 1) volatility of the spot I futures 
prices and the spot futures arbitrage gap is not particularly significant. 
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Table 9.2 - Regression Analysis for the June '94, September '94 and June '99 ALSI40 
Futures Contracts between their underlying GARCHO,l) Spot Volatility and their 
Arbitrage Gaps. 
Dependent Variable: JUN94 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 4/05/1994 6/15/1994 
Included observations: 46 
Excluded observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 8.413763 45.72196 0.184020 0.8548 
GARCHVOLATILITY 92.14307 283.7345 0.324751 0.7469 
R-squared 0.002391 Mean dependent var 23.12724 
Adjusted R-squared -0.020282 S.D.dependentvar 41.27075 
S.E. of regression 41.68717 Akalke Info criterion 10.34077 
Sum squared resid 76464.08 Schwarz criterion 10.42027 
Log likelihood -235.8377 F-statlstic 0.105463 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.562870 ProblF-statistic) 0.746909 
Dependent Variable: JUN99 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 7/09/19986/17/1999 
Included observations: 230 
Excluded observations: 114 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -17.44029 9.564483 -1.823443 0.0695 
GARCHVOLATILITY -52.12510 37.74668 -1.380919 0.1687 
R-squared 0.008294 Mean dependent var -29.74314 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003945 S.D. dependentvar 52.87116 
S.E. of regression 52.76677 Akaike info criterion 10.77830 
Sum squared resid 634827.8 Schwarz criterion 10.80819 
Log likelihood -1237.504 F-statistic 1.906936 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.154373 Prob(F-statistic) 0.168656 
Dependent Variable: SEP94 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 4/05/19949/15/1994 
Included observations: 112 
Excluded observations: 52 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -97.27184 24.68947 -3.939811 0.0001 
GARCHVOLATILITY 680.5085 180.2898 3.774525 0.0003 
R-squared 0.114667 Mean dependent var -6.204436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.106619 S.D. dependent var 58.67885 
S.E. of regression 55.46258 Akaike Info criterion 10.88699 
Sum squared resid 338370.8 Schwarz criterion 10.93553 
Log likelihood -607.6714 F-statistlc 14.24704 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.643646 Prob(F -statistic) 0.000260 
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9.4.1 Comments on Volatility during the Crises. 
Looking at the correlograms of the ALS140 futures contracts over the period 28 August 1997 to 28 August 
1999 (see appendix 9.2) one does not notice any significant events or correlations. This is the same as what 
was found when the Traditional volatility examination was performed. The September 1997 contract has 5 
lags where the correlation between the spot volatility and the arbitrage gap is greater than 0.6. This does not 
necessarily show any relationship between the two variables. The December 1997 and March 1998 
contracts have slightly higher correlations than in the case of the traditional volatility correlations, the main 
difference is that the correlations vary between the different time lags more I the case of the GARCH 
calculated correlations. The June and September 1998 contracts have higher correlations for the frrst 15 
lags. As the lags increase the correlation decreases, this is directly contrary to the findings of the traditional 
model in which one observes the opposite occurring. The December 1998 correlograms shows the 
correlations increasing over the different lags. As in the case of the previous contracts, there does not seem 
to be a relationship between the GARCH( 1,1) volatility of the underlying spot and futures prices and the 
arbitrage gap calculated in chapter eight for the contracts which existed during the period of the emerging 
market crises. 
9.5 Conclusions. 
As in the previous chapter, the use of the GARCH(l,l) model to calculate volatility has not yielded any 
significant relationship between the market volatility and the arbitrage gap. The results derived from the 
use of the GARCH(l,l) model suggests that there is a closer relationship between volatility and the 
arbitrage gap even though it is difficult to comment on the closeness of this relationship. 
These findings, as in the previous chapter, do seem counterintuitive, as a reasonable expectation would be 
that periods of high volatility result in a break down in established pricing mechanisms (such as the spot / 
futures cost of carry model). Again, one could argue that the above findings do support an alternative 
theory - that there is another factor that leads to the opening and closing of the arbitrage gap that has a 
greater effect than the volatility of the underlying share / futures prices. As suggested before, the alternative 
factor outlined in chapter eight could be the missing variable the liquidity in the underlying stock lending 
market. 
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Chapter 10: Implications of Findings. 
The fmdings of this study do have some implications for the capital markets. The implications have been 
treated on a finding-by-finding basis (only the significant findings have been focused on): 
1. There are index arbitrage trading opportunities in the South African Markets. 
This implies that the South African index futures are not priced correctly. This could have implications 
for the hedging effectiveness of the South African financial markets. The implications should also be 
examined against a backdrop of how potential inefficiencies are removed In order to remove the 
pricing efficiencies one should be able to conduct index arbitrage using all the constituents of the 
underlying index. In order for this to take place there either needs to be a creation of an effective and 
efficient "basket" market where one can buy and sell the constituents of an index as a basket of stocks, 
thereby avoiding timing problems of trying to assemble an index position over a period of time and the 
resultant transaction costs, or a liquid, high volume Exchange Traded Funds (EFT) market. There is 
not a great deal of evidence of a basket market, however, there is an emerging EFT market in South 
Africa with the creation of the SATRIX40 market. An implication of this study is that there is a 
profitable opportunity for an active ETF market in South Africa. 
There are thus pricing inefficiencies in the local index futures markets. This is not a reflection on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the market, rather it shows there is a need for products that allow for 
practical index arbitrage to take place. 
2. The index arbitrage opportunities are greater for the reverse cash and carry strategy. 
This fmding results in interesting implications and to ascertain what these are one needs to look closely 
at the reverse cash and carry strategy. Clearly, one of its mechanisms are failing and as the cash and 
carry strategy is becoming more efficient, it must be a leg of the transaction that the cash and carry 
strategy does not have securities lending. 
In the case of the cash and carry strategy one also needs to purchase and sell a basket of shares that 
constitute the underlying index as one would need to do in the case of the reverse cash and carry 
strategy. The primary difference between the two strategies is the securities lending component. The 
persistence of the reverse cash and carry arbitrage gap suggests that the securities lending market is not 
functioning correctly. This implies that there are profitable opportunities in this regard. This is 
explored further in the conclusion. 
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3. The cash and carry opportunities have been decreasing over the past few years. 
With the cash and carry opportunities decreasing over the past few years, this implies that the index 
futures market is being priced correctly through increased activity. This is supported by the increase in 
volumes traded (of both the futures contracts (Swart, 1998 : 53) and the spot market) and the increased 
participation of both niche financial services companies and foreign banks in our local capital markets. 
4. There were market volatility spikes during the emerging market crises. 
The implications of this finding is that the South African Futures and Equity markets were adversely 
affected by the emerging market crises. This fmding is not necessarily ground breaking, it confirms the 
opinions that were presented in the fmancial and popular press. This implies that South Africa is 
increasingly becoming a member of the global capital markets and is thus affected by movements in 
foreign markets. 
5. There is seemingly little or no relationship between market volatility and futures pricing 
efficiency. 
The result of the study as to whether market volatility affected the arbitrage gap and therefore the 
pricing efficiency of the equity and equity futures markets showed that there seems to be little or no 
relationship between volatility and pricing efficiency. At best, there is a relationship that is not 
significant and is difficult to measure. 
The implications of this are that, even though our markets seemed to fail the efficiency test during the 
crises, the reason for this is unclear and is not likely to be due to increased volatility. This implies that 
there is some other variable affecting the pricing efficiency of the equity spot and futures markets. 
One implication of the above findings is that the market's pricing efficiency seemed to handle 
volatility spikes - when the volatility spikes occurred the pricing efficiency did not necessarily break 
down. This suggests that further work needs to be done in this area to determine what the destabilizing 
variable may be. 
The above implications seem to support a view that the market is inefficient from time to time, but the 
reasons for this are possibly not directly attributed to the market or its mechanics, but rather as a 
consequence of other external factors. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions 
In answer to the question posed by this study "does volatility impact on the pricing efficiency of the South 
African Futures Exchange" there is no evidence of the volatility having a significant impact on the pricing 
efficiency. While this does not rule out some relationship between the two variables, the relationship is not 
significant. 
As speculated above, this begs the question: "what drives the movements in the arbitrage gap for the index 
futures?" It was suggested that the answer could lie in the products supporting the primary capital markets, 
specifically stock lending and exchange traded funds. In this regard further research should be done in the 
area of liquidity in the securities lending market and how this impacts on the execution of the reverse cash 
and carry arbitrage strategy and consequently the pricing efficiency of the futures market. Further research 
should also be done on the ETF funds (which currently comprise SATRIX40), the volumes traded and 
liquidity and use by institutional traders. The volumes could be compared to the open interest on the 
Futures Exchange to determine how much, if at all, of the SATRIX40 is used in index arbitrage. This could 
be further augmented by an investigation into the existence of a "basket" trading market. 
One can conclude that the South African Index Futures Market is inefficient but the efficiency is constantly 
increasing to the point where the current market does not allow for many cash and carry arbitrage trades. 
This leads one to further conclude that the South African Equity and Equity Futures markets are constantly 
improving in terms of efficiency which will allow for more accurate hedging and actively traded markets as 
the fair value pricing mechanism can be more relied on. 
The market volatility did increase during the emerging market crisis and one should be able to conclude 
that as the shocks occurred, notably the Asian crisis, the market's pricing mechanism remained stable. This 
could lead one to conclude that the South African equity and equity futures market absorbed the market 
shocks with little adverse effects. Where the market's efficiency did suffer was where the market instability 
persisted, as in the case of 1998 where the Russian and Brazilian crisis occurred One must note that the 
volatility peaked in October 1997 - at the time of the Asian Crisis and was lower during 1998, which is in 
contrast to the pricing efficiency that remained intact during the Asian crisis but deteriorated during 1998. 
GARCH( 1,1) appeared to model volatility more accurately than the traditional volatility measure. This also 
showed a marked increase in the average volatility levels from pre 28 August 1997 to post 28 August 1997. 
The average volatility levels approximately doubled between the two periods. 
One aspect of the market that was not taken into account in this investigation was market liquidity. As 
identified by Swart (1998 ; 66), an investigation into liquidity could shed some light on the changes in 
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volatility and market efficiency. A study into the area of market liquidity would thus be an area for further 
research. 
Further work also needs to be done on the efficiency measurement using actual dividends rather than a 
dividend yield. As the futures pricing mechanism is based on the time value of money, the timing of 
dividends is important and the dividends should not be spread on an annual basis. This could yield 
alternative results on the efficiency of the futures market. 
Ultimately one can conclude that the South African futures market is efficiently priced, but with persistent 
market instability the reverse cash and carry arbitrage trade breaks down thereby causing periods of 
inefficiency. The market instability is characterized by higher long-term volatility and, even though there is 
no significant relationship between market volatility and pricing inefficiency, there appears to be a weak 
relationship between long-term volatility (persistent market instability) and the efficiency of the pricing 
mechanism. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.1- Financial Services Companies Listed on the JSE at 31 October 1999. 
Banks Sector 
Short Name Listed 31/10/99 Listed 111/95 
ABSA Yes Yes 
BOE Yes Yes 
FBC FIDELITY Yes Yes 
FIRSTRAND Yes Yes 
INVESTEC Yes Yes 
MERCANTILE Yes No 
NEDCOR Yes Yes 
NRB Yes Yes 
REGAL Yes No 
SAAMBOU Yes Yes 
SARB Yes Yes 
SIB Yes Yes 
STANBIC Yes Yes 
Financial Services Sector 
Short Name Listed 31/10/99 Listed 111/95 Short Name Listed 31110/99 Listed 111/95 
ALEXFBS Yes No IOTA Yes No 
AMB Yes No NAIL Yes Yes 
APPLETON Yes No NIBH Yes No 
ARCAY Yes No OUTSORS Yes No 
BJM Yes No PERGRIN Yes No 
BRAIT Yes Yes PSG Yes Yes 
CADIZ Yes No PSGINVBANK Yes No 
COROHLD Yes Yes QUYN Yes No 
CREDCOR Yes No RAD Yes No 
DECILLION Yes No SASFIN Yes Yes 
EQUINOX Yes No SOLUTNS Yes No 
FINSHARE Yes No TBBH Yes No 
FURNCAP Yes No THUKANI Yes No 
GENSEC Yes No TIGON Yes No 
GLENMIB Yes No TISEC Yes No 
GLOBAL Yes No UNIFER Yes No 
GREENWICH Yes No 
HEDGE Yes No 
INCENT Yes No 
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Appendix 1.2 - Detailed list of Definitions 
ADV ANCEIDECLINE RATIO: This is a ratio that is calculated by dividing the difference between the 
total number of shares that have increased in value and the total number of shares that have decreased in 
value, by the total number of shares that have been traded that day. 
ALL-IN-PRICE: This is the actual price paid for a bond or gilt (or other interest based instrument). It is 
calculated from the yield-to-maturity (YTM), and consists of the clean price plus accrued interest. 
ALSI: All share index. SAFEX provides futures on this index, the specifications of which are discussed in 
chapter 3.1. 
ASK PRICE: This is the price at which a seller is prepared to part with his shares or contracts (also known 
as the OFFER PRICE). The BID PRICE and ASK PRICE together make up the DOUBLE in the futures 
market. (SAFEX, 1999 : 2) 
AT BEST: An instruction given to a broker by the client to sell or buy "at best" would give the broker 
freedom to purchase or sell the instrument concerned at the price most advantageous to his client as soon as 
possible. (SAFEX, 1999 : 2) 
AVERAGE COST: This is a method of valuing assets at the average of their cost price. A simple average is 
performed by totaling the cost of the assets and dividing by the number of assets purchased. 
BASIS: In the case of the futures market, basis describes the difference between the price of a future and 
the spot price of the underlying asset. For example, if the ALSI is at a level of 8500 index points and the 
ALSI future is trading at 9000 the basis is 500 points (see below for the defmition of a point). 
BASIS POINT AND POINTS: Points are associated with bonds and gilts a basis point is equal to one-
hundredth of one percent. However, a point can also describe an index unit, so where an index moves from 
8000 to 8050, this can be described as a movement of 50 points. 
BASIS RISK: The risk that the BASIS will move against the position held, thereby reducing the profit for a 
speculator or the effectiveness of a hedge. A speculator who is long an index future with a 50 point positive 
basis does not benefit if the underlying asset goes up by ten points while the basis narrows by ten points 
(i.e. the futures price does not rise with the index). (SAFEX, 1999 : 3) 
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BEAR: An investor or speculator (or other market participant) who looks to profit from downwards 
movements in prices. A bear can be a participant who also expects downward movements in prices. 
BEAR MARKET: This term is given to markets where either the main index is dropping or the majority of 
the share prices are dropping. 
BEAR RAID: Where investors who have sold short (made bear sales) attempt to force the price ofa share 
down by making further bear sales so that they can cover their positions profitably at lower prices. 
(SAFEX, 1999: 3) 
BEAR SALE: This is known also as a short sale and involves selling shares before they have been 
purchased. The form of the sale is an agreement to sell the shares at an agreed future date. The seller looks 
to profit by waiting to purchase the shares before delivery has to take place, at a price lower than the agreed 
selling price. Bear selling was originated by the Eskimos who used to sell polar bear skins to European 
traders. The demand for polar bear skins varied depending on whether they were fashionable or not. The 
Eskimos, realising this, took the opportunity when the demand for skins was strong to sell not only their 
current stock of skins, but also their next hunting trip's skins. In this way they actually sold the skins of 
polar bears that they had not yet killed to take advantage of the higher prices. (SAFEX. 1999 : 4) Bear or 
short sales can be created synthetically with the use of securities lending. Here the trader will borrow 
shares, sell them into the market, buy them back at a later lower price, and deliver them back to their 
owner, profiting on the drop in the price of the shares. 
BID PRICE: When a buyer tenders a price for a share, future, or any other instrument, the price of this 
tender is known as the bid price. 
BPV: BPV is short for "Basis point value", which is the Rand value of one basis point change in the yield 
of the security. (SAFEX, 1999 : 6) 
BULL: This is an individual who has an optimistic outlook for the market, a share or contract. 
BULL TREND: A bull trend is an upward trend in the market. share or contract. This is on contrast to a 
bear trend, which is a downward trend. 
BUY PRICE: The buy price is the price of the buy offer closest to the last trade of the day that is published 
in the financial press. This is different to a bid offer as it is the last bid offer of the day, which is closest to 
the last traded price. 
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CARRYING CHARGE MARKET: A futures market in which farther dated contracts trade at successively 
higher prices, so called because this conforms to the theoretical model in which the premium of the futures 
price over the spot price should increase the longer the time to expiry due to the increased carry costs. 
(SAFEX, 1999: 8) 
CARRY RATE: This is the cost, per day, of holding an asset. This cost is the basis for the "Cost of Carry" 
futures pricing model. This cost will include opportunity costs such as interest foregone. 
CASH MARKET: This is an alternative for the spot market and is the market for the underlying asset in a 
futures contract. The spot market for the ALSI future would be the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
CBOT: The Chicago Board of Trade, t1;le oldest and largest futures exchange in the world. (SAFEX, 1999 
10) 
CLEAN PRICE: The clean price of a gilt or bond is the present value of the redemption value of the 
principal plus the present value of the periodic compound payments over the remaining life of the bond 
The all-in-price is the clean price plus the accrued interest. (SAFEX, 1999 :10) 
CLEARING HOUSE: A clearing house is responsible for the matching of all trades. In a futures market 
this function is extended to include the daily marking-to-market of each open futures position. The 
clearinghouse associated with SAFEX is called SAFCOM. 
CLOSE OUT: This is the "exiting" of a position by a market participant This is usually done by taking an 
equal but opposite trade to the one the trader is currently exposed to. This has the effect of locking in any 
profits or losses that the trader has made. This action is necessary, as, unlike in the share markets, the future 
cannot be sold as it is a contract. The trader will then enter into an opposite contract. This has the effect of 
canceling the trader's position and thus simulated the "sale" of the contract. 
CLOSING PRICE: The closing price is the price of the last trade at the end of the trading day. This is also 
known as the ''ruling'' price or "last" price. Technically there are differences as the ruling or last prices are 
adjusted in the case where the last buy offer is higher than the closing price or the sell offer is lower than 
the closing price. These prices are quoted in the financial press. 
CME: Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
COMEX: Commodity Exchange Inc. 
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CORRECTION: This occurs where a price trend is broken temporarily with a movement in price. in the 
opposite direction to the direction of the trend. It is traditionally associated with a temporary drop in prices 
when the overall trend is an increase in prices. 
DAILY LIMIT: A limit imposed by certain exchanges on the extent to which a particular instrument can 
move in one day. (SAFEX, 1999 :13). This is designed to protect market participants from both default and 
irrational behavior in the markets. If the price move exceeds the limit, trade in the instrument is suspended. 
Due to the high initial margin called for in our market SAFEX has not felt it necessary to impose daily 
limits.). SAFEX, 1999: 13) 
DAY ORDER: When placing an order the trader has to put a time limit of the filling of the order. A day 
order is an offer that is set to expire by the end of the trading day during which time it was made. 
DELIVERY DATE: When an instrument or commodity is sold, this is the date upon which it must be 
delivered to the buyer. In the case of futures, delivery often does not occur and market participants will 
settle the net price gain or loss with their counterparts. This also happens on the delivery date and thus the 
delivery date is also known as the settlement date. 
DOLO FUTURE: A future on the dollar price of gold, which was discontinued in 1994. The contract 
specification was RIOO times the dollar price of gold with a margin requirement of RI ,600 per contract. 
The contract was replaced by the Krugerrand Future (KRNO). (SAFEX, 1999 : 15) 
DOUBLE: This is another term for the "bid offer spread". This refers to the difference between the closest 
buy offer and sell offer. Collectively these are often referred to as the double. The double, or bid-offer 
spread is related to the liquidity of the underlying instrument. The more liquid the instrument the smaller 
the double. 
ELC1: Equity-linked cash instrument issued by Eskom. (SAFEX, 1999 : 17) 
ELFI: Equity-linked fixed-interest stock. 
FINANCIAL FUTURE: Essentially this instrument is a future that, has as its underlying instrument, a 
financial asset such as a share. This is in contrast to a future which has as its underlying a commodity. 
FORWARD CONTRACT: The difference between a forward and a future is the future is a standardised 
contract traded on a recognised exchange. A forward agreement is an agreement between two parties to 
transact in the future (like a futures contract) however, the agreement can be to transact in anything. This 
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non-standardisation leads to difficulty when one of the parties looks to close out the agreement by entering 
into another opposite agreement. 
FORWARD PRICE: The price at which the future delivery of the underlying instrument or commodity has 
been agreed to. 
GLD!: SAFEX's All-Gold Index future, based on the JSE's All-Gold index (SAFEX, 1999: 22) 
HEDGE: When a market participant purchases or sells a security that is the opposite to an existing position 
so as to reduce the risk that the market participant is exposed to, this is known as Hedging. This has the 
effect of reducing the price risk in the open position. Hedging typically occurs when a market participant is 
exposed to a security which he or she has no desire to sell or buy (in the case of a short position), but is of 
the opinion that temporary adverse price movements are to occur. A hedge will be entered into to avoid 
this. 
HEDGE RATIO: The proportion of futures contracts or of the underlying asset required to hedge an open 
position. The need for the hedge ratio derives from the fuet that the price movements in spot and derivative 
markets are not exactly matched. (SAFEX, 1999 : 23). 
HEDGER: This is the individual who engages in hedging. Hedgers are market participants who wish to 
reduce risk by hedging and can range from fund managers to farmers (in the case of farmers, the underlying 
security will be a commodity). 
INOl: SAFEX's Industrial Index future, based on the JSE's Industrial index. (SAFEX, 1999 : 24) 
INITIAL MARGIN: Initial margin is the margin required by the braking fum before a futures position can 
be entered in to. This margin as adjusted daily as the future price changes. These changes are dealt with as 
variation margin. 
INVERTED MARKET: A futures market in which the near-dated contract is trading at a higher price than 
farther dated contracts (considered "abnonnal"). (SAFEX, 1999 : 25) 
KRND FUTURE: Kruger Rand futures are contracts to deliver Kruger Rands at some time in the future. 
The Kruger Rand Futures was launched in 1994 (SAFEX, 1999 : 26) and is the first South African futures 
contract to allow for physical delivery. Kruger Rand futures were the first of their kind and result in the 
actual delivery of the underlying commodity. 
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LIFFE: London Intemational Financial Futures Exchange. 
LONG: A long position is where a market participant has purchased a security and aims to profit from the 
increase in the price of the security. Where a market participant is "long" a future the individual is 
contracted to purchase the underlying securities at an agreed rate at some date in the future. 
LONG HEDGE: The purchase of derivatives in anticipation of (a) future cash flows and (b) a rise in the 
price of the underlying asset. The long hedge therefore allows a portfolio manager to lock in current prices 
in a rising market before he has the funds to take a position in the underlying asset. (SAFEX, 1999 : 28) 
MARK-TO-MARKET: This occurs at the end of each trading day. The profits or losses on each market 
participants trading accounts are calculated and the clients are either given their profits or required to make 
good their losses. All changes (that is, cash flows) occur through the margin account. This mark-to-market 
process exists in order to ensure that market participants are able to meet their liabilities that may arise due 
to adverse price movements. If this mechanism was not in place, a trader could find, after a few days, that 
the losses would be so large that default would occur - the trader would not be able to meet his or her 
obligations arising from the losses. The exchange would then face risk of failing as participants lost 
confidence in it. 
MARKET MAKER: A market maker is a market participant who will offer to buy or sell a given security 
and thus ensure its liquidity. The Market maker is usually a member of the exchange. Market makers 
expose themselves to price risk by trading and thus will compensate themselves for taking on this risk by 
keeping a wide spread between the prices at which they are prepared to buy and sell. Market makers try to 
reduce the price risk they experience by ensuring they buy as much as they sell. 
MARKET ABLE SECURITIES TAX (M.S. T.): A tax levied on all purchases of shares and other securities, 
which stands at 0.25% of the value of the transaction (SAFEX, 1999 : 29). M.S.T. was replaced with U.S.T. 
(Uncertified Securities Tax) in 1999. The rate and tax mechanism, however, remained the same. 
NEGOTIABLE CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT (N.C.D.): An N.C.D. is issued by banks that wish to raise 
funds. It is a fixed deposit that is actively traded. It is the same as a treasury bill, but issued by banks. The 
secondary market for N.C.O's is the money market where N.C.D's are traded between money market 
participants. An N.C.O. is a short-term deposit and interest is usually paid in six-month installments. In the 
event of the N.C.O. having a term ofless than one year the interest is usually paid on maturity. 
NET CARRY COSTS: These costs are the costs of holding a security or commodity. These costs include 
storage and insurance costs (in the case of a commodity) and the interest that one is unable to earn while 
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one's cash is invested in the commodity or instrument (opportunity cost). Against this cost, one nets off the 
realised benefit of holding the instrument. This will be interest or dividends, or other cash inflows the 
investor will receive while holding the instrument or commodity. Once the net off has taken place one is 
left with the net carrying costs. 
NOMBI: Market shorthand for the Notional Medium Dated (five year) bond future. This FCO instrument 
traded for eighteen months but was discontinued in 1989 due to poor liquidity. (SAFEX, 1999 : 32). 
NOTIONAL CONTRACT: When a futures contract is based on an instrument that does not exist it is 
known as "Notional". Delivery of the underlying cannot occur and thus the final settlement between the 
two parties involved in the trade is on a net basis. The concept of a notional contract is most often 
encountered in the area of bond derivatives where the notional bond is based on a selection of bonds. This 
collection ofa number of securities to form a future is how the index~linked future is structured. The index 
cannot be delivered, a notional contract can. This index contract is thus notional. 
OFFER PRICE: Where bid is the price a market participant is willing to buy at, the offer price is the price 
the market participant is willing to sell at. 
OFFSET: Positions in the futures and options market are not on-sold in the secondary market; rather, a 
trader offsets a position by entering into an exactly opposite contract. A long call is closed out by selling an 
equivalent can; a long futures position is offset by the sale of the same contract. (SAFEX, 1999 ; 33) 
OFFSET MARGIN: Where a trader has opposite exposure to contracts that are similar, the trader's risk is 
reduced. This traditionally occurs most in the case of contracts of different maturities or contracts on 
similar underlying assets. This opposite exposure will serve to reduce the need for margin. The exchange 
will often allow the margin requirements to be relaxed in these cases. SAFEX allows offset for margin 
calculating purposes where the trader has opposite positions in similar contracts of different maturities 
(calendar spreads) or contracts where the underlying instruments are similar (inter series spreads). An 
example of this would be where the trader has a contract to buy the INDI and a contract to sell the ALSI. 
To some extent the trader is reducing risk - this is similar to the situation where the trader buys and sells 
the same security, which reduces risk. The reason for the reduced risk is that some of the equities in the 
INDI will also be in the ALSI, as well as the fact that the movements in the INDI should be correlated with 
movements in the ALSI. 
OPEN INTEREST: If a party enters into a futures contract to buy the underlying in the future without a 
corresponding seller, this is known as an open position. The same holds for a seller of a futures contract - if 
there is no corresponding buyer the contract is open. The "open interest" is the accumulation of all these 
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open positions for each contract at each maturity date. As a contract is closed out the open interest will be 
reduced by one. 
PRINCIP AL: The market participant who accepts the risk of holding the security is known as the principal. 
This is in contrast to agents who will not accept risk and hold securities on behalf of a third party. 
PHYSICALS: When a futures contract matures, settlement can occur in different ways. One way is to 
actually deliver the underlying commodity or instrument. This is known as physical delivery and 
consequently, when this occurs the settlement is known to be a "physicals" settlement. It is important to 
note that this term does not only govern commodities. There may be a case where a futures contract on a 
specific share will result in the physical delivery of the share certificates at maturity. 
REPO AND REPO RATE: A repurchase agreement (repo) refers to the case where an organisation needs 
cash and "sells" securities to a lender who will "purchase" the securities on the promise that the securities 
will be repurchased by the "seller" at a future date. The repo rate is the rate of interest on a repo transaction. 
SERIES: In the context of the futures markets, this term refers to the different maturities of a specific 
futures contract. For example, the March, June, September and December maturities of the Industrial Index 
(INDI) future will be collectively known as the INDI series. 
SETTLEMENT: This occurs at the maturity of the futures contract. Where the futures contract has not been 
closed out and is allowed to mature, either delivery of the underlying instrument(s) must take place or a net 
cash settlement must occur, at maturity. In the cash of a notional underlying, delivery cannot take place and 
the settlement must take the form of a net cash payment between the parties. 
SETTLEMENT DATE: The date on which a transaction is given effect and on which payment and delivery 
takes place. In the gilts market, for example, settlement takes place on the second Thursday after the 
transaction is executed. Share Index Futures are settled on the 15th (or next business day) of March, June, 
September, and December. (SAFEX, 1999 : 43) 
SETTLEMENT PRICE: This is the price that is used for settlement purposes. The price is usually the price 
at the close of trade on the maturity date of the futures contract. In some cases this is calculated with the 
use of a formula. This is done so as to stop market participants manipulating the price in the last trading 
session on the maturity date and thus influence the amounts used in settlement. 
SETTLEMENT RISK: This risk is similar to default risk in that it deals with the risk of the counter party 
not performing as per the contract in discharging their obligations. More specifically, it is the risk that the 
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counter party to a deal will not be able to settle as agreed to in the futures contract. Settlement risk is 
negligible when one uses an organised exchange such as SAFEX. 
SHORT: A short position is where a market participant has sold a security and aims to profit from the 
decrease in the price of the security. An important fact to note is that the short seller does not own the 
shares when the sale takes place. The short seller hopes to sell the security at a price (without delivering it), 
wait for the price to drop, purchase it (for less) and deliver it against the original sale. This has the effect of 
the short seller profiting from the drop in the price of the security. A short seller thus has a bearish view of 
the security. Where a market participant is short a future the individual is contracted to sell the underlying 
securities at an agreed rate at some date in the future. 
SPREAD: There are two possible definitions of a spread. The most common is the difference between the 
bid and offer prices (see double above). The other definition of a spread is where a future of one maturity 
is purchased and another, at a different maturity is sold. This, as will be seen lower, is another form of 
arbitrage. It is not, however, arbitrage in the strictest sense, as there is an element of risk in the trade. 
TICK: A short horizontal strike on a bar graph, showing the price at which the share closed within the 
trading range. (SAFEX, 1999 : 49) 
TRADING SESSION: SAFEX does not impose trading hours on the futures market, and deals are 
sometimes concluded as early as 7:00 am or as late as 8:00 pm. (SAFEX. 1999: 50) 
VARIATION MARGIN: Where initial margin is required to enter into a futures trade, variation margin is 
the cash flow that must occur when a trader incurs losses and must pay into the margin account in order to 
keep the position open. As described in the mark-to-market process above, the daily profits or losses a 
trader experiences are adjusted through the margin account. Where the market participant makes a profit, 
he or she is able to take funds out of the margin account. Where a loss is incurred funds must be paid in. 
This is variation margin. 
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Appendix 3.1 - SAFEX Contract Specifications. 
The following are the specifications of the SAFEX·listed futures contracts at the end on 1999. All 
information has been supplied by 8AFEX. 
Part 1: Index futures. 
Mining Index Financial Index 
Revised Revised Revised 
periodically by the periodically by the periodically by the periodically by the 
risk committee. risk committee. risk committee. risk committee. 
Reduced margin Reduced margin Reduced margin Reduced margin 
for spread for spread for spread for spread 
average average Arithmetic average average 
of the index taken of the index taken of the index taken of the index taken 
every 2 minutes, every 2 minutes. every 2 minutes, every 2 minutes, 
over the fmal two over the final two over the fmal two over the final two 
hours of trading on hours of trading on hours of trading on hours of trading on 
expiry date, as expiry date, as expiry date, as expiry date, as 
calculated by the calculated by the calculated by the calculated by the 
JSE. J8E. JSE. JSE. 
Cash Settled Cash Settled Cash Settled Cash Settled 
Futures Futures 
Options R 0.50 Options R 0.50 
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Part 2: Interest rate and Currency Futures. 
Long Bond Long Bond Long Bond Short Term 3 Month Rand Dollar 
periodically periodically 
by the risk by the risk 
committee. committee. 
Reduced Reduced 
margin for margin for 
spread spread 
Midpoint of Midpoint of Midpoint of 
best spot bid best spot bid best spot bid 
and offer and offer and offer 
yields yields yields 
advertised on advertised on advertised on 
Reuters at Reuters at Reuters at 
12hOOon 12hOOon 12hOO on 
i expiry. expiry. 
periodically 































Futures R 1.00 
Options R 0.50 

















Based on the 
three month 
JIBARrate 




will be 100 
minus the nBAR 
rounded to three 
decimal places. 
exchange between 
• the South African 
















offers to buy and 




of each is 
calculated and 
highest and lowest 
discarded. 
Average of the 
four. 











Part 3: Individual Equity Futures; 
Anglogold The Board of De Beers 
Executors Consolidated 
100 x the share 100 x the share 100 x the share 
price (e.g. price (e.g. price (e.g. 
share price share price share price 
85.25, future 85.25, future 85.25, future 
Average pnce Average price Average price Average price 
as calculated as calculated as calculated as calculated 
by the JSE by the JSE bytheJSE by theJSE 
between 14hOO between 14hOO between 14hOO between 14hOO 
and 16hOO on and 16hOOon and 16hOO on and 16hOO on 
date. date. date. date. 
Physically Physically Physically Physically 
settled in terms settled in terms settled in terms settled in terms 
of Rule 8.4.7. of Rule 8.4.7. of Rule 8.4.7. of Rule 8.4.7. 
Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 
Options R 0.15 Options R 0.15 Options R 0.15 Options R 0.15 












share to two 
decimals. 
R 1 (RO.Ol in 
the share price) 
Average price 
as calculated 
by the JSE 
between 14hOO 
and 16hOO on 
date. 
Physically 
settled in terms 
of Rule 8.4.7. 
Futures R 0.30 






share to two 
decimals. 
R 1 (RO.O! 
the share price) 
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Part 4: Individual Equity Futures continued. 
Liberty Life Comparex Ricbemont Sa sol SA 
100 x the share 100 x the share 
price (e.g. price (e.g. 
share price share price 
85.25, future 85.25, future 
on on on on on 
third Thursday third Thursday third Thursday third Thursday third Thursday 
of March, June, of March, June, of March, June, of March, June, of March, June, 
September or September or September or September or September or 





share to two 
m m 
the share price) the share price) the share price) the share price) 
Average price Average price Average price Average price Average price Average price 
as calculated as calculated as calculated as calculated as calculated as calculated 
by the JSE by the JSE by the JSE by the JSE by the JSE by theJSE 
between 14hOO between 14hOO between 14hOO between 14hOO between 14hOO between 14hOO 
and 16hOO on and 16hOO on and 16hOOon and 16hOO on and 16hOO on and 16hOO on 
date. date. date. date. 
Physically Physically Physically Physically 
settled in terms settled in terms settled in terms settled in terms 
of Rule 8.4.7. of Rule 8.4.7. of Rule 8.4.7. of Rule 8.4.7. 
Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 Futures R 0.30 
Options R 0.15 Options R 0.15 Options R 0.15 Options RO.1S Options RO.lS 
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Appendix 3.2 - Sixteen SPAN Scenarios. 
Number Move in Futures Price Change in Volatility. 
1 Futures Unchanged Volatility up. 
2 Futures Unchanged Volatility Down. 
3 Futures up 1/3 range Volatility up. 
4 Futures up 1/3 range Volatility Down. 
5 Futures down 113 range Volatility up. 
6 Futures down 1/3 range Volatility Down. 
7 Futures up 2/3 range Volatility up. 
8 Futures up 2/3 range Volatility Down. 
9 Futures down 2/3 range Volatility up. 
10 Futures down 2/3 range Volatility Down. 
11 Futures up 3/3 range Volatility up. 
12 Futures up 3/3 range Volatility Down. 
13 Futures down 3/3 range Volatility up. 
14 Futures down 3/3 range Volatility Down. 
15 Futures up extreme move Not Applicable 
16 Futures down extreme move Not Applicable 
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Appendix 8.1 - Futures I Spot Grapbs 
See accompanying CD - ROM. 
On the CD - ROM select the "R squared" directory and you will frod all the different generic 
contracts in the fonn of Excel spreadsheets. In each spreadsheet there is a covering summary page 
that uses hyperlinks to each contract. By clicking on a hyper link one will be taken to the contract 
and shown: the date, the spot and futures price on that date and the log nonnal changes in the 
future and the spot for each day. The page after the data for each contract of the graph that shows 
the spot and the actual futures price for the selected contract graphed against one another. The 
"RSQ Analysis" page shows the month-by-month r squared figures for each of the contracts in the 
time series. 
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Appendix 8.2 - Futures Fair Value Calculator. 
See accompanying CD-ROM. 
Fair Value Calculator Refmements. 
The calculator that has been designed does not take into account brokerage. the possible movements in 
margin over the period that the arbitrage position is in place and the possible movements in the collateral 
for the securities loan over the period that the arbitrage position is in place. These could be incorporated to 
enable the futures trader to use it as a day-to-day tool. 
To include brokerage, care must be taken to determine the method brokerage is charged. Brokerage can be 
charged as an invoiced fee, in which case Value Added Tax (V AT) must be taken into account. In some 
instances the brokerage is taken as part of the bid / offer spread In this case V AT in not included at the 
brokerage forms part of trading income. 
To build in margin movements, one must forecast the volatility of the future over the period of the position. 
It would be prudent to assume the position will be held to maturity of the futures contract Once the 
volatility has been forecast the resultant futures prices will have to be compared to the margin "triggers" 
(see chapter 3). The extent to which the extreme prices breach the triggers will have to be quantified This 
will then be translated into margin requirements. The timing of this will be difficult to determine. Either an 
average time period (over the maturity of the futures contract) could be used. or the extreme prices could be 
assumed to occur early in the contract's life. This would enable one to calculate the cost of margin 
movements. 
The movement in collateral on the securities loan should be dealt with in the same way as the above margin 
movements. 
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Appendix 9.1- Correlograms for the correlations between "Traditional" ALSI volatility 
and the ALSI Arbitrage Gap. 
Contract # 1: June 1990 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample~· •. 51D4/1990i1~lDat29DO 
Inc ludedoJ;fsetV~tion9;17 








Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. 
lead 
a 0.2973 0,2973 
1 0.2072 0.J963 
2~0.0106 0.2514 
:3 0.0591 0.3674 
.4 0:1473 0.1935 






11 ,.O.~55 0.4749 
12-0.5270 0:2512 
1. 3 ... · .·.~ •. O.48.· 85 0.2588 
14,.O.55~3 .0.3577 
15.-0 .. 39JO 0.3132 
















o 0.4812 0.4812 
1 0;.4585 0.5246 
:2 0.41620,6424 
30;8036 0}009 
4 0;7'880 O.~.79S 
5 0,5775 0;2e48 
6 0:31550,2919 
7 0,3355 0,3290 
8 0043200:3271 
9 0,3Ej32 0.3476 
10 0,3646 0.3651 
11 0.4147 0,2100 
12 0,2844 0.0846 
13 0,0956 0:0898 
14, 0,1108 OJ495 
15 0,1763 D.1179 
1.6 0,1607 0.0438 
17 0.0701 0:1:1297 
1B,,-O,n156,,~O.ot43 
19.~oIJ9135' cCl.pP10 
20" -0,1871, -O.O~24 
21 -O~1520 ·.(l0471 
24,0.1 047 ~O:06QP 
23,-0>1'641 ~OJ947 
24 -0:3525 -0.3156 












37 -0,5100 ,.Q,8165 





43 -OA 174-0.3729 
44 -0:3722-0A353 
45,-0.4371 -0.4645 
46 .0,4776 -O.30n 
47, -0,3054.0.1895 
48 -0,1918 ,(j.~071 
49,.0,2375 -0.2175 
50 .0,2320 -O.J878 
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L 0 0.71000.7106 
, 1 0.7468(1,15988 
:2 0; 703$ 0.~400 
3. D.sea2 1 >1781 
41;t339 ,0.9069 
5 0.8:;11 0.'7(}21 
6 0,5650Q.7125 
7 0,6055 D~6640 
a O.1lS29 0.6242 
9 0.60960:$35j 
10 073281:0717 
11 O.89~3 0,6189 
14 0:6665Q.6241 
13 0:4498 0~S4S2 
14 0.4627 ,O.60l5 
15 0.4893 .0.5589 




20 0.3095 .o.57!36 
21 0;33280,5435 
22 0.3469 0;4988 
23 0.3226 OJ5853 
24 .0.3002 0.8:713 
25 0.46289:6676 
26 0,~264 0:5115 
27 0,21m (I.544ft; 




~ 0.2615 QJ3a26 
33 0.1667 0.4962 
34 0.11040:5354 
35 o:n71 0.490,2 
36 0;1161 9,4443 




41. 0.0172 0.5440 
42 0.02720.4850 
43 0,0196 0·4274 




48 At0543 0,5316 
49, -0,0523 0,.1640 
50 ,~O:0Q50 0.4237 
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Contract # 4: March 1991 ALSI Futures Contract 
SampJe: 5104/1990 12tlJe:aoOO 
Jnclud~d ~bseNatl53n~;"2. ". . . '. . 
Com:lfatjoil~are. asymptOtically co.nsistent. appro~jrru~tlons 


























o 0,6545 0,6545 
1 0:6541 0,6587 
2 0.6519 0.8748 
:3 0,8592 L0967 
4 1,06060,8744 
5 0;8271 OJ3GG2 
6 0,5991 0.6790 
7 0.5987 a ..67BS 
8 0:6207 ,00,6(24 
9 0.6203 0.9005 
10 0.7923 1 .1474 
11 0,9695 0,9110 
g g:.~~~ g:~~~ 
14 0.5349 0:8996 
15 0 . .5513 0.69tO 
16 0,561.40.9177 
17 0,1051 1.1431, 
1'8 0,8435 0.9041 
19 0:6436 0 .. 69.15 
20 0,4619 0.71.9,3 
21 O,45650'?0~ 
22 0,4763 0.6821 
23 0.4853 0.9;247 
24 0.5967 1,1664 
250;7217 0.9109 
2S 0;5476 0,8840 
27 03781 0,7154 
28 Cl,3747 0,7089 
29 0.393l5 0.68t2 
30 0.4031 0:91313 
31 0;4S41 1.1526 
32 0.5658 0.8Eis12 
33 0,41220.6387 
:34 0:2838 0.6636 
350,27390,aa22 
as. 0,2882 ,0.6904 
'31' 0;2964 0:8375 
38 0;3460 1.01$ 
39 0.3927 0:7766 
40 0.2729 0,6451 
41 0,1719 0.5768 
42 0:1.654 0.5943 
43 0,'805 0,5596 
44 0,'760 0.7159 
45 0 .. 1785 0,8583 
46 0,1919,0:5353 
47 0,120S 0:4297 
48 0.0519 0,4$ 
490,0S39 0.4620 
50 0:0722 0:4625 
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Contract # 5: June 1991 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sam~J~; 6,{)41t~Q01 ~Od 
Included.ops.et\lalipns;·Yl 
Correl~tions.ar~~J'm~totit;~Uyconsiste6tl*ppro)(imath)lls 
JUN9'· :VOtATILlTY(.i) .JI;JN91.VOL,ATlLlTY(+i} lag lead 
I O.-O.OOOS ·a,roSE! 
11 ,.0.0466 -O,02eO 
2-0.0519 ,.o:(J535 
3 -0<1115 . .(1.0750 
4 -Q.1676. -0 .. 0465 
5-0J759·Q,02:3Q 
9-0, 1327 ~bi0427 
7.~O.t40!i ~O,07a9 
8-0A 555 ,.oJ 274 
9>,.o.1~2 '(lJ71O 




14. -0.1197-001 ~3S 
15· .• 0,t2S9 A1.1735 











27 0.0296 ,(1,0829 
2l;J ,.(I.04Q61)<1616 
29. ·0.0000-0,1547 
r 30Q.ane . o.1291 
31 D.OS1tl -0.16.40 
32 (1.0458 -0.0659 
33 1).0898·0,0002 




38 0.0809 0.1112 
~ 0:04430,{211 
40 0;0172 0,1491 
41 U.Q11P 0.183.1 
42·0.0~4Q.1423 






49-0.1359 0 .. 2825 
50.-0.1 4G2 0.2684 
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Contract # 6: September 1991 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sarr"lpJe:5.A:l4l1990 1.21OS11OOO 
lnc;lwd!ldops~rvati0l1g;715 
Ccirr~I~~jonsare. agymptQticaRy r:()I'\$igtentappro)(itn~tlon$ 
~EP~1\VOl.fo.nLITV('i)SSP91NQl,Al"1I..ITY(+O ilag lead 








1 0.7612 0.7433 
;Z 0.80400.9491 
3 1. 01341 . .1836 
41.24750.9524 
5 1,OQ44o.SSl;l2 
6 O.iJ97 .O.7l40 
7 0,6963 0.6751 
8 0.66670.6$1 
9 0,6855 0.8955 
10 0,95911,0681 
111.1772 0.8537 
I 12 0,95113 UB331 
I 13 0,7112 0.6146 
I 14 0,65ere O.6(J59 
15 0:6089 0.5693 
16 0,8009 0.7290 
17 0,8240 0 .. 8966 
181.04200.8897 
I 19 OM37 0.5013 
I 20 O:62!39 O;4Ba:l 
I 2 t O.SQ9S. Q,4f1?a 
22 0,S8360:46e2 
23 0.5411 0.58.95 
24 0.7514 O.6a64 
I 25 0.94151 0.5282 
26 0;.7S6~ 0:3674 
'270.570;2 0.3463 
26 .. 0.~40:3355 
1. 29 0,5416 O.317() 
I 30 0;50100.3996 
31 0~S607 OA~6 
32 0,0092 0.3207 
33. 0:6670 0.2048 
34 0:®48 0.1853 
35 0,54i 40.1706 
36 0.5228001641 
37 0,45$ 0~2035 
36 0.5932 0,.2128 
39 0.7401 ·0.1529 
40 0,5665 0.0920 
41 0,3ere7 O~0763 
42 0.4312 Q:0548 
430:41850:0757 
I 44 0.3504 0.1004 
145 0.4374 O,0B19 
I 48 0.54630.0731 
47 0:4061 0;0353 
48 0:2918 0.0240 
49 0:3201 0.0229 
50, 0.29190.0334 
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Contract # 7: December 1991 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sampl~: 5Jo4l19901~90 
IncludEld Ol)$ervations: 7.4 
CorrelationsareliSymptotlc~Uttonsistenf.approj(itnati(lns 
lag lead 
o 0.3788 0'.3788 
1 0.4278 0.3649 
2 0.46600.4564 
3 0,542:3 0,5731 
4 O~63620,4302 
5 0;4891 0;3325 
6. O~3G35 0,2677 
7 0.21240.2189 
aD; 208602536 
9 0.2832 0,3400 
10 0.4063 0.48.07 
.11 0.5.4180;4279 
12 0.5113 0,3804 
13 0,4~e40;2~5{) 
14 0,.2922 .0.2078 
150.21020:1574 
16 0:2118 0 .. 1917 
17 0,2961 0:2885 
18 0.3309 0236:3 
19 0;29$ 0..2355 
20 0.2454 0.1671 
210,0843 0,1002 
22-0.0244 0.0747 
23 -°:°252 .oJ 190 
24-0,.0129 0>1759 
2$ .. 0:0070 OJ4~ 
215 0,0464 OJ~92 
27 0,07Sa 0,0$32 
26 ~O;07820;0311 
29,0,1544 ,0.0249 
30 -0.1449 QJ)501 
3L-0.15OO 0.0832 
32 -0.1569 0.0736 
3:3 .. -0.0522 0.0772 








42 -0.0796 0.0589 































1 0.3375 0:31\37 
20,3455 Q;4269 
3 0.4280 0.5485 
4 0,5251 0.4.382 
5 004057 0 .. 3507 
6 0.2929 0,3579 
7 0.2790 0:33;19 
a 0.3001 0,3301 
9 0,3100 ;1).4546 
10 0.3686 0.5641 
11 0.4698 {)A~ 
12 0:36590.3721 
13 0.2674 0.3103 
14 0.2540 1).3430 
Hi 0.2622 0.3400 
16 0.2715 0.4587 
17 0.3365 0,5825 
1 a 0.3995 0.4800 
19 0;3045 0.3649 
20 0.22190.3688 
21. 0,2099 Q,3447 
22 0;2112 ,0.3337 
23 0.2178 0,4592 
24 0.2698 0.513gO 
25 0.32370.4561 
26 0.24570.3603 
27 0 .. 1700 0.3663 
26 0.1.83( 0.3387 
29 0.01657 0;3291 
so 0.170.2 0:4497 
310:2000 0.5700 
32 0 .. 22.86 0.451.0 
33 0.fS61 a.sag 
34 O.lOea 0.3561 
35 CL10570.3~4 
36 0:1075 0.3208 




41 O.O~2 0.3!:i35 
42 0:0l§7 0.3374 
43 0.0482 0,3255 
44 0.02500.4574 


















Contract # 9: June 1992 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample;61D4119$O·.1.2@fl120Q0 
lnduded observliltipn$.:fi{." 
Correl~tio rlssre, s$ymptoticillilycopsisfentiipproximations 
JUN92N0LATILlTYFi).JPN9~;VOLATILITY(+i} lag lead 
o 0.4006 0.4006 
r 0.3515 0.4161 
2. 0.3737 ft6451 
;3 0.3755 0.9246 
4 0.26980.8724 
5 0.·1'120 0 .. 6714 
6 0.0787 0,9243 
., O;00S60.6203 
8 ·0:0313Q.7136 
EJ. -0.0660 ·1.0327. 
10·0:1Q.46 1 :2237 
t1-001530L0408 
12 -0.1503 0.7524 
13 -0.1058 .0.61:24 
14-0.0508 0.62.113 
15·-0.1068 0.7282 
16 ·0.2029 0; 93Q7 
17 -0.30911'.0642 
18·0:4877 9J36S6 





24-0.6301 1 :0604 
25·0.77550;9187 
26 -0.6690 0'669G 
27 ·0.4783 0.5310 
28.0.37120.5407 
29 -0.,3984 O.~9 
30.0.49010.81~6 
31· ..• 0:6526 0.9426 
32 .0.8288 0.7362 
33.0.5848 0.4767 
34 .• 0.3fIJ90:.36.98 
$ .• 0.3479 0,3847 








.44 ·.0.2':331 OJ530 




49 ·0:1981 0.1059 
50·0;1640 0,1372 
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Contract # 10: September 1992 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sampls~6J04~99P14lO1i1aoPO 
Included oi;r$et'llatiP¥l$;64 











5 -0.0217 ~0.1553 
6,0.511e~OJ743 
7,0.5375 -OJ835 
9 . .Q.5Qa9 .0:1197 
9·0.4918 -0.1062 
10.-0:6978 -m1144 
11 ·0 .. 9235,:0.0316 
12·-0;7481 O.04~9 
13 -O;6809Q:O~ 
14 -0.56$1..0 . .0426 
15 ·0,5510.0,021(1 
16.0.5386 0.06.44 
17 ,0.74,39 .0. t 122 
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Contract # 11: December 1992 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sat'nple:5104/199012AJaI2OQO 
IncllJded.o~sE;)tvati()n$:;~2 .• 
Correlations are asYmptotic~lIydQn$istE;)ntapproximatiQns 
Impact of Volatility on Pricing Efficiency of South African Futures. 
lag lead 
0.-0 . .0121 -0,0121 
1 0.0405 8:0503 
2 0,18620,0909 
:3 0,2~39 0.0~85 
4 0,2519 OJ]97~ 
5 0;t463 .o.DrZ8 
6~0.0241 .0 . .0048 
i~0~1J788 0.0159 
a 0.0967 .oJOlJ3 
Q 0.2284 .0,1028 
10 0)6~1 q.0264 
11 0,Q736 ,:(1.0182 
12 0.06c49 -q . .o113 
13 0 . 0413 0 . .0237 
14 0.1354 0.0651 
.150.3132 O·O~20 
16 0.4873 0:0212 
t7 .o,490tOJJ379 
18 0.4753 0;.0841 
19 0.22q2QJQ7Q 
20.~O . .o3.T60,0074 
21 -(11932·-0.01~q 
22 -0;.0917 .0:0333 
23-0.0494 0.07$8 
24, -O.t7~2 0:q310 
2.5.'. -0. , .. 3. 08 .... ·... 9 .. ·. -0.0.· .. 2.···9 .....5 ..• . ". ,". 
26 ··0 :2423· ~.o.0I337 
27 .. 0.1 001 O:O~20 
28.-.0.1881 0:1300 
29 ';0.1385 0.1013 
3O.~O . .o648 O.OSa2 








































4 0.10270 .. 0942 
5 0:0824 0:0741 
6 0.0523 QJJSOd 
7 0.0183 .0.0369 
8 0.0181 fJ.OSt? 
9 0.04420.0916 
10 0.0600 0.1063 
11 0;0790 OJOO6 
12 O;~7 0.0948 
13 0.0797 .0.0597 
14 0.0516 O.Q~SS 
15 0.0425 0.0385 
Hi 0.0619. 0.0007 
17 0,0851 OJJG54 
18 0.0883. 0.0526 
190,0644 0.0523 
20 .0:0389 0:0250 





26 ·0:0155 0:0292 




31 ·0:02!50 .,0;0169 
32:·0,028'·0.0112 
33 .. ·0,0047 O.CJO$ 
34.0.0162 ,0:0:201 
35 0.0130 -0.06.16 
36' 0.0008 ,O.062~ 
37 0~:Q247 .0.0SS8 
38 0,0S94·0.0962 




43 0.0430 -(1J004 
44 0;(}597.0.1251 
45 0.0587 ·0.,1599 
46 0.0646 ,.0,1237 
47 0.0544 .0.0802 
48 0.0393 -0.0717 
49 O.Om.·Q,104] 
50· .0.0327· .0 .. 1186 
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Contract # 13: June 1993 ALSI Futures Contract 
~ampl~:610411~01.2iOO!200P 
Induded of,JselVatjons::~ 
. Correlation~ ar~ a9ymptoticall~icbn$:istentapproximations 
lag lead 
o 0.3497 0.34$7 
1 0.4030 O~2956 
:2 0;4033 0.366J 
3. 0:5819 0:4520 
4 0.714e O.~ 
5' 0:131100.1615 
6 0:4635 0.t999 
7 0.4516 0.1768 
8 0.5140 0.1392 
9 0$156 .OJ634 
10 0.1971 0 .. 2405 
111))320 .0.1832 
12 0.878130.1032 
l~ 0.6550 O:~a3 
14 0.63040:0876 
15 0.68260:0591 
16 0.7'710 0:0724 
17 0.98100.0582 
18 1.2315 .0.0103 
1.9 0:9890 .!l0210 
20 0,7146 ,0.0015 
21 0.70.29 -llQ079 
22 0;7371-0.0166 
I. 23 0.8003 .o.05~ 
I. 24 J.013t-O.oasa 
25 1:2220 -0.07'93 
1 . :?6LOIl23 -0.0641 
Z1 0.7236-0.0566 
r 26. 0;6723 -0.~5~ 
129 O.7551p.0631 
30 0,7602. ,0:0845 
3J 0.9684 .0;0949 
~. J.29:3'7 ~O:0607 
33 0.8980 .0.0484 
34 0.6738 ~0:03f;l8 
35 0,6730. -0,oe07 
" 0.6497· -0.0651 
37 0.6387 .O.055E! 
3a O;l3OO3.0:0~7 
39 0.941T.-O.QS98 
40 0.7418· ·0;0398 
41· CJ.5397.0.tJ544 
42 0.50f:1f-:O.07P4 
43 O;55(J6. -0.0609 
44 0:4711·0.0547 
45 O.5983.0.~23 
46 0;7376. -0:0507 
41 0.5].;13 -0:0340 
48 0,4354-01'105 
49 0:4571 ~{:toaQ9 
50 0.4410 ·0:0615 
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Contract # 14: September 1993 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:61'0411~O,~2~12OO0 
Included, ob?e('ilatt(jn$: V2 
Corre.lations.lilreaSymptoticaIlYC,onsistent a~pt'o)(lmations 
SEpgj,VOI,AT:ILJTY{-i) SEP93 ,VOLATI UTV(+i) lag lead 
.( 0 -0.33:71 -0.21371 
1 -0;3423 -0,3852 
;2 ,0.3879 -0.4725 
:3 -0;3W0-0.6087 
-4 -0.4885-O.5m~ 
5 .-0: 3252 .0 .. :3498 
6 -0.2137 -0.3850 
'1 -0:2441. -0.3271 
J 8 -0.2350 ~0.3323 
9. ,0.1784 -0.5350 
10. -0.2338 -0.5990 
1 ~ -0,:2635 ~0.4837 
.~ ·0,1793 ~O,4485 
13 ·0.1516 -0.3553 
14 .. ·01670-0,3734-
J "5,0. t2!;l3 ·0.3917 
I 16 -0.1052 -0,5509 
.I 17~0.1572 .. {178QEl 
18.-0.2315 -OB719 
19.-0.2289 cO.4640 
20 -0.1862 -0:4702 





26 -0.2032 -0.3824 
·01490 .• 0.291~ 
28 .. 0:1869 -0.3035 
29. -0.1711-0.3553 
30 ~0:.1.332 -0.4064 
.I 31,0.2164 -004450 
I 32 -0.2673 -0.3661 
33 .. -0:2219 .• 0.1915 
I 14 -0.1385 -0.2036 
I 35 -O.1698~0;2765 
.:38 -0:1936 -0.1440 
37 -0.1576 -0 .. 1754 
.f as -0:1853 -0.2651 
39 -0.2395 -0.19)3 
40 -0,1822 ,0.1037 
41.0.1209 -0.1369 
42 -0.J394 -0:0860 
43-0,1339 .. 0.0534 
44 -OA388 -0.0445 
45 -0.1892 -0.0072 
I 46.,,112036 O:Q68S 
J47 -0.1280 0.0926 
48 ·0.0746 0".06t5 
49 -0.0566 0.0944 
50 ·0;0540 0.2053 
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Contract # 15: December 1993 ALSI Futures Contract 
Date: 05l29,1lJ1Tjfli~:Ol:~~ 
S.arnpl~: 5;eWt$~ 1211)aaooo 
InchJ~e.d ~bsetvation:s:74 
Correl~tions . ar~a$rmpto~j~~ny.c()!l$i$hlnt·. approximations 
lag lead 




.4 qd041 0.6350 
50.5l08 0.6479 
6 O.~.42$Q.601O 
7 O.:i1565 0,5205 
80.3298 0.5313 
9 0.27480,.7568 
10 0.3265 0.0047 
1'1 0:335707497 
12 0.2343 0'9602 
13 0.1467 0.5458 
14 0.1485 0.5119 
150.1724 0.5478 
16 O.14960.7~0 
17 0.1593 a.Ba79 
18 0.15090.6678 
19 0.0701 0.5353 
20 0.0317 (J;5178 
21 0.0514 0.4409 
22 0.0376 0.4290 
23 0.0400 0 .. 6100 
















40 -0.4461 0.1.325 
41.0.3;)15 .0 .. 1216 




.48. -0.6892 0.0152 
47.Q.5434 cO.0239 
48.0.4609 -0.0038 
49 .• 0.4637 0.0351 
50 .0.41.88 0 . .05.13 
Page 216 


























o 0:1141 OJ 141 
1 0.0212 ·0:0075 
:2 0:1018 0:0496 
:3 0.0074 0.0078 
4 0~1757-0.0644 
5 0.1607 ·0.0299 
6 0.2262 ·0.0218 
7 0.2693, ·OJ431 
8 0;16.65.~OJ511 
9 0.1346 -0,1392 
10 O~ 1594 ·0.1127 
11 0.1264 :0,1535 
12 0.2635 -0.1765 
13 0.1484,-0.1663 
14 0.22.09 ~O;2400 
15 0.2213 .0,2195 
16 0:1048 -0:1678 
17 0.1608 -0.2033 
18 0.1296 -02240 
19 0.0863 .0,1706 
20 0,1:328 ~O.20aO 
21 0:1a25~0.4131 
22 0.1043 .0,3244 
23 0.0158 -0.3165 
24 0.0879 ·0:3123 
25 0,~25-0;2063 
26 0.0457 ·0:2307 
27 O,OO12~0;3190 
28 0.0933 .0,4Jt68 
29 0.0296-'0.3782 
30 0:0057 ;O,31CJ6 
31 0.0403 -0,1803 
32 0.0360 .• 0,2158 
33 0;0447 ·0,3990 
34 O.0IJa4 .0,3037 
35 0,0087-0,4072 
36 .0.0561. ·(t201.S 
37 ·0,0155-0,J288 
38 0;11170 -0.,0927 
39 0,0114-0:Q.616 
40 -0.0298 -0,0362 
41 "0.0216 .0 .. 0012 
42 0.0000 0.0446 
43. -0.0255 0.0744 
44 -0.02480,0109 
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o 0:1141 0,1141 
1 0.0212 ·0.0075 
2 0;1018 0,0496 
3 0.0874 0,0078 
4 0;1757.0'0644 
5 0,J607 -0,0299 
6 0.2262-C[02113 
7 0.2693 -0.14-:91 
8 0.1665-0,J511 
9 0,1346, -0,1392 
10 0.1594' .0.1727 
11 OJ:;:64,~O.1535 
12 0,2635 ·0.1755 
13 0..1484 -0.1863 
14 0.2209, -0:2400 
15 0.22~3 .• 02195 
16 O.11J48~O.)67:8 
17 0.1808, -0,.2033 
18. 0.1296.{),2240 
19 . .0,0883.0,1706 
20 0;13:28 ~0:2080 
21 0.11325 ~O.4131 
22 0.1043,-0.3244 
23 0;0158 -0.3115'5 
24 0.0879 ;0.3123 
25 0:0925 -0.2003 
26 0.0457 .0.2307 
27 0.0812-D.31;W 
28 0.0933 .o.44~ 
29 0.0296 -0;3782 
30 0.0057 ~0.3106 
31 O.0403~0.lB03 
32 0.0360-0 .. 2158 
33 0.0447.0,3090 
34 0.0084 -0.3937 





.40 -O.O~S8 ~0:036:2 
41."0;0216 O.[l[l'12 
420:0000 0·0446 
43 -0.O~5 0.0744 
44.-0.0248 0.0109 
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Contract # 18: September 1994 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 610511990 121081.2000 
In.efti,ded observations: 112 
Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations 
SEP94 ,VOLA TIL!TY(~i) Se;p94,VOLATIUTY(+i) 
I, 
lag lead 
o 0.4355 0.4355 
1 0.~42 0.2706 
2 0.2480 0,2575 
3 0.3051 0.2614 
4 0.3094 0~2656 
5 0.3097 0.2384 
6 0,3785 0.2994 
7 0.5158 0,3891 
8 0.3629 0.3197 
9 0.3108 0.1900 
10 0:3829 0.1844 
11 0,3595 0.2618 
12 0.3490 0.2383 
13 0.4095 0.2904 
14 0.5273 0.3746 
15 0.4027 0.2829 
16 0.3004 0.2250 
17 0.3264 0.2258 
18 0.,3211 0.1886 
19 0.3210 0 .. 1920 
20 0.3546 0.229(' 
21 0.4643 0.3112 
22 0.3130 0.2060 
23 0.2240 0.1921 
24 0.2662 0.1608 
25 0.2453 0.1764 
26 0.2313 0:.2009 
27 0.3063 0.301 t 
28 0.3560 0.3666 
29 0.2465 0.3015 
30 0.2104 0.2267 
31 0.1954 0.2266 
32 0.1315 0.1849 
33 0.1640 0.1996 
34 0.1858 0.2936 
35 0.1984 0;3050 
3e 0.1252 0.23f;l6 
17 0.0867 0.1646 
38 0.1246 0.1852 
39 0.0688 0.1483 
40 0.0105 0.1197 
41 0.0421 0.1743 
42 0.0635 0.1918 
43 0.0196 0;1205 
44 0.0037 0.0940 
45 0.0666 0.0886 
46 -0:0042 0.0414 
47 -0:0219 0.0619 
48 0.0146 0.0949 
49 0.0020 0.0901 
50 -0.0442 0:0795 
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Contract # 19: December 1994 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:6105119905/171199~·. 
Il'lch..lded.·()~set\latlon~r$!8. 















4·. -0,2146 .-0:.1741 
5 -Ot162-0.2094 
6.0.1523-02348 










17 0.0364 .DJ~e3 
18 0:0526 -0.1972 
19 0:0506 .DJ279 
20 O .. 04p7-0:Qf309 
21 0.0715,0.1.$5 
22 0:0951 ~0;()886 
230.1118 ~O,0648 
24 0.0723 · ... 0.0984 
25 0.0511 -0,0551 
26 0.1273 -0.0tl42 
27 0.2205 ·-0.0698 
2& 0:3448-1113.17 
290,29;:0.0,1'203 
30 0;2157 -0,0864 
31 0.2466.°'0791 
32 0.2294 -0:0204 
33 0·11300 -tlOOeg 
34 0.27S6.":D .. 1J819 
35 0.3799 .0;0670 
36 0.3;230 ,:0,0181 
37 0.2511 0.0059 
38 0.2362·-0.0367 
39 0.2306 0.0209 
40 0,2154 0..03.94 
41 0..27890..'0662 
42 0.3e09 0;0723 
43 0..31780.0853 
44 0..2769 0.0474 
45 Q.;24n. 0;0132 
46 0..23490..0808 
47 0..20.04 0..0.783 
48 O.2Sl25 0:0576 
49 0.35610.0923 
50. 0.2596 0.0959 
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Contract # 20: March 1995 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: GI05/1.99012IPElI2000 
Included obs6r>i'atiol'Is: 237 



















































.. 1 I 
I I 
lag lead 
o -0.0270 -0.0270 
j -0.0326 -0.0421 
2 0.0042 -0.0392 
3 0:0078 -OIJ314 
4 0.0280 0,0063 
5 0.0210 0.0021 
B 0;0185 -0.0407 
7 0.0229 -0.0306 
8 0.0144 -0.0255 
9 0.0055 -0.0264 
10 0.0093 -0.0143 
11 0.03580.0053 
12 0.0305 0,0016 
13 0.0113-0:0006 
14 O:ooas 0.0032 
15 0:00.40-0.0021 
16 O.OO5a.-O.OO26 
17 0.0086 .. "0.0151 
18 0.00170 .. 0029 
19 0:0053 ·0:0006 
20 ·0:0268 ·0:Ot34 
21 . -0:0264 .0;0119 
22 ·0.0303 ,0.01.90 
23 0.0057-0.0172 
24 0.0083 0.0016 
25-0·0301 0,0006 
28 ·0,0452 ~O:o020 
27 .0:0402 0.0592 
28 0.0083 0.0565 
29-0.1]688 0,0720 
30 0.0053 0 .• 0775 
31 OJJ065 0.0758 
32 -111188 -0.0019 
33 -0.1187 -0.0039 
34 -0.OOS5 0.0779 
35 -0.0.911. 0.0750 
36 ·-0.0982 0.0022 
37 0.0029 0.0913 
38 Q.0050 O~09~ 
39 .0,1148 -0.0038 
40-0,1 186 -110053 
41 -0.1171 O.DarS 
42 ~(d 169 0.:0.791 
43 -O.11~2 0;0598 
44 0.0021 0..0527 
45 0.9044 0.0417 
46 .0.130.0. -O.OOSti 
47 0..0003 -0..0069 
46 -0.1294 0.0338 
49 0.0.0.24 0.0346 
50 -0.1395 0.0.304 
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Contract # 21: June 1995 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:6tD5/1990 12AJBI2IJOd 
Included .oP13eNslions;111 
Conelationsarl3 asym ptotlcaUy (:oflsistl3nt .·approxirnat iol')s 








1 7 -OA482~OJ235 
.I 8-0:3Q84.0.0989 
~ •. '. -0.2985-.O:lJ788 
1 O·0.2~ .0·049·7 
11.0.2516.-0:0292 












24 ..• OJ7%,0:t)4~ 
25. ·O;18~-O.0242 
26.0J:233 0 . .0461 
27· .• -0;1438.-0:00'02 
·28.-0.1826.,q.Q®1 
29 .• 0.J502 ~OAOO.2 
1 30 :0.Q806.0;1029 
1. 31.0.0270-0.0954 
32 .0.04.49;:.0.09.40 
33 . -0·9.147 ,9.1001 
34 O.04:23.,.o,J309 
35 O.0Ei29.0.1986 
36 0.01'12 ·0.1 535 
37 O.0933~O.121JB 
38 O.1110.0J49~ 
39 0:04~ 11].454 
40 O:lQeS.-O,111.9 
41 O:1540~OJ295 
42 0:1756 .,0:1728 
.43 0.1293.,Q,0967 
44. 0:1107 . .,():O$14 
45 O.0tl91-q,1~1 
46 OW73 .0.076a 















Contract # 22: September 1995 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:., 6105I19ao .... 141061200() 
tnclud$.dQbset'ii~tions:11:3 
Corr~lations •. E!re •. s.~ymptbti£allycPt1si~tentapprQ)(imations 
lag lead 
o .0.1693.,.0,1693 
1 ·0:1540 ·0:1289 
2·0,t177 ... O.Q94f) 
3 ·0,0764 ·0.1174 




















24 -0:0;361 . ·(1.O692 
25 ,.0:0199·0:0515 
,I 26 -0.0221 -0.0.103 
27 ,.0.0567·q.0683 




32,. -0:0674 .0.0274 
3:3.0:0854 .0.a6St) 
34-O,1381.0J 153 
35 -0.1765 .0;1827 
38 ,.0.J590 ,·.0.1739 
37-0.143$·0.1499 
38·0.1160,,··0.150;2 
39 -0.1043 ·0.1206 
40·0.1212, ·O.096~ 
41 .0.1627 -0.1380 
4~ -O.1684~O.182e 
43-0.1640., .0.1655 





49 .0.2358 .• 0.1.343 
50.0,2161 -:0,1155 
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Contract # 23: December 1995 ALSI Futures Contract 
8ample:£ilJ,5n99012ilJ~t2000 
IncludedofiservatillnS[ 19a 
C orrelat.ions· are al?ymptotical!y Gonsist,entappro)(imations 
()E~.VOLATlUTY(~i) oeCf15.Y0!.ATII.:ITY(+i) lag lead 
O~0:0205 ,0.0205 
1 -0.025S. -0,0049 
2 -0,022\)0:0097 
:3',0.0061 .. -0.Ot57 
4 ,0:0099.,0.0121 
I· 5 .0.0019 0.00;39 
6,-0.0079 0,-0194 
I 7-0.0135 0:0181 
6 ~0:02470:D209 
9 ·.0.0231 0.0288 
10·0.0111 0.0238 
11 . ,0.01530:0307 




18 ,0.0667 0:0081 
17·0.0553 Q,0057 
18 .0.0427 -0:0147 




23· .O.1104 -0,0679 
24-0.1191 ·0.0611 
25·0.1109 -0.0704 
26,0,J14 t ..Q.0596 
27 .0.1712.0:0844 
I 2B .0.2114.0.1t89 
29.0;1835-0,1021 
:,30·0:1403 :0.(1151)3 
31 .. -0.'1538.0,0312 
32.0.1570.0.0321 
33. ,0.1700 .0.03T4 
34 -0.2334,0.02~8 
35 .• 0.2718 -0.0264 
36 -0.:2080 -O~,04'4 
37-0,1517-0.0296 
38 ·0.1618. 0,0092 
:,39 -0.1585:0:0098 
40·0.1657 -0·.0610 
41 .0.2257 :0:077.3 
I. '4t -02742-0.0791 
43-0,2056~0.oea7 
44~0.1387,.O,0482 
45,0 .. 1.558· -Q.m04 
46,0.1688 ~:0324 
















Contract # 24: March 1996 ALSI Futures Contract 
SampIe:6I05'1~O •.. 1·21D?J2iltlO 
Included obstilVatiohs:.3W 




:2 ~0.1528 ~O]22S 
3-0.1506 ~0;1275 




8 .0:2020 .• 0.1253 
9 -0.1628 .0.0912 
10 -0.1590 -0,(.1799 
11-0.1535 ·0.074.7 










f j 22-0.2490.·0;0520 
I 1 23 . -0.1972 ,0.0426 
I I 24-0.1942.0:Q35S 
.1 I 25 ·0.2033 ·0.0130 
j I 26 .0.1763 0.0164 
I I 27 -0.2449 0.0157 
I 1 28 A);3383 0.0061 
1 1 29·0:2811 0.0032 
I 1 30.0.19560 .. QO~ 
I 1 3J -0.t952 OJJ203 
32 -0.1912 0,0414 
I I 33 .0.1771 0.0201 
I I 3,bO.~01 0.02613 
I I 35 -0.2895 0.0475 
I 1 36-0.2256 0.0525 
I I. 31.-0.1638. 0.0308 
I 1 3a .• 0.1518 0:0259 
I I 39.0.18040:0421 
40 .• 0.1564 003157 
41·,0.2063 0,(1617 
42 -0,2611 0.0014 
43,0.2217 0,0866 
44 -0.t599 Q.(j605 
45 -0,17110.0528 
46 .,-0.1833 0.04$)4 
















Contract # 25: June 1996 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:6AJ5I199012/1Ja120QO 
Incluaedobser'l'atlo~s: 189 
Correlatio.ns .Slreasymptolicfiltyconsistent 8pprOximaiiQns 
JUN9i;),YQI"AfIUTV(-iJ JUNOO.vO.~TILlTY(+i) lag lead 
o 0.2650 0.2850 
1 0.23t!4 0.2341 
2 0.2107 OJ600 
3 0.2018 0:1270 
40.1894 0.1225 
5 0:2142 0.1221 
6 0.3087 0.1434 
7 OA150 0.1733 
8 0.3574 0.1386 
9 0.2914 0.1104 
1I1 0.29260.0920 
11 0.2773 0.0859 
12 0.29~ 0.0802 
13004294 0,1054 
14 0,5322 0.1364 
15 0.4277 0.1:948 
t6 0.33550.116$ 
17 0:3499 0.0830 
18 0.3485 0.0730 
19 03579 0.0757 
20 0,4753 0.1183 
21 0.5769 0.1617 
42 004378 0.1375 
23 0 .. 3154 0:0985 
24 0.3484 0.0717 
25 0.3529 0.0768 
26 0.;34840.1014 
27 004643 0.t270 
26 0.5910 0.1615 
29 Q,4857 0.1431 
30 0.3511 0.1055 
31 0.3645 O:082~ 
32 0.3779 0.01355 
3~ 0.~B2 OJOSS 
34 0.4664 0.1318 
35 0.5962 0;1510 
:J). 0.4995 0,1191 
37 0.3605 0,0643 
36 0,3511 a.052€) 
39 0,3577 0.0644-
40 0.36620"A01:2 
41 0.4941 0.0999 
42 0.5862 O,~4 
1 .I 43 .0.4646 0:0585 
I, 1 44 0.313.1 0.0381 
I 1 45. 0:3242 0.0335 
l. I 46 0;3489 0.0354 
I I 47 0.3451 0.0456 
I I 413 0.4M1 0.Q439 
I. J 49 0.5555 0.0281 
f •• , 50 0.4344 0.0121 
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0.. ,0 .Ocal· ... ~0.Oca1 
1 ,-110036 ~.Q915 
2. -0.0389 .-0.1 faa 
3 0.004S.0;1132 
4 0.0986 -0;1391 
5 0,051}..(JA544 
6 0.0435 :0.2232 
7 0.0.893 . .o:~148 
8 Ofo.arS. ~.O .. 2543 
9 0..0.119 -0.20.71 
10 0;1378 ~O.2286 
11 0.2140 -0.263.1 
12 0.1059 -0.::1380 
13. 0..1698 "02996 
14 0.30.18..0.'4'1:27 




19 0.1896 -0..2322 
20. 0.2874·0.2919 
21 0.3591 ~.3f3.11 
22 0,2756 .o .. :nq4 
230:20.45:. -0,2273 
24 0.2296·0.2154 
25 O.22p9 .o.1~11 
26 0..2453 -0.1.977 




31 0.J847 -0.1144 
32 0.20$ .0.J087 
33 0.19to.-I1.0889 
34 0:270.6 .0.1357 
35 O,3416.o..J507 
36 0.2573-001 253 
37 0.1824 .0.0835 
38 0.2105 .0.0.700 
39 0..2255 -0 .. 0049 
40. 0.2558 0..032.8 
41 0.;2665.0.0064 
42 O.2~1 0.,0.196 
43 0>1506-0.0291 
440J1902 .0.0483 
45 0, t01S -o.D13O 
46 0;1249 0.0881 
47 0.1383 0;1068 
48 0;10960.0593 
49 0.1Q44 0.0824 
50 0.03710.0474 
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Contract # 27: December 1996 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:SI051199012f(l(3a£l1)) 
Includedobse.tVatiOl"is:116 . 
Conelat.jans· areoisymptotically consistent. approximations 
DE C9S"YO LA TIUTYH)' OEC96,VOl.AlIUTY (+i) lag lead 
1 . 0 0,0381 0,0381 
1 0.0305. -0.0076 
2 0.0698 -0.0438 
3 O.073t{l.0143 
4 0,05590.0128 
6 0.0822 0.0252 
6 0:1253 -0:.0050 
7 0;1663 ~O:0504 
S 0.1330 -9.1150 
9 0.0938 -0,1290 
10 0.1245 -0.0712 
11 O~ 1066 -0.0199 
12 0,0948 -0.0127 
13 0.1482 -0.0759 
14 001924-0.1409 
I, 1.5 0.1165 -0.1829 
liS 0.0639 -0;1608 
17 0,1191 .,Q.0910 
1.8 0:113.0-0.0395 
19 0.0903 -0:0276 
20 0.1233 -0.0949 
21 0 .. 1565.-0.1381 
22 0.J058 -0.1608 
23 0.0717 -0.1320 





29 0.1 i40 0.0293 
30 0.0862 0.0642 
31 0.1544 0:1230 
32 OJ 451 0,0343 
33 0.0985 .0.0213 
34 0.1429 0.0948 
3$ [Jt921 0:0725 
3li 0.1404 0.0353 
37 0.12S8 0.0805 
I, SEI 0.1704 0.1084 
39 0.1491 -0.0093 
40 0>1299 -O,Q079 
41 0.15480,0576 
42 0.2126 0.:0202 
43 0.1391 -0.0351 
44 0.1355 -0..0234 
45 0.1459 -0.0409 
460.1023 -0,0886 
47 0.0999 -0.1082 
48 0,1106 ,.0,0953 
49 0.1274 -0.1260 
60 0.0825-0.0(;19 
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Contract # 30: March 1997 ALSI Futures Contract 
SampJe: •. 6105/199014J!l312000 
Intlu d$d .. 0 oservatipns: <417 
Correlations 'alreas:rmptoticall~l cOl1$i$tef'ltapproximations 
MAR97.vOLAtlL.ITY(~~ MAR97.VClLATiUTY(+i) lag lead 
.0 0.0903 .0 . .0903 
1 0 . .0777 0~.o542 
r 2 0.Ol)3.oQ:!J383 
1 1 :3 .0.0523 no.4::l4 
1 1 .4 .0 . .0417 OJJ623 
I I S .0 . .0413 .0.0648 
.I 1 6 .0.0677 . oJl803 
1 I 7 D.One 0,0952 
1 I 8 .0 . .0644 0.0787 
I I 9 .0.0430 0,0473 
.1 I 1.0 .0 . .0391 .0.0545 
I I 11 .0 . .0278 .0.0834 
I I 12 .o;Q225 .0 . .0909 
I 1 13 .0 . 0297 .0;1122 
I .1 14 .0 . .0362 O:136P 
1 I 15 0:.0288 . 0.1170 
I 1 16 .0.01.08 .0.0773 
II 17 .0 . .00290'0832 
1 1 18 0.00131 0.1.096 
1 I 1 9 0 . .0.0.28 .0.1223 
I 2.0,./) . .0.053 .0,1561 
I 21 • .0:0177.001$5 
I I 22 ·0.0181 .0.1565 
II 23-(lO~670: 1.095 
I I 24,./):0293 .o.J20.o 
I I 25··.0.0226 .0; 1508 
I I 26·.0 . .0239 .0.1585 
27,.0 . .0425 .o.2Q55 
28-.0:0633 .0 .. 2634-
29 ·.0.0494 0:22.04 
3.0··0 . 0442 .0.163.0 
31·.0 . .0429 .oJ 717 
31,.0,.0390 tL2.o11 
33.0:.0491 .0.2021 
34 • .0 . .0675.0;271.0 




39·.0 . .0484 .0.2508 
4.0 ·.0,.0576 Q,2481 
41. ~O,0790 0.3364-




46 • .0.0616 0.2869 
47-0.0675 0.2884 
48 -0,.0855 0.3850 
49.~O.1056 OA7a4 
50. ~O.oa68 .0.3875 
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Contract # 31: June 1997 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 61U5/19ao 121Ul:ll2OOO 
Irrcludedob.servatiQl'ls; .166 





o -0.1091. -0.1091 
1 -0 .. 0934 -0.0984 
:2 -0.0360 ~O.0751 
3 -0.0629 -0.1136 
4. -0.1301 -0.0408 
5 -0.0845 ·0.,0374 
6 -o:oe07.~.'475 
7 -0.0565-0:1517 
8 -0.0501 .0.1244 
9 -0.0071 -0.1220 




14 -0;0109 -0.1549 
15 -0.OO74~0.i400 
16 -0.0257 ·0 .. 1201 
t7 ·0;0366 -D.101S 
18 -0.0322 ~O,0352 
19 -0.1:)155 .0.0346 
20 -0;0354 -0.121;1 
21 ~0.0666 ~dJ172 
22 .-0.0990 -0,1103 
23 -0.0396 fO.,QS19 
24 .0:0419-0.0422 
25-0:05830.0021 






32 -0.0774 .0..0185 
33 -0.0590 0,0444 
34 ,O;!J943 0.0857 
35 -0,1354 0;1'096 




40 -0.0936 0 .. 0661 
41-0.1316 0.0946 
42.-0.1639 0.1191 
43 -0.12.86 0:0858 
44 -0:07600.0658 
45 -0.0748 0.0924 
46 -0.1080 0.0734 
47 -0.06520 .. 0662 
48 ~D.077D 0:0891 
49 ~0.1199 O.lQ50 
50 ~0:D527 0.0484 
Page 230 











Contract # 32: September 1997 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sampla:6Jt)511 ~a0121(J812000 
locluded .?b$eNathms~184 
Correlations .. are. IlsymptoticaJlyco!1sistent approxima~ions 










o 0,0086 0,0066 
1 0,0330 -0:0.031 
:;: 0.04750.0027 
:=1 0:0326 • .0.0316 
4 ~O,()08B ·0.0279 
5 ·0,0055 ·0,01:31 
6 0,04;13 ·0.06S9 
7' 0;0.968 -0.0904 
8 0.0611 -0.057·1 
9 0,0556-0:0727 
10 0,0361 -0:0938 
11 0,0124 ~o.,0495 
12 0,0448 -0,0347 
t3 0,a681 .. {1.0673 
14 0,01503 -.0,,1045 
15 0,0704 .. 0.0785 
16 0.0.134.(10581 
17 0,0.136 -0;0004 
16 0,0.617 -ll0330 
19 0,0523.cP,0313 
20 0,0639 rO:0645 
21 0:0837-o~0676 
22 0,0370 -0,0511 
23 0.0180 7110382 
24 0.0269 .~O,d36S 
25 0,08210,OQ12 




30 o.mGt 0.0708 
31 0.0158 0.,0660 
32 0.,01%6 0,0181 
$ 0 . .0043 0,0315 
34 0,05320.,0911 
35 0,0.352 0, t1e~ 
36 0.0139 OJ 103 
37 o,ooao 0 •. 1075 
38 o.,Q1f60,Oa90 
.39 -0.0003 0:0326 
40 0,0020 0.0396 
41 .0..00:500.:1004 
42 ... 0.0374 0.1169 
43 ."0.06:40 0,1095 
44 .. 0.0086 0;0915 
45-0.0012 0,0814 
46 ~0.046t .0.0275 
47-010028 .0,0285 
480.00040.0942 
49. "0.0076 0.0873 
50 . 0;07'81 0,0686 
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Contract # 33: December 1997 ALSI Futures Contract 



































o -0,2627 -0.2627 














15 -0.1009. -0:2186 
16-0.0886 -0.1821. 
17 -0.0948.0;t569 





23 .• 0:0600-0.1512 
24 -0.0610.0.1315 
25·0.t1549 ~O.Qa95 
26 -1:).0320 -0:0752 
27.0.0379 -0 .. 1293 
29-0.0630 .0;1104 
29.0;0462.0.0667 
30.0.Q380 ... ~.0438 
31.-0.0423. -0,0465 









41 0,0117 .0,1];398 
42 0,0091. ;0,0368 
43 0.0141.·. ~O'O35O 
44 0,Ot91>-0:0247 
45 0.0137-0,0238 
46 0.0072 -0:0054 
47 0.02.19.-0,0114 
48 0.0342 -0,0398 
49 0;0340 .. 0.0383 
50 0.0271' -0,0450 
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Contract # 34: March 1998 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample:6tD5/19001¥Jt)812000 
'nclud~dobse~tipns: .•. 347 
Correlationsarea'$yrnptoticallyoOhsisten~ .. ·appro)(lmations 
MAR9ftVOLATILITY (-i) MA89B,VQLA:l;1LITY (+I) lead 
0-0.1993 . -0.1993 
1 ~O.14a7 .Q.1850 
2-0:0891 -o~ 1613 
~. -0,0773 -0.1411 
" -0,1081 -0.0910 
!5. -0.1073. ,.a. 12lS! 
6,-0,1.224 -0.2062 
7 ,-0. 147t .. ~Q:2282 
a -0,1195 -0.1871 
9. -0:0860 . -0.1562 
10 ..• 0.0978· ~0.1377 
11 -0.1066 ~O.08p3 
12.0.Q913 -0.1051 
13·0.1188 -.o.t765 
14 ,.0.1660 -0.1930 
15 -0.1283~OJ649 
16·0.0995 ~-I114Q8 









:28-0.oas8 . ..IJ:PS65 
27 -0,1131]. -0.1050 




:32.' -0.0915 ~(lOtS'4 
~ .. -O.0756At0230 
34 .-O.1002.,~O,Q543 
35 . -0.1396 .• 0.0595 




40 -0.0739 .0,0298 
41·0.0838 .. 0:0561 
42\ ~0.W.1?.(I.0P21 
43,0.0793.· . .{).1J482 




48 -0.0492 ;O.~2 
49.Q.0663.~O:0718 
50·-0:0529 .. -<J.OS15 
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Contract # 35: June 1998 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 61OS11913o.12JOf312000 
It'lduded.obsel'll$iiofl$:18S 
Correlations $rea'Sympttl~ically consistem. approximations 
JUN9S,VOLArIUTY(-j).·jUI\l~a,YQI..ATILlty(+i) lag lead 
) 0. O:OOS2 0.,0.0.132 
. j 1 0,04.13 -0..0.175 
I 2 0..0.308 -0..0.458 
$ 0.0018 -0.0.304 
.4 -0..0.2650.0.427 
5 0..0318 0. . .020.8 
60.0.465 ,0.0.261 
7 0..0.217 0..0.278 
I e 0.0.247 .0.0.485 




13 0.:0.577 0,1006 
14 0.0295 0.1692 
15 o.;0.5Q1 0,1 ~6 
16 0 .. 0116 0..0.972 
17&01160,1J31 
111 0.0.116 .001524 
19 0;0.637 0.1333 
20 0.0971 0.1669 
21 0.08680..2177 
22 0.07790.; 1848 
23 0.05680:~463 
24 0..0008 0..1705 
25 0.03140.2084 





31 0.0.667 0.3OS1 
32 o..Q979 0:2910 
33 0.1:365 0.2991 
34 0..1865 0.3994 
35 0.1841.0..4826 
3~ 0.1289 0.3427 
37 0..0783 0.2598 
38 0,10.79 0 .. 2911 
39 o..OS31 0.270.9 
40. 0.0900. 0.2447 
41 0.1411 0.3105 
42 0.1526 0.3760 
43 0..1005 0.2820. 
44 0.0.195 0.::10.27 
45 o.,0983Q,2J5t 
46 0.0704 0.2(199 
47 0.0813 0.,1828 
48 0.1092 0.2244 
49 0,0945 0.2705 
50 0:04120:1106 
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Contract # 36: September 1998 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 6105/1990 1210812000 
Included obsel'lations: 246 









o 0.1369 0.1369 
1 0.1095 0.1032 
2 0.0873 0.0819 
3 0.0963 0.0867 
4 0.0839 0.0914 
5 0.0906 0.0887 
6 0.1172 0,1198 
7 0.1397 0 .. 1789 
8 0.1033 0.1620 
9 O.OBOO 0.1361 
10 0.0751 0.1268 
11 0.0767 0.1297 
12 0.0963 0.1385 
13 0 .. 1166 0.1865 
14 0.1373 0.2426 
15 0.1192 0.1927 
16 0.0920 0 .. 1443 
17 0.0769 0.1388 
18 0.0758 0.1266 
19 OJD21 0.1358 
20 0.1456 0.1979 
21 0.1787 0.2356 
22 0.14450.1970 
23 0.1355 0.1632 
24 0.1201 0.1469 
25 0.0925 0.1495 
26 0.1389 0 .. 1860 
27 0.1965 0..2807 
28 0.2152 0.3520 
29 0.1575 0.3067 
30 0.1333 0.2337 
31 0.1261 0.2173 
32 0.0948 0..2274 
33 0.1274 0:2534 
34 0.1787 0.3217 
35 0.1908 0.3767 
36 0.1384 0.2741 
37 0.1114 0,1964 
38 0; 1056 0:2206 
39 0.0544 0.2187 
40 0.0673 0.2095 
41 0.1101 0.2684 
42 0.1086 0.3232 
43 0:0748 0:2464 
44 0.0580 0.1701 
45 0:0567 0.1813 
46 0.0213 O.l~l 
47 0.02.28 0.1744 
48 0.0402 0.2243 
49 0.0248 0.2699 
50 0:0016 0 .. 1839 
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Contract # 37: December 1998 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 6JlJ51199P.1211JaQOOO 
Includedob'sef\!~i~ns:. 2a2 





















o 0,0854 0.0854 
1 0,1015 0,0829 
2 0,0840 0,0421 
3 0,0504 ·0,0027 
.4 OD420 0,0045 
5 0,1039 .0,0305 
6 0,1593 0,0338 
7 0,1780 0,0356 
8 0,1521 0,0507 
9 0,1220 0,0286 
10 0,0953 ·0,01137 
11 0,0969 ·0:0008 
12 0,1584 0,0181 
13 0.2213 0.0139 
1'4 0,25550,0(]39 
15 0:2223 O.lJ253 
16 0,1105 0,0086 
17 0,1437-0,02.83 
18. Cl1;382 ·0,Ot92 
19 0.1841 -0:0128 
20 0,2567 ~0,D.139 
21 0:3024 ~0,0327 
22 0,2482 ~O,O159 
23 0,1935 ·0,0220 
24 0:1638 ~0:OO07 
25 0,1598 ·0,0451 
26 0,2240 .0,0437 
27 0,3129 ·0.0445 
28 0.3$13 ~0:0702 




33 0:2674 -0,0543 
34 0,3588·0,0854 
35 0,4123 ·0,1117 
380:3391 -0.0989 
37 0:2675 .O.os46 
38 0,;2346 ~O,Ose4 
39 0,2214 -0,0715 
40 0,2807 -0,0734 
41 0.3917·0,1148 
42 0,4531 .001478 
43 0:3766 ·0;1224 
44 0.2818 ·0.1039 
45 0,2606.-0;1 101 
46. 0.2524.-0.0849 
47 0.3080 ·0:0852 
48 0.4279 ~J 192 
49 0.5123 -0.1613 
50 0,4205 -0.1408 
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Contract # 38: March 1999 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 6J1J5/l990 12!0812000 
Included obsetvatjon$: 513 
Correlations are asym~toHcally consistent approximations 
MAR99.YOLATILITY(-i) MAR99,YOLATILlTY(+i) lag lead 
o -0.1373 -0.1373 
1 -0:1124 -0.1151 
2 -0.0560 -0.0950 
3 -0.0567 -0.0973 
4 -0.0973 ~0.0627 
5 -0.0947 -0·.0628 
0.-0.1062 -0.1202 
7. -0.0872 -0.1363 
8 -0.0684 ·0.1143 
9 -0.0492 -0.0968 
10 -0:0496 -0.0995 
11 .0.0514 -0.0609 
12 -0.0469 -0.0620 
13 -0.0580 -0.1203 
14 -0.0727 -0.1411 
15 -0.0569 ~0.1194 
1£ .-0.0428 -0.1002 
17 -0.0424 -0.1015 
18 -0.0442 -0.0646 
19 -0.0411 -0.0668 
20 -0.0506 -0.1280 
21 -0.0640 -0.1503 
22 -0.0500 -0.1278 
!' / 23 -0.0341 ~0.1 078 
/ / 24 -0.0344 -0.1087 
/ / 25 -0.0399 -0.0698 
// 26 -0.0333 -0.0727 
/ / 27 -0.0388 -0.1334 
/ / 28 -0.0485 cO.1577 
/ I 29-0.0412 -0.1287 
/ / 30 -0.0296. -0: 1075 
/ / 31 -0.0250-0.1053 
r / 32 -0.0274 ~0.D705 
/ / 33 ·0.0219 -0:0753 
/ / 34 -0.02.63 ·0,1370 
/ / 35 -0.0371. -0.1853 
/ / 36 . -0.0296 .0.1424 
/ / 37 -0.02.19 .0 .. 1189 
/ 1 38 -0.0202 -0.1165 
r / 39 -0.0247. ~0.OI324 
/ / 40 -0.0180 -0.0882 
/ / 41 -0.0191 .0,1531 
// 42 -0.0290 -0.1837 
/ ./ 43 -0.0233 -0.1543 
/ .I 44 -0.0189 -0,1260 
/ / 45 -0.0149 -0.1231 
J / 46 -0.0182 -0.0894 
I / 47 -000105 -0.0937 
I I 48 -0:0109 -0.1545 
I / 49 -0.0197 -0.18413 
I I 50 -0.0183 -0.1565 
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Contract # 39: June 1999 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 610511990 12108/2000 
Included observat.ions: 229 
Correlations are Sl?ymptotlcallycot'lsistentappro)(imations 































o ·0.1042 ~0.1042 
1·0.0610 -0:0592 
2·0:0390 ·0.0339 
:3 ·0,0509 .(J.0397 
4-0.0534 "0:0526 
5 -0,0394 -0.0479 
15.0.0471 ..{j.0536 
7 ·0.0486-0.05915 
8 ·0.0$76 .Q.047tl 
9 ·0.01$-0:041.3 
10 ·0.0277 -0:0298 
11·0,0409 -0.0255 
12.0.0232 -0.0553 
13 ,0 .. 0188 rO.0837 
14-0.0324 ·0.1 OO!3 
15 -0.OHJ4cO:09QO 
16 0;0009 -0.0909 
17 0.0009 -0.0807 




22 0.00:21 -0.1651 
23 0.0177 .0.1566 
24 0,0095 .0;1631 
25 -0,0127 -0.1404 
26,-0,0054 -0,1852 
27 0.0205 -0..2485 
28 0.0305 :-0.3202 
29 0.Q266 ,.0.2570 
30 0,0396",0.222.8 
31 0:0494. -0.2317 
32 0.0256 -0;2196 
33 0:0210412311 
34 0.0565 -0.334,1 
35 0.0770.0:4319 
36 0.0603 -0.3008 
37 0,0519 ~(I.2a75 
38 0.0440 -0,3120 
39 0.0326 .0.3023 
40 0.0403 '~O.3038 
41 0.0573 -0:4234 
42 0.0680.0.55aQ 
43 Q.0~8. -0..4316 
44 0.(1538.0.3413 
45 0055S .0.3738 
46 0.0329 ·O,3tl47 
47 0.0444 -0.:3437 
.1 48 0,0788 -0,4674 
._ 49 0.09(2 -0.590.2 
50 0.0652 .0.4661 
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Contract # 40: September 1999 ALSI Futures Contract 
Sample: 6105/1990 1210812OPO 
Included observations: 16.0 
Correlation's are asymptotically consistenlappro)(imations 
SEP99,VOLATILlTY(.i) SEP99,VdLATILlTY(+i) lag lead 
o -0.3624 cO.3624 
1 -0.2635 -0.2635 
2-0.2160 ·0.1374 
3 -0.2565. -0.1458 
4 -0.2251 -0.1734 
5 -0.1920 -0.1477 
6 -0.2094 -0.1621 
7 -0.2011. -0.1934 
8 -0.0364 -0.1506 
9 -0.0173 ·0.1156 
10 0.0053 -0.0854 
11-0.0334 -0.0744 
12 .0.02.04 -0.0783 
13 0.0422 -0.1585 
14 0.0908 -0.1750 
15 0.1118 -0.1333 
16 0.0950 -0.0477 
17 0.0696 -0.0425 
18 0.0686 -0.0716 
19 0.0479 .0:0794 
20 0.1205 -0.0869 
21 OJ510 -0.0864 
22 0.1440 -0.0511 
23 0.0929 -0.0261 
24 0.0801 -.0.07131 
25 0.0640. ·0:0989 
26 0.0356 -0.0739 
27 0.0857 -0.1384 
28 0.1317 .0.1810 
29 0.1477 cO .. 1411 
30 0.1324 ~0:0836 
31 0,1336.0:085.2 
32 0.0867 .0.1177 
33 0.0294 cO.13S1 
34 0.0761 -0.1405 
L 35 0.1361 ~O; 1591 
36 0.1370 -0.1307 
37 0.0710 .0..0587 
38 0.0537 -0.0500 
39 0.0721 -0.0881 
40 0.0423,-0.1174 
41 0:0473 -0.1455 
42 0.0856 -0.1273 
43 0.0893 -0.1058 
44 0.0927 -0.0611 
45 0.0771 -0.0552 
46 0.0980 -0.0621 
47 0.0697 -0.0855 
48 0.1409 -0.1224 
49 0.2145 -0.1353 
50 0.2098 -0.1017 
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Appendix 9.2 - Correlograms for the correlations between "GARCH(l,l)" ALSI volatility 
and the ALSI Arbitrage Gap. 
See accompanying CD - Rom. 
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Appendix 9.3 - Legislative Environment Analysis. 
A9.3.1 SAFEX internal regulation 
On the 29 November 1995 the rules of SAFEX replaced the original constitution adopted by SAFEX on 14 
February 1990. The new rules adopted all the articles of the constitution and have since evolved into the 
current set. In the SAFEX rules, the objectives of SAFE X are dermed as "to establish, operate and regulate 
a financial exchange where trading in the financial instruments listed by SAFEX will be conducted in a fair 
and orderly manner and in accordance with the provisions of the Act" (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 2-1). In the 
rules, SAFEX is recognised as a juristic person with all the associated succession rights. 
The rules set out the executive committee of SAFEX. This being no less than seven and no more than 
eleven representatives of the members of SAFE X (who the rules are to govern). The requirements for 
membership of SAFE X are set out in the rules (see table A9.1 below) as well as the conditions for on going 
membership and capital requirements. SAFEX has two classes of members, namely the clearing and non-
clearing members. These also break down into two further categories, namely: broking and non-broking 
members. A clearing member is dermed as "a person admitted by the executive committee as a clearing 
member of SAFEX and who has entered into a clearing house agreement with the clearing house" (SAFEX 
Rules, 1999 : 1-7). A non-Clearing member is dermed as "any person admitted by the executive committee 
to membership of SAFEX and who is not a clearing member but who is either a broking member or a non-
broking member" (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 1.15). A Broking member is dermed as "a member who is a 
financial instrument trader" (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 1-4). A non-broking member is defined as !fa member 
who may trade with members for his own account but not with clients" (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 1-14). 
Table A9.1 - Requirements for Membership of SAFEX. 
Natural Requirements 
Persons 
Members who are natural persons and affiliated officers of members shall, in the opinion of the executive 
committee, be of good character and high business integrity and shall not in the five years or whatever 
longer period the executive committee may decide, prior to the date on which the membership is 
considered by the executive committee have been -
convicted of a criminal offence; 
expelled, whether as a member or otherwise, from any financial exchange as dermed in the Act 
or stock exchange as defined in the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act No 1 of 1985), or 
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from any similar institution or association in the Republic of South Africa or elsewhere; 
employed by or associated with a member of any financial exchange as defined in the Act or 
stock exchange as defined in the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act No 1 of 1985), or 
similar institution or association in the Republic of South Africa or elsewhere who was expelled 
as a member of that exchange and where the person or affiliated officer has, in the opinion of the 
executive committee, contributed to the act which led to the expulsion of such member; 
dismissed from the employment of any member of any fmancial exchange as defmed in the Act 
or stock exchange as defmed in the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act No 1 of 1985), or 
similar institution or association whether in the Republic of South Africa or elsewhere where, in 
the opinion of the executive committee, the act or omission that led to such dismissal would 
exclude such person as a member or affiliated officer under the rules of SAFEX. 
A member who is a natural person shall be at least twenty-one years of age and of full legal 
capacity and a citizen or permanent resident of the Republic of South Africa. 
Corporate Requirements 
Entities 
A member which is a body corporate, external company or partnership shall -
not employ, register or permit an affiliated officer to be in any way associated with it without the 
prior approval of the executive committee; 
have, in the opinion of the executive committee, a good reputation and high business standing. 
the external company shall, when submitting its application for membership, submit proof of 
compliance with the requirements of Section 322 of the Companies Act, ] 973 (Act No. 61 of 
1973) by furnishing the membership committee with the certificate of registration as provided 
for in Section 322(2) of the said Companies Act; 
the own funds of the local branch of the external company shall at all times exceed the liabilities 
of the said local branch of the external company in the Republic by an amount equal to or greater 
than that provided for in rule 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.2.7 or 4.2.8 (of the SAFEX rules) as the case maybe; 
the foreign parent of the local branch of the external company shall confirm to the exchange that 
it is required to comply with capital adequacy requirements similar to those in the Republic, and 
that they are reporting such as required to a foreign regulator; 
the thirteen weeks operating costs requirement I rule 4.2.4.2 (of the SAFEX rules) shall relate to 
the operating costs of the local branch of the external company in the RepUblic; and 
an external company which operates as a branch by means of which a foreign institution 
conducts the business ofa bank, shall submit its capital adequacyretums in terms of rules 4.6.6 
and 4.6.7 (of the SAFEX rules) to the Registrar of Banks, and shall at all times comply with the 
Banks Act, 1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990) and any Conditions published in terms of the said Banks 
Act. 
(Source: SAFEX Rules, 1999: 4-1 to 4-3) 
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The SAFEX rules also outline the need for a compliance officer to ensure compliance of the member with 
the rules of SAFEX. The compliance section of the rules extend to the monitoring of who the member is 
able to trade with and which of the member's staff are able to do so. Junior dealers are only able to trade for 
the member's account. Senior dealers are able to trade for the member's account as well as client accounts. 
In order for one to become a member of SAFEX, one must purchase a seat on SAFEX. The registration of 
one seat, whether owned or leased, confers membership on the person in whose name the seat is registered. 
(SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 6-1). Seats can be bought and sold as well as leased. This would occur where 
membership ceases (either voluntarily or through the actions of SAFEX). The withdrawing member is able 
to sell a seat in the open market as long as the purchaser complies with all the requirements of becoming a 
member. The price of seats on an exchange often reflect the health of the fmancial sector. If the demand for 
seats increases along with the price one usually experiences buoyant markets. Members, who own more 
than one seat, are able to lease their surplus seats to other members, as long as, in the event the lessee's 
membership is terminated, the lease terminates. The acquisition (and leasing) of seats on the exchange is 
subject to the 10% rule. No member is able to hold more than 10% of the seats on SAFEX whether through 
ownership or leasing arrangements. This is to guard against undue influencing of the exchange by 
individual members. 
The rules of SAFEX also govern the actual trading practices of the members. This is primarily driven 
through ATS (Automated Trading System) - SAFEX's electronic trading platform. SAFEX does allow Off-
ATS trading, but this is determined by the executive committee of SAFEX. If a trade is Off·ATS, the trade 
will either be telephonic or written. In this case the precise requirements for what constitutes a valid offer 
or bid are outlined in the SAFEX rules. If a trade is conducted through ATS the member is bound by the 
trade, regardless of whether the trade was authorised by the member or not. In this way SAFEX passes on 
the responsibility to ensure that only authorised trades are conducted, to the members of the exchange. The 
members thus become responsible for all application controls over their ATS terminals. The time of ATS 
trading is from 07h30 to 17h30 each business day with 30 minutes allowed after trading for administrative 
purposes. 
Off-ATS trades need to be reported to maintain market transparency. The SAFEX rules thus dictate that in 
the event ofan Off-ATS trade having taken place, the trade must be reported to the clearing house within 
10 minutes of the trade having taken place. Off·ATS trades concluded after trading hours are to be reported 
the following morning. 
Another issue that concerns trading practices is that of order priority. The basic rule in this case is !fA 
member shall not trade with another member if the trade could satisfy an order from a client" (SAFEX 
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Rules, 1999 : 7-6). The rule is designed to ensure all clients are treated equally. During times of market 
turbulence brokers have been accused of favoring larger clients over smaller ones and executing their 
orders ftrst. This is not speciftc to SAFEX and is more of a general ftnancial market issue. Further to the 
above rule, a member shall not trade with a client if the trade could satisfy a previously received order from 
another client (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 7-6). This is also extended to include the protection of other members 
!fa member shall not trade with another member, if the trade could satisfy a previously received order from 
another member" (SAFEX Rules, 1999: 7-6). 
The basic rule when trading with clients and other members is that the member shall be liable to ensure due 
fulfillment of all obligations arising out of the trade. Members may trade as both agents and principals with 
clients and other members. If a member has two clients with corresponding buy and sell offers the member 
may net them off as an Off-ATS transaction. but may only do so as a principal and after complying with 
certain SAFEX rules. In order to be able to trade with clients, members have to enter into client 
agreements. These agreements set out the terms within which the client can trade with and through the 
member. The client must also register with the member before being able to trade. The required registration 
details are set out in the SAFEX rules. The member will also be required to send advice notes to the client 
from time to time. The format of these are determined by SAFEX. 
Clearing of trades by the clearing house are also governed by the SAFEX rules. Trades are cleared by the 
clearing house when, in the case ofOff-ATS trades, the trade is either reported to the clearing house or 
matched as allowed by the SAFEX rules. In the case of ATS based trades, the clearing occurs as soon as 
the trade is concluded on ATS. The way in which the actual trade is cleared is through a process called 
Novation. Novation is where. in the case of the buyer, SAFEX replaces the seller and becomes the new 
seller to the buyer. In the case of the seller, SAFEX replaces the buyer and becomes the buyer to the seller. 
In the event the price of the trade is substantially different to the current market price the clearing house can 
refuse to clear the trade. 
The trade is treated as an open position if the participant has not entered into a trade involving the same 
contract prior to the trade taking place. If the participant has entered into a trade in the contract prior to the 
trade taking place the participant is faced with two possible situations. The ftrst case is where the previous 
trade was in the same direction as the current trade. In this case the open position of the participant is 
increased. In the second case the participant would have entered into an opposite trade to the original trade. 
In this case the open position would be reduced. This can be illustrated by means of an example: suppose a 
participant entered into 10 ALSI futures September 1997 contracts to buy the ALSI on 1 July 1997. If on 
the 10 July the participant entered into 10 more ALSI futures September 1997 contracts, to sell the ALSI, 
the open position on the 10 July would be nil. If the second trade was to buy the ALSI (rather than sell it) 
the open position would be +20. See table A9.2 below. 
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Table A9.2 - Open Positions Example. 
Date Movements in Contracts Open Position 
i Scenario 1: 10 July sell ALSI. 
1 July 1997 +10 +10 
10 July 1997 -10 0 
. Scenano 2: 10 July buy ALSI. 
11 July 1997 
The SAFEX rules make provision for the acceptance of margin from clients. This covers maintenance 
margin, variation margin and initial margin. The broker is also empowered to keep the margin in an 
account even if the client has not entered into any trades. This is allowed in anticipation of future trades. 
SAFE X invests all the margin it receives and pays out interest on this margin. 
Market participants are limited, in terms of the SAFEX rules, to the size of the positions they can take. This 
limit is set at the worth of the participant added to any suretyships it may have. This limit is applicable to 
clearing members. For non clearing members the limits are set by the clearing members. In calculating the 
size of the positions that can be taken, the positions of the clients of the clearing member are taken into 
account. This is because, in the event of a client of the clearing member defaulting, the clearing member 
takes responsibility for the trading liabilities of the defaulting client. As the clearing member carries the 
risk of its clients in the event of their default, the clearing member is able to set any limits that may be 
deemed necessary. 
Market participants who have clients are not restricted to simply transact for their clients. The SAFEX rules 
make provision for the market participants to actively manage the clients' investments. This may only be 
done, however, if the participant has a discretionary client agreement in place between itself and the client. 
The reporting requirements are subject to the same rules as the participant would be for normal client 
reporting activities. 
Members of SAFEX are subject to a code of Ethics. These are also established in the SAFEX rules. The 
broad underlying principle that the member must adhere to is: the member must not engage in any activity 
that could bring SAFEX into disrepute. A number of bad practices are identified as being not acceptable. 
These include price manipulation, cheating, defrauding, and the supplying of misleading information, 
dishonesty and the creating of fictitious trades. Advertising by the members is also regulated by the Ethics 
section of the SAFEX rules. Members are not allowed to advertise to the general public by only advertising 
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the potential for profit from futures trading without a statement warning of the possibility for loss. No 
statements are allowed to be made that suggest trading on SAFEX is appropriate for all individuals. 
The Ethics section of the SAFEX rules also govern the issue of insider trading. Members may not enter into 
trades if the member knows that the "information was obtained by virtue ofa relationship of trust or 
contract, whether or not the person is a party to that relationship, or through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, 
misrepresentation or any other wrongful method" (SAFEX Rules, 1999: 16-3). The information must also 
not be "generally available to the reasonable investor and includes information that some other person 
intends to trade in the exchange contract or a related exchange contract or the underlying instrument of the 
exchange contract or related exchange contract or any component of such underlying instrument on 
SAFEX or on any other exchange or market" (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 16-3). 
In the event of disciplinary hearings and investigations a set of procedures need to be followed by SAFEX. 
Disciplinary procedures come into action when a member fails to comply with the provisions of the rules. 
The first step involves an executive officer investigating the circumstances of the contravention. This will 
result in either the member being found innocent in which case the disciplinary procedures are terminated, 
or the member will be found guilty. On being found guilty, if the contravention is a minor offence the 
executive officer may issue a warning to the accused. If the contravention is not a minor offence the matter 
is referred to a disciplinary tribunal. This results in the accused being summonsed to a hearing where the 
evidence is heard before the disciplinary tribunal. The executive officer may suspend the member from 
trading for a period the officer deems necessary. On being found guilty the accused may be subject to the 
following penalties: a reprimand; a censure; a suspension; a termination of membership; a fine not 
exceeding one million Rands (to be paid into the Fidelity Fund) or the member being forced to terminate 
the employment ofa registered officer in the employ of the member. 
The details of the contravention, the findings and the penalty imposed must be published for the other 
members. The decisions of the tribunal are final unless provisions are made to appeal the findings to an 
appeal tribunal. 
A9.3.1.1 Fidelity Fund 
In accordance with the SAFEX rules, a Fidelity Fund has been set up to guarantee members' claims against 
one another. The fidelity fund is called the " SAFEX Fidelity Fund Trust" and has as its trustees the 
executive committee of SAFEX. The members contribute to the fidelity fund on the basis of the number of 
contracts they trade. The actual amount is determined by the trustees. The contributions are payable by the 
clearing members who are empowered to collect them from their respective clients for the trades entered 
into by their clients. 
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The funds within the Fidelity Fund are managed by the fund's trustees. The rules governing the 
management of the margin deposits by the clearing house also apply to the management of the Fidelity 
Fund. The fund itself is divided into two parts * a general fund and a member's fund. The member's fund is 
to settle claims of members against other members. In certain circumstances the settlement of this claim 
can be extended and paid out of the general fund. The general fund is for general claims and any claims 
made by non-members. 
A person may recover from the fidelity fund the amount of the outstanding liabilities of a member due to 
him arising out of dealings in fmancial instruments. This is provided the amount of the claim has been 
determined by way of arbitration and has become (mal and the award of the arbitrator has not been satisfied 
by the member. A clearing member or the clearing house shall be entitled to apply any such balance 
towards a claim by a person against a member and, if after the application of such balance, any part of the 
award remains unpaid, the trustees shan consider a payment from the fidelity fund (SAFEX Rules, 1999 : 
18-3). 
A9.3.1.2 Sa/com 
As part of the normal exchange activities SAFEX provides a clearing facility of all its trades through 
Safcom. Safcom is a wholly owned subsidiary of SAFEX. Safcom (Pty) Ltd (Safcom Clearing Company) 
provides clearing and margining facilities for SAFEX (Lambrechts, 1990 : 117). Safcom is a private 
company (not for profit) that administers and manages the clearing house. The actual clearing of the trades 
is done by the clearing members of the exchange as outlined in the rules. Safcom also provides SAFE X 
with compliance, surveillance and other exchange services (SAFEX, 1999 : 15). Safcom provides the 
service to both the agricultural and fmancial arms of SAFEX. 
SAFEX pays Safcom a management fee for the services it provides. This is the primary form of income 
other than the interest spread earned on the margin accounts it manages on behalf of SAFEX. This will 
usually not amount to anything as Safcom passes on all interest earned from the margin accounts to the 
margin account holders. This does differ, however, in the case of a loss, where Safcom will absorb this loss. 
An example of this occurred in 1999 when Safcom placed margin funds with a bank that was subsequently 
placed under curatorship. Safcom had to make good the losses. In this case SAFEX reimbursed Safcom for 
the losses made. Safcom also provides SAFEX with ATS (Automated Trading System). ATS is managed 
and maintained by Safcom, which developed ATS in house for SAFEX. As at the end of 1999 the number 
of clearing members who performed the clearing of the trades put through SAFEX was 7. These 7 members 
cleared the trades through the Safcom clearing company. 
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Safcom, according to Patrick Birley (2000), the Chief Executive of SAFEX has one of the lowest clearing 
costs in the world. This enables SAFEX to charge amongst the lowest transaction costs of the world's 
futures exchanges. It is important that Safcom performs its duties without any problems or delay. The 
clearing house serves to remove the credit risk from the transaction through the process of novation. One 
must remember, however, that the credit risk is not entirely removed, Safcom becomes the guarantor of the 
trade. For this reason the market has to have confidence in Safcom, from both a credit and operational 
perspective. The credit perspective is covered by the fact that the clearing members essentially 
"underwrite" the trades being cleared through Safcom. For this reason the credit risk profile of Safcom is 
the credit risk profile of the clearing members. It is for this reason that the requirements to become a 
clearing member are so onerous. The operational confidence is needed for market participants to ensure 
that they can rely on trades being cleared and recorded correctly. The goals of Safcom are thus to "provide 
its services to the members of SAFEX as efficiently and economically as possible" (Lambrechts, 1990 : 
1I7). Safcom thus plays an important role in the successful functioning of the market. 
A9.3.2 Legislation 
Besides the SAFEX rules, the only other piece oflegislation governing the futures market is the Financial 
Markets Control Act of 1989. This ignores other non specific pieces oflegislation such as the labour 
legislation. This piece of legislation directly refers to the definition of a futures contract and thus governs 
the futures market in South Africa. 
A9.3.2.1 The Financial Markets Control Act 1989 
The fmancial markets control act 55 of 1989 (the act) governs exchanges. Specifically it is the governing 
legislation over the South African Futures Exchange. The act defmes a number of key fmancial terms. 
These can be seen in table A4.3 below. The act defines the controlling body of exchanges in South Africa. 
The controlling body is made up of a registrar and deputy registrar of financial markets as well as a 
financial markets advisory board. The individuals who fill these posts are appointed by the Finance 
Minister. 
Table A9.3 - Definition of Key Financial Terms According to the Financial Markets Control 
Act 
Term Definition 
Clearing house in relation to a financial exchange, means a body corporate or unincorporated 
association providing services or facilities in respect of the buying and selling 























of financial instruments on the financial market in question; 
means an association contemplated in section 7 to which a financial market 
license has been issued; 
means:-
(a) a futures contract; 
(b) an option contract; 
(c) loan stock; or 
(d) any other instrument declared by the Registrar by notice in the 
Government Gazette to be a fmancial instrument; 
means any person who is a member of a fmancial exchange, but not a financial I 
instrument trader, and who is authorised in terms of the rules thereof to carry • 
on the business of buying and selling listed financial instruments on his own 
account; 
means any person who is a member of a fmancial exchange and is authorised 
in terms of the rules thereof to carryon the business of buying and selling 
listed fmancial instruments on behalf of other persons or on his own account; 
means a market for the carrying on of the business of buying and selling 
financial instruments, taking place:-
(a) on an exchange or at any other place; or 
(b) by means of any system or facility; 
means a standardised contract the effect of which is that:-
(a) a person agrees to deliver to or receive from another person a certain 
quantity of corporeal or incorporeal things on a future date at a pre-
arranged price; or 
(b) a person will pay to or receive from another person an amount of 
money on a future date according to whether the pre-arranged value or 
price of an asset, index as referred to in the defmition of "securities" 
in section 1 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act No.1 of 
1985), currency, rate of interest or any other factor is higher or lower 
on that future date than the pre-arranged value or price; 
means financial instruments included in the list offmancial instruments kept by 
an executive committee in terms of section 14; 
means a standardised contract the effect of which is that a person acquires the 
option 
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(a) to buy from or sell to another person a certain quantity of 
corporeal or incorporeal things before or on a future date at a 
pre-arranged price; or 
(b) that an amount of money will be paid to or received from another 
person before or on a future date according to whether the pre-
arranged value or price of an asset, index as referred to in the 
definition of "securities" in section 1 of the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act, 1985 (Act No.1 of 1985), currency, rate of interest 
or any other factor is higher or lower before or on that future 
date than the pre-arranged value or price; 
Standardised contract means a contract that complies with the formal requirements applying on a 
financial market to a contract of the kind in question and in respect of which 
dealings take place on that market; 
(Source: Fmanclal Markets Control Act, 1999 : 6 to 9) 
The Financial Markets Advisory Board (the board) is empowered by the act to perform various functions. 
This includes any investigations that may need to be performed by the Registrar concerning financial 
markets. In this case the board is empowered to investigate and report on its findings to the registrar as well 
as make recommendations on the investigation. With regards to the administrative issues concerning the 
board, these are the responsibility of the registrar. The advisory board is empowered to appoint sub 
committees to achieve its goals. 
The act seeks to regulate the buying and selling of financial instruments (as defined above) and the business 
of being a fmancial market. The overriding rule is that no person may carryon the business of a financial 
market without a license. More specifically this means that no person may engage in the business of buying 
and selling of unlisted or listed financial instruments (whether it be on that individual's own behalf or on 
behalf of other people) unless the following requirements are met. The individual is a financial instrument 
trader or works through a financial instrument trader. The term financial instrument trader is defined in 
table A4.3 above. The registrar determines an individual to be carrying on the business of buying and 
selling fmancial instruments as contemplated above if that person does so as a regular feature of his or her 
business. The registrar also determines this to be the case if "he holds himself out as a person who carries 
on the business of buying and selling financial instruments" (Financial Markets Control Act 1999: 11). As 
part of this restriction to deal in securities the act also restricts individuals to manage investments on behalf 
of others unless the manager is approved by the registrar. 
The act regulates the procedure for applying for a license to run an exchange. Briefly, ten or more people 
can carryon the business of an exchange and must apply to the registrar for a license for the exchange. The 
application must be made in a manner prescribed by the registrar, a fee must accompany the application 
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along with the proposed rules of the exchange. As part of the application procedures the registrar will 
advertise the application for the exchange in the national newspapers. 
In issuing the license the registrar has to ensure the association has sufficient flnancial resources to carry on 
the business of an exchange. This includes having sufflcient resources to meet the day-to-day requirements 
imposed on the exchange by the registrar. The proposed rules of the exchange will have to comply with the 
act and the interests of the public would have to be served by the issuance of the license. To ensure the 
market is sustainable the exchange will have to comprise of at least ten members who will carry on the 
business of being buyers and sellers on the exchange. 
Once the license has been issued it will expire on the 31 st December of each year to be renewed the 
following year. As part of this renewal process there will be a renewal fee. The registrar may refuse to 
renew the license if the registrar is of the opinion the rules of the exchange were not properly enforced 
during the previous year. The registrar may also choose not to renew the license if the fInancial exchange 
not complying with the act. Along with being allowed to refuse renewal of a license the registrar is 
empowered by the act to cancel or suspend a license. The three primary reasons for this are if the exchange 
is carrying on business that is not in the public interest, the license was obtained fraudulently, or the 
exchange has ceased the business of being a financial market. Once the license has been issued the 
fmancial exchange takes on a juristic personality such as a company would which enables it to be sue or be 
sued. 
As part of the license granting procedures, the registrar will assess the fmancial standing of the exchange. 
The registrar to empowered by the act to require the members of the exchange to contribute funds to the 
exchange to allow it to carryon the business of being a financial exchange. In the case where the exchange 
has surplus assets it is allowed to distribute this to the members under certain conditions decided by the 
registrar. Before the registrar can rule on whether the surplus may be transferred to the members the surplus 
must first be net of any liabilities. Once this has been established, the members must approve the 
disbursement in terms of the written constitution of the exchange. It is at this stage that the registrar can 
decide to distribute the surplus to the members. Another way of accessing the surplus is where the 
exchange is dissolved. 
With regards the instruments, the executive committee of the Financial Markets Advisory board must 
maintain a register of the instruments that are allowed to be traded on the exchange. No dealings may take 
place in instruments that are not on this list. The executive committee also reserves the right to remove 
instruments from the list if it sees flt to do so. In removing a financial instrument the committee must allow 
the exchange to make representations defending the listing of the instrument. 
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Each exchange must have a set of rules and an executive committee to manage it. The rules must include 
parameters on how delivery and settlement should take place, how members are to deal in the fmancial 
instruments and how they disclose their dealings. The way in which credit is granted by a member to a 
client as well as the types of individuals the exchange should allow to become members need to be defined 
in the rules. 
The rules need to outline how one is able to become a member and must set out the expected qualifications 
an individual needs to have in order to achieve this. On becoming a member the disciplinary procedures are 
also necessary in terms of the act and should form part of the rules as well. The act also requires the rules to 
make provisions for a fidelity type fund such as in the case of SAFEX, 
The day-to-day activities of members are also required to be established in the rules, by the act. This 
includes the way in which a trader must separate clients' funds from his or her own. This is further 
expanded to include the manner in which fees are charged and advertising takes place by the different 
members. A key feature of the act's requirements regarding the rules is that the rules should take into 
account the public interest in all the dealings of the exchange. 
The exchange must establish a board to hear appeals. The appeals that are to be heard are appeals against 
the executive committee of the Financial Markets Advisory Board. This is primarily for the case where the 
exchange's executive committee rejects an application for membership, terminates a membership, imposes 
a penalty, includes or removes fmancial instruments from the active list that are traded. The board may 
decide on whether it is able to hear the appeal and whether the appeal should be granted or not. Once the 
board has decided on an appeal, the decision will be binding upon the executive committee of the exchange 
and shall be deemed to have come from the executive committee. 
The act outlaws false trading and market manipulation. This includes direct and indirect action and 
fictitious and artificial transactions, where the intended effect is to create artificial prices, fluctuations, or 
maintain, inflate or depress prices. The act widens its scope to include the making of false statements and 
disseminating of false information to induce other individuals to trade on the basis of the statements or 
information, or create artificial prices. 
Individuals are not allowed to advertise the transacting on an exchange that has not been approved by the 
registrar in terms on the act. This includes foreign-based exchanges and would include foreign-based 
futures exchanges. As part of these advertising requirements no one is allowed to fraudulently induce 
individuals to engage in the trade offmancial instruments. This includes the making of statements that 
contain forecasts that are known to be false or misleading and the withholding or concealment of 
information that would be material to the decision of whether or not to engage in trading. 











The act makes provisions for the case where an individual contravenes the rules of an exchange. In this 
case the individual may be liable for damages suffered by another who has suffered as a result of the 
contravention. This is explicitly the case in the above situation where an individual is falsely induced into 
engaging in trading on the exchange. The damages are limited, however, to twice the amount the 
contravening individual gained from the infringement. 
With regards public notices affecting the instruments listed on the exchange, no person may circulate news 
that may affect the price of the instrument unless that person's name accompanies the announcement. IN the 
case where the announcement is based on information that has been disclosed the source of the information 
must be disclosed with the announcement. 
In the case where the registrar detects undesirable practices the registrar is empowered to require the 
exchange to begin voluntary winding up procedures, or direct the exchange, the clearing house, or a 
member to refrain from continuing with the undesirable practice. In the case where the exchange wishes to 
dissolve voluntarily, the act governs the manner in which this should be done. An alternative course of 
action is to obtain a court order ordering the winding up of the fmancial exchange. The court order may be 
brought by either the exchange itself, a member, a creditor, the registrar, or a judicial manager. 
The act's scope governs more than SAFEX. However, its provisions apply to SAFEX. SAFEX's rules 
comply with the requirements of the act. The detailed nature of SAFEX's rules ensure there is little need to 
rely on the Financial Markets Control Act for guidance. The act is thus only brought into consideration 
when the relationship between the different parties and SAFEX is concerned. After the review of SAFEX's 
rules in the earlier part of the chapter, one can see that they take into consideration all the issues raised in 
the act. Other than the non-specific legislation governing areas such as labour relations, the SAFEX rules 
and the Financial Markets Control Act are the only areas of compliance when one is looking to participate 
in SAFEX. As most of the provisions of the act govern the running of an exchange and not necessarily the 
individual rules and regulations of each exchange, the primary area of compliance that a market participant 
should be concerned with is compliance with the SAFEX rules. Further to this would be any special 
regulatory notices issued to market participants by SAFEX. 
A9.3.3 External Bodies 
The only external regulatory bodies to SAFEX are the Financial Markets Advisory Board and the Financial 
Services Board. As mentioned above the Financial Markets Advisory Board is a body that does not only 
cover SAFEX, but all exchanges approved by the registrar. The reasoning behind the board is that it is 
supposed to assist the fmance minister and the registrar in their policy-making duties (Lambrechts, 1990 : 
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108). According to Lambrechts (1990 : 108) the board has the added responsibility (over those dictated in 
the Financial Markets Control Act) to create a research center to study market developments both locally 
and overseas as well as coordinate developments between different financial sectors under their 
supervision. 
Like the Financial Markets Advisory Board, the Financial Services Board (FSB) overseas financial 
exchanges (both the stock, futures and bond exchanges). The fmancial markets department within the FSB 
has a mission of "Striving to ensure sound and efficient markets and related services for the exchange of 
relevant securities and financial instruments, together with mechanisms for investor protection." (FSB, 
2000, mission.html). It vision is "To be a professional and efficient regulator and supervisor of financial 
markets and related services. " (FSB, 2000, mission.html). The difference between the FSB and the 
Financial Markets Advisory Board is the focus of the regulation. The FSB is not focused on the day-to-day 
activities of exchanges; it is focused on investor protection. It is for this reason that the FSB has a scope 
wider than the fmancial markets and covers insurance companies, pensions and unit trusts as well. 
The FSB regulates the granting of approval to become investment managers and marketing of ones services 
within South Africa in the area of financial markets. In this area the FSB implements the rules defmed by 
the Financial Markets Control Act regarding these issues. The FSB also administers the collection of the 
fees payable in terms of the Financial Markets Control act. In this regard the FSB is not another regulatory 
body but a facilitator of the rules outlined in the Financial Markets Control Act. The fmancial services 
board was established as" in terms of the Financial Services Board Act, 1990, to exercise supervision over 
the business offmancial institutions." (FSB, 2000, mission.html). 
A9.3.4 Conclusion. 
The goal of a futures exchange should be to provide liquidity, transparency and accessibility (Young & 
Theys, 1999 : 20) and deliver this using a secure and cheap delivery mechanism. According to Lambrechts 
(1990, Ill) the goals of the clearing house should be to match buy and sell trades, assure the fmancial 
integrity of the contracts traded and provide the necessary mechanism for delivery. Through the course of 
this chapter one can see that through regulatory efforts and the efforts of SAFE X itself the above goals 
have been achieved or have structures put in place, which allow for them to be achieved. 
In the case of liquidity, the only way this can be ensured is if SAFEX actively intervenes in the market to 
ensure the instruments are traded. This is not prevalent amongst the world's futures exchanges. What 
SAFEX can do is put in place structures that ensure liquidity. This is provided by mechanisms such as the 
automated trading system that allows for immediate and efficient price discovery that will allow for more 
advanced trading strategies such as arbitrage that rely on this. 
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Liquidity is further provided by the main market participants who are active in the market. This is further 
enforced in the act that requires at least 10 members to provide both buy and sell quotations in the market. 
Finally, liquidity is helped through the existence of an efficient clearing house. This creates confidence in 
the market by allowing the participants to rely on the fact that trades entered into will be settled timeously 
and accurately. This confidence, in turn, will have a positive impact on market liquidity as it will encourage 
more trades. 
Accessibility is provided by a combination of the SAFEX rules and the Financial Markets Control Act. 
Both of these documents outline the requirements of becoming a member of the exchange and how one can 
engage in trading on SAFEX. As the rules have been outlined clearly, compliance with them becomes 
easier to achieve. This, in turn, increases accessibility. The rules and the act are explicit in how one may 
become a member of the exchange - this makes the requirements clear. Whether the requirements are 
biased and exclusionary is a different matter. In the case of SAFEX, this can be tested by comparing the 
requirements of becoming a member of another significant futures exchange with the requirements of 
becoming a member of SAFEX. According to Kolb (1997, 4) the Chicago Board of Trade is the oldest and 
largest futures exchange and it requires members to purchase seats on the exchange. The way in which 
these seats are bought and sold are similar to the methodology the SAFEX regulations outline. The 
requirements to become a member of the exchange are similar between the Chicago Board of Trade and 
SAFEX. 
Accessibility does not only revolve around the membership requirements of an exchange, it includes the 
ability to trade. In this regard the comparison needs to be drawn between the rules and the margin 
requirements of SAFEX and the Chicago Board of Trade. In terms of the SAFEX rules any member of the 
public can trade through a broker if they meet the credit requirements of the broker and were not falsely 
induced to trade futures. They are able to trade directly (i.e. not through a broker) if they become a member 
of the exchange and pass the prerequisite exams. A similar situation exists at the Chicago Board of Trade. 
The margining system devised by SAFEX is based, in part, on the margining system employed by the 
Chicago Board of Trade. SAFEX determines the margins that are dependant on the underlying spot 
instrument and the contract specifications, to which each broker adds their own required margin. This 
depends on the creditworthiness of the market participant applying for an account to trade futures. 
According to Kolb (1997: 4), this is the same as the margining system employed by the Chicago Board of 
Trade. One could conclude from this that as the accessibility to SAFEX is similar to that of the Chicago 
Board of Trade, SAFEX is an accessible futures exchange. 










Appendices Page 256 
Transparency, according to Young & Theys (1999 : 20) is the third key element of a successful exchange. 
This is achieved, as in the case of liquidity, through a combination of the SAFEX rules and the Automated 
Trading System. The rules ensure transparency by specifically disallowing market manipulation that 
includes the withholding of information and insider trading (which would be based on information not 
distributed to the general public). The rules and the Financial Markets Control Act provide for penalties in 
the event this rule is contravened. 
The ATS increases transparency by allowing for a real time feed of market data and bids and offers. This 
allows participants to determine the market levels and current trading prices. The making available of the 
real time market data ensures that market participants are able to make informed decisions based on the 
current state of the market. Unlike in the case of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), there is little 
evidence of the real time SAFEX market data being made available to the general public through popular 
mediums such as fmancial web sites. In the case of the JSE, equity prices are made available on line 
through on line brokers, financial web sites and, on occasion, through the web sites of the listed companies 
themselves. This does point to lower market transparency, however, SAFEX does not wish to entice 
participants into the market who do not understand futures due to the possible loss they may face and thus 
the level of transparency is set to cater to the needs of specialist market participants. This attitude of 
SAFEX can be seen throughout the SAFEX rules as well as through the Financial Markets Control Act. In 
light of this attitude one can conclude the transparency is adequate. Transparency is provided to the general 
public through publications as the Business Day, however, this is not real time data and would not be 
sufficient for an active futures trader. 
The requirements of Young & Theys for a successful market have been met in the case of SAFEX. The 
roles outlined by Lambrechts (1990, 111) are also met; as described above, the first role of a futures 
exchange is to match trades. The ATS system does exactly this; trades are matched on a real time basis. For 
trades concluded outside the ATS, there is an elaborate set of rules governing them (see above - Rules of 
SAFEX). In this case the exchange does not actively match the trades but allows the match to take place 
and records the match and deals with the post trade management. 
The second role of the exchange (according to Lambrechts 1990: 111) - to assure financial integrity is 
covered by the SAFEX rules and the Financial Markets Control Act. The integrity issue is broad and covers 
the actual integrity of the trade to the integrity of the market participants. The integrity of the trade is taken 
care of by the ATS. ATS, in conjunction with the clearing house, ensures each trade is successfully 
processed. thereby achieving integrity. The integrity of the market is covered by the rules such as the anti 
market manipulation rule mentioned above. The integrity of the market participants is achieved by 
requiring them to conform to the ethics section of the rules. 
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The final role of an exchange - to provide a mechanism for delivery - is provided by Safcom and the 
clearing house of SAFEX. In this case delivery must be considered as both the settlement of the trades and 
the delivery of any necessary cash. Safcom undertakes this delivery. In the case of the cash, the margin 
mechanism ensures that any cash that needs to be delivered against any contract will be. The final 
settlement of the positions is also undertaken by Safcom through the clearing members who each have the 
fmancial resources to ensure all trades are settled. The platform for this is provided by a combination of the 
SAFEX rules and the Financial Markets Control Act. 
In conclusion, the act and the SAFEX rules ensure an efficient exchange that allows the market to operate 
normally, Both the act and the rules need bodies to enforce them. This is done by the Financial Services 
Board in the case of the act and the SAFEX executive in the case of the SAFEX rules. Without these two 
documents and their respective enforcement bodies the efficient functioning of SAFEX could be 
jeopardised. 
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Appendix 9.4 - Discussion of the development of tbe ARCH model 
ARCH takes into account the time effect and long-term trends in variance. The next step is to look closer at 
the actual weighting of the data. This leads on to the next model: exponentially weighted moving average 
(EWMA). In this case the individual weights that are assigned to the observations decrease exponentially as 
the data points move backward through time. This can be represented as follows: 
(22) 
Where: 
a constant between zero and one. 
Applying this to formula 17 above and separating tOdaY's volatility, the following formula results: 
(23) 
This allows one to estimate today's volatility from the previous day's volatility and the most recent 
observation of the changes in the returns from the instrument (or market variable). This equation was 
constructed by substituting the original volatility estimate (formula 17) with the volatility estimate from the 
previous day added to the market variable for the current day, with both being adjusted respectively for 
their weightings. If one repeats the substitution for the previous day b y substituting it for the day before 
( 0';_2)' the following formula results: 
This type of substitution can be repeated until a pattern emerges. The resultant formula is as follows: 
m 
0'; = (1- A)LA/:1U;_i + AmO'; (25) 
i=1 
According to Hull (1999, 371) the above formula can be simplified even further: for large m, the term 
Am O'g is sufficiently small to be ignored so that equation 23 becomes the same as equation 17 with 
(1 - A )AH = at. This means that the Uj IS decline at a rate orA as one moves back through time. Each 
weight becomes J... times the previous weight. This result is called the EWMA model and can be used to 











estimate today's variance using only the previous day's variance estimate and the most recent observation of 
the movement in the market variable. This can be illustrated by the following example in table A9.4: 
Table A9.4 - Example ofthe Exponentially Weighted Moving Average Model. 
Suppose that A is 0.9, the volatility estimated from the previous day (n-1) is 1 % per day and 
the proportional change in the market variable during the previous day (n-1) is 2%. This 
means that 0";_1 = 0.012 = 0.0001 and U :-1 = 0.022 = 0.0004. Equation 23 gives the 
following result: 
0"; = 0.9 X 0.0001 + 0.1 X 0.0004 = 0.00013 
The estimate of the volatility for dayn. O"n' is therefore. ",,0.00013 or 1.14% per day. Note 
that the expected value of U;_1 is 0";_1 or 0.0001. In this example, the realised value of 
U;_1 is greater than the expected value, and as a result, the volatility estimate increases. If the 
realised value of U;_I had been less than its expected value, the estimate of the volatility 
would have decreased. 
Source (Hull, 1999 : 371) 
The EWMA formula allows one to track changes in volatility. If there is a big movement in the market 
variable on the previous day (n-l) so that U :-1 is large, one will note an increase in volatility. The variable 
A governs how sensitive the volatility is to the most recent observations of the market variable. A low value 
orA leads to a higher weighting being given to the market variable. A high value orA produces estimates of 
the daily volatility that responds slowly to new information on the market variables. (Hull, 1999 : 372). 
One should note that the above EWMA formula does not take into account any weighting being given to 
the long run average variance. By adding this to the equation one gets a new model called GARCH -
General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. GARCH was first introduced by Bollerslev in 1986 
(Engle, 1995 : 42). It expands on the EWMA model by bringing long run variance into the equation. The 
EWMA model is a specific form of the GARCH model, this can be seen in the series of equations below. 
The equation for GARCH (1,1) is: 
(26) 
















the weight assigned to V. 
the long run variance rate. 
the weight assigned to u ;-1 . 
the weight assigned to 0";_1' 




To derive the EWMA model from the GARCH model one needs to set'Y = 0, a = 1 • Ie and ~ = }y. The 
notation (1,1) in the GARCH model refers to the data being used to estimate the volatility. The (l,l) 
indicates that 0":_1 is the most recent observation ofu2 and the most recent estimate of the variance rate. 
The more general GARCH (p,q) model calculates the 0"; from the most recentp observations on u2 and 
the most recent q estimates of the variance rate. (Hull, 1999 : 372). According to Hull (1999: 372) 
GARCH (1,1) is the most popular of the GARCH models. Similar to equation 21, the GARCH model can 
be rewritten as follows: 
(28) 
This is the form of the model that is usually used to estimate the parameters. The process is to first estimate 
the parameters (0, a and ~. Once this has been done'Y can be derived as follows: 1 • a. - ~. Upon deriving y, 
the long-term variance can be calculated by performing the following calculation: rr. According to Hull 
(1999 : 373), in order for the weight to be applied to the long term variance to be positive and hence a 
stable GARCH (1,1) process, the following is required: a + ~ < 1. If this is not the case the weighting that 
will be applied to the long-term variance will be negative. The application of the GARCH(l,I) model can 
best be seen on the following example in table A9.5 below: 
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Table A9.5 - Example of the GARCH (1,1) ModeL 
Suppose the GARCH (1.1) model is estimated from daily data as: 
0'; = 0.000002 + O.13u;_1 + 0.860'=-1 
This corresponds to a = 0.13, P = 0.86 and ro = 0.000002. Because y = 1 - a - p, it follows that 
y 0.01. Because ro = 'IV, it follows that V= 0.0002. In other words, the long run average 
variance per day implied by the model is 0.0002. This corresponds to a volatility of 
.J0.0002 = 0.014or 1.4% per day. 
Suppose that the estimate and the volatility on day n - I is 1.6% per day so that 0';_1 = 0.0162 
= 0.000256 and that the proportional change in the market variable on day n - 1 is 1 % so that 
U:_1 0.012 0.0001. Then: 
0'; =0.000002 + O.l3x 0.0001 + 0.86x 0.000256 = 0.00023516 
The new estimate of the volatility is therefore .J0.00023516 = 0.01530r 1.53% per day. 
Source: Hull (1999: 373). 
As was done to formula 23, one can undertake a substitution process with the GARCH formula. Taking 
equation 28 as a starting point, one can substitute 0';_1 with the previous day's GARCH equation: 
(29) 
One can continue this substitution process by substituting the 0';-2 in the previous day's GARCH equation 
for OJ + au ;-3 + PO';_3 . If one continues this process an infinite number of times the u ;-1 term becomes 
affected as follows. The weight that is applied to it becomes «pH. The weight thus declines at an 
exponential rate p. Comparing this to the EWMA model the GARCH P parameter is similar to the EWMA's 
A parameter. The p parameter determines the sensitivity of the GARCH volatility estimate to the u terms. If 
one had the situation where P was set at 0.8, u ;-2 is only 80% as important as U ;-1 and U ;-3 is only 64% 
as U ;-1' In this case U ;-3 is only 80% as important as U ;-2 . 
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The GARCH (1,1) model is similar to the EWMA model in that it takes into account the exponential decay 
of the importance of individual variance observations over time, in the estimation of current variance. The 
difference lies in the fact that the GARCH (1,1) model explicitly takes long run volatility trends into 
account, where the EWMA model does not. 
Hull (1999 : 374) is of the opinion that the GARCH (1,1) model is the theoretically more appealing model 
if one has to decide between using it or the EWMA model. This is because the GARCH (1,1) model takes 
into account long run volatility estimates, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, variance exhibits mean 
reversion, which is brought into account through the inclusion of the long run average volatility parameter. 
For the purposes of the thesis the GARCH (1,1) model will be used in determining the advanced volatility 
estimates. The ARCH model and the traditional model will be used to show the difference in determining 
volatility when not taking into account the exponential decay of the effect of earlier observations and the 
long run average volatility level. With regards the GARCH (1,1) model, work needs to be done on the 
estimation of the different weightings of the variables. The theory behind this will be dealt with chapter 7 
and the actual measurement of the weightings will be done in chapter 9. 
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